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This study investigates the renegotiation of security alliances, specifically the 
structural conditions surrounding their revision. Although the field of international 
relations offers a rich discussion of the formation and violation of alliance treaties, few 
scholars have addressed the reasons why alliance members amend security obligations. 
After the formation of an alliance, a member may become dissatisfied owing to changes 
in the external and domestic security environments. A failure to address this discontent 
increases the risk of alliance breakdown. Members manage their alliance relationship 
through a negotiation process or intra-alliance bargaining in the search for a new 
arrangement that can endure. Factors that help to show commitment to the alliance and 
communicate a set of feasible solutions are crucial if members are to find a mutually 
acceptable arrangement. By taking these factors into account, allies are more likely to 
revise an existing treaty. Examining a set of bilateral alliances dating from 1945 to 
2001, this research demonstrates that public requests for renegotiation compel allies to 
  
change the status quo. It is found that alliance-related fixed assets and the formation of 
external alliances increase the likelihood of treaty revision, though institutionalization 
of an alliance does not help to resolve interest divergence. In addition, this study 
examines the strategy of delay in intra-alliance bargaining. Allies may postpone a 
dispute by ignoring it while working to maintain the alliance. Tension among allies 
thus increases, but the alliance endures.  
 I examine three alliances in order to illustrate this renegotiation process. Among 
these, the Anglo-Japanese alliance demonstrates two successful renegotiations that 
prolonged a wavering alliance relationship; the Sino-Soviet alliance is an example of 
failure owing to the lack of substantive cooperation; and the US-Taiwan alliance during 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
In September 2012, the Japanese government decided to take a step forward in the 
dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by nationalizing them. 1  Japan’s move 
immediately raised diplomatic tensions with China and Taiwan, which also claimed 
sovereignty over these islands. The pressure from China was particularly intense. 
Beijing blamed Japan for “stealing” the islands and vowed to take action to defend its 
own claim.2 Chinese research vessels sailed past Japanese patrols and attempted to 
approach the islands, and in February 2013 a Chinese naval vessel locked on to a 
Japanese patrol boat with its targeting radar.3  
Being Japan’s most important ally, the US was also drawn into this dispute. In 
fact, Japan’s insistence on nationalization placed the US in a difficult position. The US-
Japan alliance treaty did not specify a defense obligation regarding the Senkaku Islands. 
While it was in its interest to stand by Japan, the US was reluctant to intervene in any 
militarized conflict between China and Japan. In other words, Japan initiated a 
diplomatic move that was inconsistent with the interests of its ally, which meant that 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute constituted an unexpected occurrence in an otherwise solid 
                                                 
1 The Japanese government’s decision was prompted by right-wing politician Shintaro Ishihara, then the 
governor of Tokyo, who called for the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to purchase the disputed 
Senkaku Islands. The Japanese government, fearing that Ishihara’s initiative would further antagonize 
neighboring countries, decided to act first by nationalizing the islands. 
2 “China Accuses Japan of Stealing After Purchase of Group of Disputed Islands,” New York Times, 
September 11, 2012. 




alliance relationship. So it was that the US quickly became involved and was forced to 
mediate between Japan and China.  
Events like the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute occur from time to time in all alliance 
relationship. Changes in a member’s security needs can create dissatisfaction with the 
security benefits provided for in the alliance treaty, as a result of which the member 
may take actions that affect the interests of other members, so that the allies must find 
a way to manage their disagreements. During the 1956 Suez Crisis, for example, Britain 
and France supported Israel’s invasion of Egypt, but quickly called off military 
operations under pressure from the US, and Israel withdrew from Sinai after few 
months, thus restoring the status quo. The US was able to make a clear demand of its 
allies, one that kept them from provoking Nasser and his key ally, the Soviet Union. 
As in the Senkaku dispute, the members of the alliance were able to coordinate their 
interests successfully: Britain and France understood that the US would not support 
their overseas expansion. In these cases, alliance relationships were maintained or even 
strengthened during periods of discord between allies.4  
An alliance treaty is a commitment to mutual cooperation; alliance institutions 
may also provide channels to reconcile differences. In theory, allies should be able to 
resolve their disputes by seeking ways to accommodate dissatisfaction and adjusting 
existing security cooperation to meet the evolving security interests of members (T. 
Kim, 2011). Renegotiating an alliance treaty is thus an important way for allies to 
respond to tensions that arise in regard to such issues as security cooperation. The 
                                                 
4 Similar cases include: the collapse after only three months of an agreement between Syria and Libya 
owing to disagreement about the design of a “single state” and the alliance among Guatemala, Honduras, 




Russo-Japanese War, for instance, was on the verge of ending when Britain and Japan 
decided to renew their alliance in 1905. Japan’s impending victory eliminated Britain’s 
concern over a Russian advance in Manchuria while at the same time increasing British 
apprehension about Japan’s intentions in China. As a result, Britain and Japan agreed 
to place greater restrictions on their defense commitment. While in this example Britain 
and Japan scaled back their treaty obligations, other revisions to treaties expand alliance 
functions. For instance, when the defense treaty between East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia that was signed in 1967 was expanded ten years later, comprehensive 
defense provisions and a new consultation provision helped to consolidate the alliance 
between the two states.  
Renegotiation among allies, however, is not always successful. A member that 
distrusts the reliability of one or more other members may decide to withdraw from an 
alliance. The shared security interest during the formation of an alliance does not 
necessarily help to prevent or ameliorate the divergence of interests. Even alliance 
members that want to maintain an alliance may fail. Early in the Cold War, for example, 
the Soviet Union tried to constrain China’s aggression toward Taiwan by limiting its 
access to high-tech weaponry at a time when China was eager to develop ballistic 
missiles and nuclear weaponry. In this case, the Soviets’ efforts did not strengthen 
alliance cohesion but rather aggravated distrust between the fellow communist nations.  
These examples illustrate that security cooperation between allies is potentially 
unstable when circumstances change, and that successful renegotiation is not a given. 




emerge when external or domestic political conditions change or when differences that 
have been set aside later become impossible to ignore. 
This dissertation explores the reasons why some allies successfully renegotiate their 
differences and others do not or, more specifically, why some treaties are able to be 
revised but others fall apart. The Soviets’ concern regarding China’s ambitions in the 
Taiwan Strait was similar to the US’s concern about the ambitions of Britain and France 
regarding the Suez Canal. China might have provoked a conflict with the US; Britain 
and France might have entrapped the US in a conflict with the Soviets. In the course of 
both crises, alliance members tried to persuade their partners not to alter the status quo, 
but the outcomes were quite different. One explanation could be that Mao was 
ideologically radicalized and that Eden faced strong domestic pressure to halt military 
operations, but alliance politics certainly played a key role. The Soviets and the US 
both wanted to restrain their allies. This dissertation addresses reasons why these efforts 
had completely different outcomes, and in particular what the Soviets could have done 
to halt Mao’s military adventure in Taiwan Strait and whether they missed the 
opportunity to build an enduring Sino-Soviet relationship.  
Further, even though a provocative action may compromise an alliance relationship, 
states sometimes repeatedly make such actions. North Korea is an obvious example, 
provoking nuclear crises as it does again and again despite China’s concerns.5 Recently, 
China has become impatient with Kim Jong-un’s nuclear adventures, but the latter 
seems unconcerned about whether this loyal ally will continue to support his regime in 
                                                 
5 China did not criticize the nuclear program in public until late 2015, after North Korea’s third nuclear 




the face of more provocative moves.6 The DPRK might be expected to wonder whether 
China’s 2016 decision to cooperate with the US in drafting a new UN sanction 
regarding North Korea means that China’s commitment to the alliance is becoming 
unreliable, and under what conditions China would change its position and turn against 
Kim’s nuclear diplomacy.  
In order to answer these questions, I will investigate how alliance members manage 
their disagreements through renegotiation. An exploration of renegotiation clarifies 
how alliance members manage their quarrels, a process that involves give–and–take 
bargaining over a range of solutions and that I term “intra-alliance bargaining.” 
Highlighting this dynamic illuminates the alliance relationship. Members of an alliance 
may want to uphold it, or they may find that their friendship is less solid than they had 
thought it to be. Failure to reach a bargain increases the risk of alliance termination. 
Alliance treaty revision is a typical means through which members resolve their 
differences. A successful renegotiation establishes a formal arrangement to regulate the 
new security obligations. This achievement requires that members revisit the existing 
treaty and revise its content. Treaty revision is, however, a relatively unexplored 
question in the field of alliance politics. As shown in Table 1.1, in their investigation 
of alliance termination, Leeds and Savun (2007) find that about 25% of bilateral 
alliance treaties have terminated through treaty revision. The fact that many treaties are 
revised, some multiple times, suggests that alliance members frequently reevaluate 
                                                 
6 Another curious case is North Korea’s shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, which is occupied by South 
Korea, in 2010, which might have provoked war between the Koreas. It is commonly assumed that North 
Korea initiated the crisis for domestic reasons, but such an action might have been expected to raise 
China’s concern about finding itself entrapped, which raises the question of why the North Korean 




their relationships and revise their treaties accordingly. Alliance members thus do not 
abandon an alliance immediately when they become dissatisfied with a treaty, 
particularly when it fails to meet their security needs; rather, they negotiate with their 
allies and modify their treaty to accommodate mutual interests. 













Number of Cases 105 47 33 75 44 304 
(% of total) (34%) (16%) (11%) (25%) (15%)  
Mean Duration in 3227 2900 4071 5237 excluded from 3389 
Days (Years) (8.8) (7.9) (11.2) (14.3) calculation (9.3) 
Source: Leeds and Savun 2007 “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?” The 




 In sum, alliances are born in different ways. Alliance treaties regulate several 
different types of security relationship, but how a treaty is written does not necessarily 
determine its fate, since provisions can be subject to revision when necessary. This 
dissertation will advance the understanding of alliance renegotiation by investigating 
how members manage their differences. In the following chapters, I make clear the 
conditions under which alliance members renegotiate their relationships.  
Plan of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 elaborates the theory of alliance renegotiation. I review the literature on 
alliance politics and discuss the lack of attention to alliance management. I then 
examine the renegotiation dynamic among allies, a process that I have termed “intra-
alliance bargaining,” and introduce the concepts that facilitate renegotiation and present 
                                                 
7 This table reports only bilateral alliance treaties. The ATOP dataset records a total of 105 out of 648 




relevant hypotheses. Chapter 3 presents a large-N empirical test designed to examine 
bilateral alliance treaties from 1945 to 2001 using statistical techniques. I then explore 
the implications of the statistical results. The following three chapters discuss three 
cases that demonstrate the mechanisms presented in the preceding chapter. Chapter 4 
examines the two successful treaty revisions of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Chapter 5 
discusses the Sino-Soviet alliance and its failure from the perspective of alliance 
renegotiation. Chapter 6 focuses on the last 10 years of the US-Taiwan alliance in order 
to illustrate the strategy of delay as an alternative means to preserve an alliance by 
avoiding a clear resolution of interest divergence between allies. Chapter 7 summarizes 





Chapter 2 Theory of Alliance Renegotiation 
In this chapter, I develop a theory to explain the causes and consequences of 
alliance renegotiation. Alliance renegotiation is a process whereby allies discuss and 
negotiate their differences. This chapter starts with a discussion of alliance formation 
because the reasons for changing the alliance relationship are of course deeply 
connected to the original purpose of an alliance. Not all alliances are able to undergo 
the changes necessary for prolonging the alliance relationship. I accordingly clarify the 
definition of the success and failure of alliance renegotiation and examine options open 
to member states during negotiation. I then explain the risk of miscommunication that 
can result in a failed renegotiation. I propose structural variables that help allies to send 
credible commitment to the alliance, which facilitates treaty revision.  
Alliance Formation, Decay, and Management  
The security alliance is a long-standing phenomenon in international politics, one 
that occurs when two or more states join together, write a pact, and commit to defend 
common security interests. The degree of commitments entered into through such 
alliances differs: some treaties require defensive or offensive military actions, while 
others merely promise neutrality or military support should certain circumstances arise. 
Alliance treaties aim to fulfill the interests of member states, and must continue to serve 
this founding purpose; otherwise the members will abandon them. Any change in the 
alliance relationship is thus closely connected to the reason why the alliance formed in 




The literature on the formation of alliances is abundant. An alliance treaty is, to 
begin with, formed after careful consideration. Classic works see alliances as a tool in 
the balance of power. Alliances are formed when aggregating capability helps to 
maintain the status quo and prevent the dominance of a single power (Morgenthau & 
Thompson, 1985; Snyder, 1997; Waltz, 1979). Some suggest that the ultimate goal of 
an alliance is to ensure survival in anarchic system. Most alliances confront external 
threats by establishing security institutions. Walt (1987) argues, the presence of a 
shared external threat leads to the formation of alliances, while the disappearance of 
such a threat leads to their dissolution. Treaties build communication channels and 
encourage military coordination, thereby deterring third party aggression as well as 
defection (Leeds & Anac, 2005).  
The function of alliance pacts has grown more sophisticated in modern 
international relations. Alliance treaties not only guarantee the security of members 
during conflicts, but also regulate such specific peacetime actions as arms transfer, 
economic assistance, and joint military exercises, serving to constrain members’ 
behavior and prevent opportunistic actions (Benson, 2011; Benson, Bentley, & Ray, 
2013; Gerzhoy, 2015). The incentives for entering into a security treaty are, then, not 
limited to survival or maintaining the balance of power. Some studies suggest that 
alliance treaties and their associated institutions help to decrease internal aggression 
and maintain peace among allies (Ke, Konrad, & Morath, 2015; Long, Nordstrom, & 




restrain Russia “through and within the alliance of Eastern powers.”8 Rivals may join 
an alliance in order to restrain one another in accordance with the non-aggression 
principle that underlies any security alliance (Pressman, 2008; Weitsman, 2004). 
In addition to states’ motives for seeking alliances, scholars are also dedicated to 
understanding how states select their security partners. Choosing an ally is a delicate 
decision. States tend to select reliable partners based on their past reputations 
(Crescenzi, Kathman, Kleinberg, & Wood, 2012; Miller, 2003; Reiter, 1994). Previous 
records of treaty violation reveal an untrustworthy state and a less than ideal partner. 
Allying with such a partner makes the alliance less reliable when it comes to deterring 
an external aggressor (Gibler, 2008). Since reputation cost is at stake, states cautiously 
select the alliance pacts in which they participate. Morrow (2000) suggests that writing 
a treaty down is itself a credible signal of future commitment. States tend to abide by 
treaty obligations because of reputation cost. The literature accordingly suggests that 
treaty alliances tend to be generally reliable and durable (Holsti, Hopmann, & Sullivan, 
1973; Johnson & Leeds, 2011; Leeds, Long, & Mitchell, 2000). Treaties are designed 
and formed with careful consideration. 
The erosion of alliance cohesion 
An alliance treaty is an opportunity to address and resolve disputes among 
members, or at least to set aside those disputes. Signing treaties creates the expectation 
among members of a commitment to future security cooperation. Since members have 
substantive interests in forming an alliance and some faith in its reliability, major 
                                                 
8 Paul Schroeder provides an in depth discussion on the constraining power of alliance pacts; see (Knorr, 




disagreements are unlikely to arise immediately after alliance formation. Alliance 
cohesion is strong at this point, but may erode after the treaty is signed. Previous studies 
find that alliance cohesion fluctuates in response to external threats (Weitsman, 2004), 
capability preponderance (Bearce, Flanagan, & Floros, 2006), or the size of an alliance 
portfolio (Grant, 2013). This research suggests that alliance cohesion weakens when 
changes occur in the external or internal security environments, under which 
circumstances members find that their treaty no longer fits their needs or that its 
implementation is difficult. For example, in the run up to World War I, the loyalty of 
Italy to the Triple Alliance became questionable as its tension with Austria-Hungary 
increased, so that Germany and Austria-Hungary came to believe that Italy would be 
an unreliable ally in a conflict.  
External changes in the international system naturally alter the security interests 
of states and their expectations regarding the utility of an alliance. Allies may no longer 
share security interests under a new security environment. The end of a major war, for 
example, rearranges relations among powerful states. Wars may redistribute territory 
or resources in a way that weakens the function of an alliance. Wars may also eliminate 
old rivalries or create new ones. On the other hand, domestic political turnover, through 
either peaceful or violent transition, may introduce new parties and leaders that view 
the alliance differently from their predecessors. The rise of Bolshevism after World 
War I, for example, made Britain uncertain about its friendship with Russia, and the 





External or internal changes may create interest divergence that engenders 
suspicion among alliance members regarding the utility of an alliance relationship or 
the credibility of various partners, a situation that leads to dissatisfaction with the 
existing security cooperation agreement. In order ensure continuous cooperation, allies 
must therefore constantly manage their relationship, a process that involves a series of 
diplomatic interactions whereby allies negotiate the specific implementation of security 
cooperation. Snyder (1997) thus argues that alliance management is a struggle between 
entrapment and abandonment.9 Alliance members use foreign policy to reassure or to 
restrain each other in the effort to maintain a stable relationship. Some studies have 
found that domestic political changes have significant impact on the longevity of an 
alliance relationship (T. Kim, 2011; Siverson & Starr, 1994). Not surprisingly, well-
institutionalized alliances are more likely to create and sustain a peaceful relationship 
among allies (Haftendorn, Keohane, & Wallander, 1999; Long et al., 2007). These 
studies focus on the stability of alliances, examining factors that promote the disruption 
and termination of an alliance relationship, but while they are informative with regard 
to alliance duration, they do not address the process whereby allies negotiate their 
differences. 
Managing differences 
A typical agenda of alliance management engages with the issue of burden-sharing. 
An alliance is a club good exclusively shared by members. Each member contributes 
resources with an expectation that other members will do so as well according to the 
                                                 




terms of the treaty. Since all members share a mutual security benefit, each has the 
opportunity to shirk its responsibilities. Members have incentives to contribute less 
while encouraging others to contribute more. More powerful states usually make 
relatively greater contributions to an alliance relationship (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966). 
Powerful hegemons can create a hierarchy to ensure cooperation and can control the 
distribution of burdens (Lake, 1999). Even under such a relationship, though, alliance 
members negotiate to distribute burdens. States revisit the current distribution when 
they believe that changes are necessary to generate more effective cooperation. Another 
problem related to burden sharing occurs during military mobilization against external 
enemies, when members may pledge resources, the exact amount of which depends on 
compromises among themselves.10  
Morrow (1991) argues that contributing to an alliance is essentially a trade-off 
between autonomy and security: states restrain their policy autonomy in exchange for 
protection or some other benefit. Because committing to more obligations places 
additional strain on a member’s resources and narrows its policy flexibility, alliance 
members generally, except in the case of hierarchical relationships in which a powerful 
member distributes burdens unilaterally, seek to minimize limits on their policy 
autonomy while at the same time maximizing their security returns. The result is a 
collective action problem, since each member wants the others to bear greater burdens 
and yet itself wants to enjoy greater policy autonomy. The problem of burden-sharing 
is not uncommon. The tendency of members to contribute less to security cooperation 
                                                 
10 For more literature concerning burden-sharing, see (A. Bennett, Lepgold, & Unger, 1994; Hartley & 




while urging others to take greater responsibility is one factor that complicates the 
implementation of a treaty. Fulfilling treaty obligations often requires extensive 
coordination, which becomes more difficult when the security environment changes.  
Studies of alliance politics usually rely on treaty provisions to examine alliance 
behavior. Alliance treaties, however, are often not designed to cope with later 
disagreements. The shifting nature of interstate relations constantly alters the security 
interests of members: new adversaries rise; old adversaries falter; states compete for 
newly discovered natural resources; members come into conflict with a third party; 
technological advancement enhances a state’s defense/offense capability; an economic 
crisis diminishes a state’s ability to contribute to defense. Changes like these create 
three distinct problems when it comes to understanding alliance management using 
treaty provisions alone.  
First, treaty provisions regulate general principles; they do not address every 
aspect of alliance relationships. The provisions usually do not specify burden-sharing 
details, nor do they provide solutions to disagreements that may arise in the future. 
Most alliance treaties do not contain guidelines for a dispute resolution mechanism 
among the allies, which must discuss possible solutions to their disagreements via 
diplomatic channels. More institutionalized alliances may include obligations about 
treaty implementation, but the specific details still require discussion between members. 
 Second, treaties are more flexible than the current literature generally assumes. 
Treaties are subject to change once members agree to revise them, at which time the 
entire treaty may be rewritten or only part of it. Members also frequently sign auxiliary 




treaty provisions are static and difficult to alter or revise, but the fact is that treaty 
revision is not uncommon. 
 Third, treaty provisions are usually ambiguous and inclusive, and do not 
guarantee effective implementation, which members must work out among themselves. 
In the course of doing so, they may realize that they their differences are such that the 
treaty might not be feasible. Ambiguous provisions may sow contention among allies 
during the implementation of a treaty.  
 Allies can certainly design provisions to cope with future changes based on their 
current expectations of how international politics will develop. Most alliances after 
World War II have been designed to foster an enduring relationship (Leeds & Mattes, 
2007). These prior beliefs, however, have limitations. Allies cannot anticipate all future 
points of disagreement, which may cause the alliance to become unsatisfactory, 
inadequate, or obsolete. 
In sum, alliance management has a significant influence on the development and 
cohesion of alliances, directly affecting alliance duration and termination. The key to 
successful alliance management is to address changes in members’ security interests. 
In the following sections, I theorize alliance renegotiation, the effort to manage policy 
differences among allies in order to maintain an alliance relationship when an alliance 
becomes obsolete. Some alliance members successfully resolve their differences, but 
others are unable to make the necessary changes.  
Intra-alliance Bargaining: actors, means, and results 
The shifts in security interests create divergence that requires that allies engage 




present their claims and try to push the final arrangement toward their ideal conception 
of it, attempting to persuade other members to concede. This process involves 
bargaining over a set of possible solutions, so I have termed it “intra-alliance 
bargaining.” To theorize intra-alliance bargaining, I make the following assumptions. 
I assume that two states form an alliance and expect their cooperation to endure. When 
both states are satisfied with the alliance, cooperation continues and no bargaining is 
needed. Bargaining occurs when one or both members grow dissatisfied with the 
current alliance relationship and initiate a renegotiation request. This member is the 
challenger, which brings forward its concerns to the other member and asks for a 
solution. The other member is the partner, which evaluates the challenger’s claim and 
decides whether it wants to engage with the issue.  
The challenger may demand that the partner take certain actions to advance its 
security interests, such as providing military aid or financial compensation, or asking 
the partner to clarify treaty provisions. The partner can choose to negotiate with the 
challenger and deal with the problem, or it can reject the challenger and leave the 
alliance immediately. The partner can also avoid a direct response by setting the matter 
aside. The partner’s willingness to respond suggests awareness of the interest 
divergence, at which point the allies begin to search for a more satisfactory arrangement.  
Successful bargaining means that members are able to resolve their differences by 
agreeing to a new arrangement that restructures the alliance in a way that honestly 
reflects the security interests of both sides. Such bargaining thus involves treaty 
revision. To be specific, successful bargaining may restructure the alliance by (1) 




treaty or protocol; 11  (3) building a multilateral alliance that includes the previous 
alliance members; or (4) building a bilateral alliance within the context of a multilateral 
alliance that specifies security cooperation uncovered by the latter. Failed bargaining 
occurs when members are unable to resolve the interest divergence, and a typical 
outcome is abrogation of an alliance. This decision occurs when one or both members 
realize that there is no solution to a major problem or when any member fails to show 
commitment to the future alliance relationship.  
It is also possible, however, for alliance members to agree to maintain the status 
quo. The challenger remains dissatisfied, but nevertheless reaches a temporary 
arrangement with the partner and agrees to preserve the alliance. Such an arrangement 
usually mandates additional commitments or benefits not specified in the treaty. The 
challenger agrees to leave the dispute unresolved until a later date, at which point the 
issue may be raised again, but the alliance relationship maintains. I will elaborate on 
the use of strategy of delay in the last section.  
Figure 2.1 shows how bargaining progresses. The change in the security 
environment prompts a challenger to request renegotiation. The partner can either 
engage the challenger, abrogate the alliance, or refuse to respond. If the partner is 
willing to discuss the matter, the renegotiation ends with either treaty revision, 
abrogation of alliance, or maintenance of the status quo. The partner can of course 
ignore the challenger’s request, at which point it is up to the latter to decide whether to 
                                                 
11 For instance, Japan and the US passed “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” in 1978 in 
order to define the specific security cooperation between two countries, and these guidelines were 




remain in the alliance. A successful strategy of delay induces the challenger to maintain 
the status quo. 
 
Figure 2.1: A Simple Decision Tree of Alliance Management 
 
During bargaining, alliance members interact and communicate their demands for 
future security cooperation. Allies not only try to determine a set of mutually acceptable 
solutions, but also evaluate whether the alliance is worth preserving. In the attempt to 
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find a solution to their differences, members may encounter difficulties during 
negotiation, since their interests are unlikely to overlap completely.  
Morrow (1994) suggests that two problems may hinder coordination in alliance 
politics. First, a distributional problem occurs when members have different 
preferences among all available solutions. The other problem is informational problem. 
Allies may conceal available options from each other in order to advance their own 
interests. These two problems intertwine. As Morrow argues, “Distributional interests 
prevent the honest sharing of information.” This dictum applies to intra-alliance 
bargaining because, even in a security alliance, members are not fully aware of each 
other’s intentions. Members sometimes have an incentive to misrepresent or hide their 
true intent in terms of maximizing their own security benefit, and so may withhold 
information regarding their security interests or falling short of their commitments in 
order to achieve unexpressed policy goals. 
These distributional and informational problems give rise to three predicaments 
during intra-alliance bargaining: alliance members may (1) be unaware that they have 
an interest divergence; (2) acknowledge the existence of interest divergence, but be 
uncertain about a mutually acceptable solution; or (3) be unsure whether other members 
will keep their commitments in the future.  
To overcome these difficulties, allies rely on information revealed during intra-
alliance bargaining when deciding on the future of an alliance. First, both sides need to 
recognize the existence of interest divergence and the need for a solution. Bargaining 




and sometimes this act of clarification can in fact be the most difficult discussion 
involved in bargaining.  
Second, if both members recognize the interest divergence, they can move on to 
negotiate an arrangement. Successful bargaining requires allies to agree on one among 
a set of mutually acceptable options. A distributional problem may occur, however, 
when allies have uncertainties regarding each other’s updated security interests and 
hence regarding what arrangements might satisfy these interests. Dialogue can clarify 
matters, but a member may become suspicious about the claims that an ally makes if 
these claims differ from its own reading of the situation. Since an alliance relationship 
allows allies to interact more frequently, each ally is confident of its own understanding 
of the evolving security needs of its partners. When there is a perception gap among 
members concerning the security benefit that one or another enjoys or about the kind 
of cooperation that best furthers the alliance’s common interests, agreement may be 
difficult to reach. Allies must genuinely communicate their own preferences and be 
able to verify each other’s claims.  
Finally, members naturally want to know the extent to which the other members 
value and are committed to the alliance. When their security interests have changed, 
they will not agree to negotiate unless they still consider each other reliable. When 
members agree to revise a treaty, a major goal is to ensure that any new obligations will 
induce sustained cooperation. An alliance will soon fall apart if bargaining reveals that 
a member has no interest in maintaining it.  
When allies are consistently candid during renegotiation, their differences are 




allies have incentives to take advantage of their partners that are founded on the 
assumption that the interests of the latter in maintaining the alliance will lead them to 
grant concessions during negotiations as a means to salvage the imperiled relationship. 
In other words, some members may enter into renegotiation with the belief that 
abrogation would be too costly for the other members. In addition, an uncommitted 
partner is unlikely to engage in negotiation and more likely simply to abandon the 
alliance immediately. A member that is willing to renegotiate, by contrast, still values 
and therefore seeks to preserve the alliance. Each member thus starts bargaining under 
the assumption that the others are unlikely to give up easily, a situation that leaves 
rooms for allies to misrepresent their security interests and levels of commitment.   
Even in an alliance relationship, a member’s commitment to the alliance is private 
information. Both the challenger and the partner have an incentive to misrepresent their 
true intentions in the pursuit of leverage during bargaining. Expressing discontent may 
gain concessions from other allies as well as testing the loyalty of each. A challenger 
may, in the course of renegotiation, threaten to withdraw from the alliance when it is 
in fact willing to accept an arrangement; a partner may misjudge a challenger’s resolve 
and fail to accommodate its needs; a challenger may misperceive its partner as 
dissatisfied and decide to withdraw from the alliance preemptively. Therefore, even 
though intra-alliance bargaining stands a good chance, and may represent the only 
chance, of resolving disagreement among members, there is no guarantee that this 




Credible Commitment in Intra-alliance Bargaining  
The above discussion makes clear that bargaining provides only an opportunity 
for allies to exchange their views and reveal their opinions. Their positions, however, 
may be distorted. Such distortion occurs mainly when allies are unable to make clear 
their true security interests and commitment to the alliance, a situation that makes 
members uncertain about each other’s claims. Since all states have the incentive to 
misrepresent their needs, any communication may include misinformation, and every 
demand and counteroffer may deliver unintended messages. This problem is more 
acute when allies have different perceptions of the security environment. 
Successful bargaining, therefore, rests on whether allies can make credible 
commitments during intra-alliance bargaining. Once members are certain that claims 
made during bargaining are genuine, they can credibly communicate their own security 
interests and expectations for the alliance going forward. To be sure, credible 
commitment does not always lead to treaty revision. Allies can decide to abandon an 
alliance even after careful discussion; but this outcome is rather rare, since the main 
purpose of intra-alliance bargaining is to resolve interest divergence and sustain the 
alliance. When members are able communicate their interests with certainty, they 
should endeavor to find an agreeable arrangement, since it is usually more costly to 
terminate an alliance than to maintain it. Allies tend to prioritize alliance ties. On the 
other hand, making a credible commitment significantly increases the chance of treaty 
revision, as allies thus find it easier to reach a negotiated arrangement. 
There is a rich literature on how states signal their reliability to their partners. 




communicate their true intentions. In alliance cooperation, credible commitment 
determines whether allies will be able to uphold the new arrangement and remain 
committed to the alliance in the future. As Powell (2006) points out, bargaining failure 
is usually the result of a state’s inability to make a credible commitment. The problem 
here is whether members have confidence in the prospects for the alliance in the future. 
An alliance only endures when members value the benefit of long-term cooperation: 
the benefits in the future are sufficiently attractive to make abrogation an unfavorable 
option. This is the “shadow of future” discussed in the literature (J. D. Fearon, 1998; 
Powell, 1999).12 A long shadow of future increases allies’ willingness to sustain an 
alliance, making them more eager to seek a new arrangement for their differences. 
Conversely, allies are less interested in finding a solution when the shadow of future is 
short. 
The length of the shadow of future depends on the security benefit provided by 
the alliance in the short and long run. Members tend to stay in an alliance when they 
gain security benefits in the future. In other words, because leaving the alliance means 
the loss of a future benefit, the cost of abrogation is considered high and the shadow of 
future in cooperation is extended. Therefore, members have more confidence in the 
prospects for an alliance relationship and are able to make a more credible commitment 
to it when there are relatively higher stakes involved. Moreover, members will under 
these circumstances be more accommodating during renegotiation and more likely to 
refrain from concealing information. In other words, the longer the shadow of future 
                                                 
12 Future benefit is closely related to the short-term cost of abrogation. As Leeds (2003) argues, a 




recognized by allies, the more likely they are to believe each other’s claims. As a result, 
allies can credibly communicate their positions during bargaining. 
 Credible commitment alone only ensures a candid exchange of views and allies’ 
faith in the alliance. Treaty revision involves a discussion of what arrangement allies 
want to adopt in order to continue their alliance relationship and best resolve their 
differences. To find the most appropriate arrangement, allies need to understand each 
other’s current security interests. These interests are likely to have changed over the 
period since alliance formation. As a consequence, obtaining information regarding 
updated security interests helps allies to choose a suitable new arrangement and to 
facilitate treaty revision. The challenger may propose a new arrangement that the 
partner finds acceptable; the partner may make a counteroffer that satisfies the 
challenger. As discussed, the exchange of views regarding security interests is most 
effective when communication is credible, for when allies have doubts about each 
other’s claims, they have a hard time understanding the updated security interests.  
In sum, allies seek to clarify two pieces of information during bargaining: (1) 
whether all members will remain committed to the alliance in the future and (2) 
each other’s updated security interests. These pieces of information naturally depend 
on observable factors in the security environment for verification.  
Factors Leading to Bargaining Success  
The above discussion shows that conditions in which there is a heavy cost for 
alliance abrogation and in which the updated security interests of alliance members are 
well understood help them to reach an arrangement. I argue that the following variables 




security relationship; (2) a large amount of fixed assets invested in the alliance 
relationship; (3) an institutional design that maintains regular contacts; and (4) the 
formation of external alliances. These variables raise the cost of alliance breakdown 
and strengthen members’ confidence in the alliance, so that members are both more 
certain that the alliance will continue and better able to find the solution that best serves 
their updated interests. In what follows, I will specify the mechanisms behind each 
factor.  
All other things being equal, these variables describe ways in which allies 
demonstrate commitment to an alliance and to resolve their disputes, though they can 
potentially affect the decision to abrogate. Thus, for instance, bargaining may reveal 
that a member has become unreliable or that there is no real solution to the interest 
divergence. But the variables proposed here are of greater importance in the context of 
successful bargaining. To begin with, the purpose of disclosing classified information 
is to prevent misunderstanding. For instance, a challenger may misperceive a hesitant 
partner as being uncommitted. An uncommitted member, however, is less likely to 
entangle itself in bargaining than to abrogate quickly as internal tension rises. Variables 
that facilitate credible commitment do not contribute to this decision since this member 
has already decided to leave the alliance. Second, the decision to abrogate sometimes 
results from a false belief that a proper solution does not exist. In theory, there must be 
multiple solutions, but members’ distributive interests hinder identification of them. 
Once members learn more about the available options, they are more likely to reach an 
arrangement. The following discussion accordingly focuses on the impact of these 




Pubic request  
A public request occurs when one or more members reveal their intention to 
renegotiate a bilateral security relationship, and it facilitates renegotiation by signaling 
resolve. First, a public request openly addresses the interest divergence and compels 
the partner to acknowledge it despite any earlier denials. Second, a public request 
discloses the challenger’s proposal, clarifying the options acceptable to all members, 
delivering updated security interests, and narrowing down policy choices. Third, a 
public announcement creates costs with regard to the domestic audience, in effect tying 
the hands of governments on all sides, since the general public can monitor the progress 
of the renegotiation. The government, under pressure from the public, takes into 
account the opinion of the domestic audience during the negotiations and bargains 
accordingly (Fearon, 1997; Putnam, 1988). Since the interest of the audience is public, 
members can better access each other’s positions.  
A public request may encourage all members to seek a mutually agreeable 
resolution of their differences. Since termination of an alliance impacts national 
security negatively, governments are likely to bear the blame if negotiation fails. 
Member governments can therefore be expected to avoid provocative or deceptive 
behavior, as these actions are likely to be called out by the domestic audience, and this 
scrutiny favors the candid communication of members’ security interests. In addition, 
once a renegotiation process is revealed, a hostile third party may assess the reliability 
of the alliance based on the extent and depth of disagreement during talks. Members 




an ambiguous message to a third party. In such cases, allies are likely to revise their 
treaties successfully to fit their interests.  
A public request can, however, alternatively lead to bargaining failure. The 
domestic audience can make its government less accommodating in the bargaining 
process, effectively constraining the government’s policy choices and at times even 
compelling it to make proposals that are unlikely to be deemed unacceptable. Such 
domestic pressure renders concession very difficult, since the government may be 
punished for ignoring public opinion, even when the bargain itself seems to be fair. For 
this reason, a public request can sometimes lead to alliance abrogation instead of treaty 
revision: it impels members to alter the status quo, but the direction of the change is 
undetermined.  
To be sure, member governments often keep disputes from the public and 
renegotiate in secret, but this procedure creates an endogeneity problem. Specifically, 
such closed-doors negotiations raise the question of whether allies make public requests 
only when they feel confident about the chance of success (or failure), and choose only 
to reveal the renegotiation to the public when the hoped-for outcome is imminent. The 
answer to this question is that this is not necessarily the case. Although members may 
have expectations regarding the progress of renegotiation when they initiate 
renegotiation by a public request, they can be certain neither about each other’s 
reactions nor about the outcome.  




Alliance-specific assets  
Alliance-specific assets are fixed assets that members invest in an alliance 
relationship. These assets represent a non-exclusive investment that is intended to 
produce security benefits shared by all members. Since these are fixed assets, they are 
not easily removed and translate into a net loss in the event a treaty is abolished. Some 
such assets are created under the provisions of an alliance treaty, but most of them are 
not regulated by treaty. They are usually efforts to facilitate or maintain security 
cooperation and ultimately to increase mutual security benefits.  
There are two types of investment that a member can create in an alliance 
relationship. First, there are individual efforts that promote shared security interests. 
An alliance pact allows members to carry out a division of labor in regard to defense. 
Lake (1999) argues that “polities can improve their welfare, or reduce the factors they 
must employ in producing security, by specializing in production of defense and 
exchanging one form of effort for another.” 13  The individual efforts of members 
generate shared security benefit. The more specialized the alliance is, the more 
members need each other and the less likely is the risk of alliance breakdown. 
Another type of asset is the expense necessary to maintain the alliance tie. 
Members will not spend on these fixed assets in the absence of an alliance relationship. 
For example, allies may have to adjust their weapons systems, deployment, 
communication systems, or military strategy plans in order to coordinate with their 
combat capabilities. Allies sometimes need to invest in fixed assets in order to fulfill 
                                                 
13 For example, France specializes in developing its army while Britain develops its navy. Together, 
these countries can maximize their production of benefit by relying on each other to provide the defense 




obligations listed in the alliance treaty, such as airports or harbors. These are efforts 
driven by the alliance relationship, and allies would not otherwise expend them were it 
not for the alliance. 
Typical examples of alliance-specific assets include military bases, outposts, 
weapons transfers, military-oriented leases of territory and ports, labor and services 
related to military training, exercises and operations, defense technology transfers, and 
joint forces. These assets represent the stakes that members invest in an alliance. And 
the more assets a member invests in an alliance, the more costly it is for that member 
to withdraw from it; hence, the member will have greater incentive to avoid a 
bargaining failure. The cost of alliance-specific assets does not apply only to the patron: 
because such an investment produces security benefits for all alliance members, any 
member not taking part in it also needs to fear the loss of the security benefits that these 
assets bring. Alliance-specific assets therefore raise the costs of alliance dissolution for 
all  members; they provide members with greater certainty that all of the allies are 
committed to the alliance. 
The benefit of the assets invested is well known to alliance members, as is the cost 
of losing them. When a challenger is dissatisfied with prevailing security cooperation, 
alliance-specific assets help in evaluating the alliance benefit for the long run. A 
challenger will not exaggerate its dissatisfaction because it does not want to endanger 
future gains. These assets also encourage the partner to negotiate and increase its 
willingness to make concessions because the alliance relationship ensures security 




Alliance-specific assets create a long shadow of future. The greater cost of alliance 
breakup helps allies to reach a successful bargain, since members value the security 
benefit brought by the assets invested. They will thus be more confident of the 
commitment of their allies.  
Alliance-specific assets are distinct from the degree of institutionalization. Not all 
alliance institutions require members to invest physical assets. For example, annual 
meetings between defense ministers do not require much in the way of resources, while 
a joint military exercise is quite costly. A significant instance of an alliance-specific 
asset is a military establishment on one ally’s territory. Deploying a military force on 
foreign soil is a very costly investment: not only is there the cost of establishing and 
maintaining military bases, but it is very expensive to transfer military staff and 
equipment to a foreign location and to maintain the military installation. For example, 
the US deployed strategic nuclear weapons to Europe during the Cold War, resulting 
in an expenditure that Fuhrmann and Sechser (2014) describe as “wastefully expensive.” 
More importantly, once members establish a military installation, the removal of that 
establishment becomes difficult. Precisely because these assets cannot be easily 
redeployed, alliance members, those who make the investment and those who only 
enjoy the benefit, have an incentive to maintain a stable and enduring security 
partnership. An alliance treaty is, therefore, more likely to be successful when more 
assets are invested in the alliance relationship. 
H2: When alliance members renegotiate their alliance, they are more likely to 
change their security relationship through treaty revision when alliance-specific assets 





Regulatory or organizational institutions established under alliance treaties are 
created to facilitate cooperation rather than to resolve disputes. Some institutional 
designs, however, do help members to achieve bargaining success. An alliance treaty, 
for example, may specify regular meetings among ranking diplomatic and military 
officials, thereby expanding communication channels. To be sure, more channels of 
interaction do not guarantee more accurate information flow; but the function of these 
channels is to build trust in repeated strategic interactions in which allies can better 
verify the information delivered in the course of bargaining based on past experience 
(Snidal 1985; Abbott and Snidal 1998). Regular communication also reveals problems 
in allies’ security cooperation, making it easier for them to recognize complications in 
their relationship. 
Communicative institutions also create a focal point (Martin, 1992). Allies 
naturally turn to these institutions when a dispute occurs and expect the matter to be 
taken seriously. Members also observe whether their allies are committed to the 
alliance relationship through these institutions. The choice by a member not to go 
through these institutions to discuss a dispute may suggest that this member is no long 
interested in the alliance. 
H3: When members renegotiate their alliance relationship, alliances that require 
regular governmental interactions will make them more likely to change their security 




Alliance with a third party  
Forming another alliance with a third party also affects bargaining behavior. 
Members establish external alliances for various reasons, including building a better 
relationship with a third party, seeking additional security protection, or at the 
suggestion of an ally. An external alliance usually has a different purpose from the 
existing alliance, but sometimes substitutes for its functions. Maintaining both the 
current alliance and the external alliance is usually the preferable option because 
members thus have a security surplus from the combination of the two.  
A new external alliance can facilitate bargaining by showing the updated security 
interests of a member.14 The new external alliance demonstrates a member’s security 
priorities, including toward which coalition camp this member is leaning, or which 
country will become its key security partner in the future. An external alliance 
indirectly delivers information about a member’s expectations for its current alliance, 
which information in turn facilitates the communication of security needs during 
bargaining. External alliances also allow members to evaluate a state’s reliability. If a 
member finds that its ally is collaborating with its enemy, the reliability of this ally is 
revealed as questionable and the current alliance is jeopardized. Conversely, if both 
members receive benefits from an external alliance, its formation will strengthen the 
existing alliance tie.  
                                                 
14 To be sure, members may choose not to an reveal external alliance to its allies, especially when the 
external alliance is agreed to in secret. In this case, the information regarding the external alliance 





H4a: When members renegotiate their alliance relationship, allies are more likely 
to revise their treaty if any member forms a new alliance with a third party. 
On the other hand, an external alliance may lead to alliance breakdown. First, if 
one ally aligns with the common enemy of its other allies, the external alliance poses a 
threat to the existing alliance. Second, the formation of an external alliance may suggest 
that an ally is switching its security partner, perhaps because the existing alliance is no 
longer attractive and the ally no longer wants to contribute resources to it. When 
security cooperation wanes owing to an external alliance, allies lose interest in the 
existing alliance, thus encourages allies to abandon the existing alliance. 
H4b: When members renegotiate their alliance relationship, allies are more likely 
to abrogate the alliance if any member forms a new alliance with a third party. 
Strategy of Delay and Entangling Alliance Relationship  
Figure 2.1 shows two situations in which allies decide not to change their security 
relationship. This may occur when the partner decides not to engage with the challenger, 
or when discussions regarding the dispute fail to reach any solution. Allies then 
maintain the status quo: the dispute remains and the challenger is still discontented but 
does not abrogate the alliance. While interest divergence persists, the partner attempts 
to place the dispute on hold, again, maintaining the status quo. These considerations 
raise the question of why such an alliance continues when the challenger’s concern 
remains unaddressed. 
In these cases, then, the dispute is postponed to a later time through the partner’s 
deliberate delay. The variables discussed above are therefore less relevant because 




to adopt this strategy when changing the alliance relationship involves greater cost than 
the status quo and no better option presents itself. The partner wants to delay the 
renegotiation either because it wants the challenger to offer other alternatives or 
because solving the interest divergence would be too costly at this point. The partner is 
satisfied with the current security cooperation, and does not want the challenger to 
misunderstand its resolve to maintain the alliance when it hesitates to entertain the 
challenger’s demand. 
The benefit of this strategy is that, if it succeeds, the challenger is unlikely to 
abandon the alliance immediately because the partner may still entertain an alternative 
solution later. Since the challenger is unsure about the partner’s attitude, it needs more 
information to determine whether to preserve the alliance. Other proposals might be 
acceptable for the partner, so it would be costly for the challenger to break away without 
further negotiation. 
The partner needs to make a credible show of its intent to maintain the alliance tie. 
The alliance persists under the condition that the partner regularly sends signals to 
demonstrate its commitment and the challenger correctly perceives these signals. What 
becomes important is whether the challenger is satisfied with the partner’s effort. If the 
partner fails to convince the challenger that the dispute will receive proper attention in 
the future, the challenger is likely to consider the alliance unsalvageable and to abrogate. 
On the other hand, successful delay temporarily appeases the challenger, preventing it 
from abandoning the alliance.  
To be sure, the delay does not solve the dispute. The challenger will repeatedly 




prolongs the alliance at the cost of an “entangled relationship.”15 Disputes between 
allies occur more often, as the challenger tends to increase diplomatic pressure on the 
partner in order to probe the latter’s intention and may also consider building security 
ties with a third party. As a result, the relationship seems tense and unstable and alliance 
cohesion appears weak. However, such a relationship does not necessarily point to an 
upcoming breakdown, for both allies have the expectation that the alliance relationship 
will sustain. 
H5: Alliance members will attempt to delay the dispute if the cost of changing the 
status quo is high.  
H6: Using the strategy of delay increases quarrels between alliance members. 
The deployment of the strategy of delay shows that intra-alliance bargaining is 
fundamentally different from crisis bargaining. First, alliance members can always 
return to the status quo, and because the alliance treaty still brings a security benefit to 
members, its loss would bring an unwanted cost. The challenger does not defect from 
the alliance unless it has completely lost faith in the reliability of the alliance. Second, 
alliance members have the option to table an issue indefinitely, while in a crisis 
bargaining states have to reach decisions in a short period of time and any hesitation 
may lead to an unfavorable outcome. Alliance members have the luxury of negotiating 
their interests for a long time without jeopardizing their relationship. They can choose 
to set aside their differences until a more propitious moment. This flexibility explains 
why alliance relationships, once established, are easier to maintain despite internal 
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quarrels. More importantly, it explains why potential enemies have an incentive to 
establish an alliance, since they can use it to prevent or at least to delay military 
confrontation. 
The next chapter employs a time series cross section statistical model to test H1 
to H4. I will demonstrate the mechanism of H5 and H6 in chapter 6. 
Case Studies and Selection of Cases 
I include three cases to test the theoretical mechanism described in this chapter. 
First, the Anglo-Japanese alliance from 1902 to 1921 shows two successful treaty 
revisions. Britain and Japan managed to revise their treaty to fulfill their security 
interests. This alliance lasted for nearly two decades during which both countries 
maintained a close military and diplomatic partnership.  
The second case is the Sino-Soviet alliance, which shows a failed renegotiation 
between Beijing and Moscow. Their friendship had been solid in the years following 
the Korean War, and western analysts had believed that their alliance would endure 
despite differences that had emerged since Khrushchev became the leader of the Soviet 
Union. However, their inability to resolve or set aside their policy disputes led to 
hostility and militarized conflict.  
Finally, I choose the US-Taiwan alliance during the 1970s to demonstrate the 
successful use of a strategy of delay. The relationship between Washington and Taipei 
was very tense during this period. The US kept Taipei satisfied enough to stay with the 
alliance while it developed a relationship with Taiwan’s most lethal enemy. 
There are rich original and secondary materials on these alliances. Most of the 




government meetings help clarify the positions of governments and their judgement on 
the value of the alliance tie. Important politicians and diplomats also wrote memoirs to 
discuss the bilateral relations in these alliances, providing an opportunity for cross-
reference. The depth of available historic records allow me to show the full picture of 
these alliance relationships.  
Another reason behind case selection is that these alliances all experienced 
changes in the security environment that required allies to renegotiate. The Anglo-
Japanese alliance was meant to deter the Russian threat, but this threat significantly 
decreased after Russia lost the land battles in Russo-Japanese War, and almost 
disappeared after Japan and Russia divided their interests in Manchuria. The 
destructive nature of the nuclear arms race made the Soviets change their policy with 
the US. This created a series of disputes between Mao and Khrushchev. Nixon’s China 
policy made leaders in Taipei very concerned; in turn, they sought ways to resist the 
negative impact of Sino-American rapprochement. In each case, the original purpose 
of the alliance eroded and the alliance relationship was at risk of breaking down. In 
addition, allies established these alliances with an expectation that their security 
relationship would continue for a long period of time. These were not alliances 
established for short-term security purposes, so the allies had interests in maintaining 
their alliance ties. However, their renegotiation outcomes varied.  
Finally, these cases represent hard cases for my theory. The Anglo-Japanese 
alliance could have broken down but endured. Beijing and Moscow could have 
managed their differences but failed. Taiwan should have sought other security 




relationships developed in ways contrary to the popular thinking at their time. I will 
explore these cases and explain the reasons behind these developments using the 





Chapter 3 Quantitative Test of Alliance Revision 
This chapter uses a large-N model to examine the hypotheses developed above 
regarding the revision of alliance treaties, and it proceeds as follows. I first describe the 
data used in this empirical test, discuss the selection effect in examining alliance 
renegotiation, and propose solutions using a statistical technique. I then explain the 
choice of model specification, arguing that the multinomial logit is the model that best 
coheres with my theoretical assumptions. I then introduce the variables used in the 
empirical model. Each concept that forms part of my hypotheses is operationalized in 
terms of measurable variables. Finally, I present the results and discuss the substantive 
meaning of my findings.16  
Research Design  
Data  
The dataset used in this research is based on Leeds and Savun’s (2007) alliance 
dyad-year data, which includes all bilateral alliances from 1816 to 2001.17 I merge their 
data with ATOP’s alliance-level data and then merge this with Correlate of War and 
PolityIV datasets using EUGENE (S. Bennett & Stam, 2000; Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 
2002). I also merge the data with the 2012 Cross-National Time Series archive, or 
                                                 
16 Please refer to the appendix for details on data collection, coding scheme of variables, summary 
statitics, and robustness check.  
17 The reason for not including multilateral alliances is because doing so in a dyad-year design would 
significantly increase observations that do not have theoretical value. Take NATO, for example; France 
may have an argument with the US over the security cooperation under NATO, but Portugal and Iceland 
do not. The theoretical implication of variables can also change. I will elaborate the possible ways of 




CNTS (Banks & Wilson, 2015). My data covers bilateral alliances from 1945 to 2001. 
The alliances related to Czechoslovakia’s split are omitted, as are treaties that have 
been fulfilled or that include any member that has lost statehood. Although theoretically 
these treaties could have been renegotiated before termination, they ended for reasons 
beyond the control of members that simply could not have maintained the alliances 
even if they had entered into successful renegotiations. Including these treaties would 
unnecessarily complicate the comparison between abrogation and revision. 18  This 
selection leaves 125 bilateral alliance treaties in my dataset.19 Furthermore, Leeds and 
Suvan provide alliance-dyad data. There are overlapping observations for pairs of 
countries that terminated an alliance treaty and started a new one in the same year. 
Because the purpose of this project is to understand the continuation of alliance 
relationships, I have omitted these overlapping observations in order to make dyad-
year data. The total number of observations is 2255. 
The Selection Problem in Alliance Renegotiation 
Changes in the security environment encourage members to renegotiate their 
alliance relationship, but it is uncertain whether they actually initiate intra-alliance 
bargaining. Obviously, if no one initiates renegotiation, no bargaining will occur. 
Although it seems reasonable to assume that allies discuss their differences regularly, 
this assumption cannot be taken for granted. The lack of data on whether bargaining 
                                                 
18 Among these fulfilled/loss of independence treaties, only one case has issued in successful treaty 
revision: the US and Israel expanded their treaty obligation in a Memorandum of Understanding in 1983. 
19 The ATOP dataset records different “phases” of an alliance. A new phase means that a treaty has 
changed in a way that affects the obligations of members. However, in the post-World War II period 




takes place presents a challenge when trying to understand the outcome of renegotiation. 
Whether allies try to fix their divergences is of course central to this research. So again, 
if a member does not even try to engage its partner, there is no chance of renegotiation. 
However, allies sometimes do reveal to the public that they are renegotiating. To test 
the theory of intra-alliance bargaining, it is possible to observe renegotiation requests 
made by allies, and this process will in turn identify dyads that underwent bargaining.  
I therefore code a variable indicating whether any alliance member requests 
renegotiation.20 This variable is coded 1 if the ruling government of any member 
expresses the desire to review or revise the security cooperation covered by the alliance 
agreement in a given year, and 0 if no such request is made. These requests can include 
a formal declaration that renegotiation is underway, a unilateral request to change the 
treaty, or a news report that identifies the start of renegotiation. There are 85 total 
requests in this data. 
Although this variable helps to identify whether allies initiate intra-alliance 
bargaining, it is still difficult to acquire information on requests that are completely 
secret and not yet declassified. For example, I cannot confirm prior requests for 22 
alliance treaties that have been successfully renegotiated. This suggests that the data is 
either classified or that no records are available.  
Furthermore, there is a selection problem in observing the success of alliance 
renegotiation. In fact, a renegotiation request may itself be related to the success of the 
renegotiation. Allies may be hesitant to request renegotiation if they believe that 
                                                 
20 Information of requests is collected from books, journal articles, Keesings World News Archive, and 




interest divergence will be difficult to resolve, and more likely to renegotiate an alliance 
when they perceive a high probability of success. If such thinking indeed takes place, 
renegotiation successes are biased toward less complicated cases. Alliance treaties may 
be successfully renegotiated either because interest divergence is limited or because 
members are confident of success. By contrast, secret renegotiation has a higher risk of 
failure. Therefore, it is possible that a selection bias may plague the empirical analysis. 
Using the available information on renegotiation requests, I will minimize the impact 
of the selection problem by means of the predicted probability of a renegotiation 
request. This two-stage estimation is intended to control for the selection effect. 
Model  
I adopt a multinomial logit model to estimate treaty revision. The reason for using 
this model instead of a simple binary response one is that intra-alliance bargaining leads 
to three types of outcomes: status quo, revision, and abrogation. Allies choose between 
these three outcomes as they bargain. The multinomial logit model estimates different 
outcomes while measuring the covariation between them. The baseline of the main 
model is the status quo, so the coefficients indicate the positive or negative effect on 
the decision of moving from the status quo to either revision or abrogation. I will also 
report the comparison between revision and abrogation. The output table includes six 
models. The first four use the status quo as the base category. Models 5 and 6 use 
abrogation as the base category. The statistical results report three pairs of comparisons: 
revision vs. status quo, revision vs. abrogation, and abrogation vs. status quo. There are 




full model includes all independent variables and controls. The selection model 
controls for the selection effect.  
Specifically, in order to control for the control selection effect, I first estimate a 
logit model on the renegotiation request variable, and then predict the probability of 
making a request for each observation and include it in the multinomial model.21 This 
method is designed to capture intra-alliance bargaining that was not made public or 
could not be retrieved from historical sources. The public request variable needs to be 
removed from this model owing to the risk of multicollinearity. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the change in an alliance relationship, which I capture 
by recoding the renegotiation variable. I first examine all coding sheets in ATOP; then, 
based on the reason for the termination of the alliance, I regroup them into three 
categories as follows.  
First, if no change occurred in a given year and the status quo was maintained, the 
coding is 0. If an alliance was still in effect in 2001, this dyad is considered status quo 
in 2001. As discussed, allies may request renegotiation but then decide to maintain the 
status quo, a situation that differs theoretically from that in which no action is taken at 
all. Nevertheless, the two situations can be treated the same here because their impacts 
on the alliance relationship in a given year are the same.22 Theoretically speaking, in 
any given year, allies may choose to maintain the status quo or to move away from it, 
                                                 
21 The logit model contains independent variables of changes of domestic and international security 
environment, please see Appendix .  




and the former represents a deliberate choice even in the absence of a renegotiation 
request.    
Second, I define a revision as either (1) the amendment of an old treaty, (2) the 
establishment of a new treaty, or (3) the signing of protocols, guidelines, or 
memorandums as an auxiliary document to a treaty. These incidences receive a coding 
of 1. Automatic renewal is not considered a renegotiation. In my coding, an alliance 
treaty may experience multiple revisions throughout the period in which it is in effect. 
Renegotiation success can take place at points other than in the last year of an alliance. 
To return to an example mentioned in the first chapter, Japan underwent two successful 
renegotiations, in 1978 and again in 1997, when the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense 
Cooperation were signed and revised. There are 55 incidences of treaty revision in the 
dataset, 52 of which resulted in the replacement of an old treaty with a new one. Two 
renegotiation cases maintained the treaties in question but established auxiliary 
agreements, namely the US-Philippines and US-Japan alliances.  
The third outcome is abrogation of a treaty, which includes (1) intentional 
violation of it and (2) intentional refusal to renew it. Abrogation means the termination 
of an alliance relationship. Should any party choose abrogation, no chance remains for 
further renegotiation. A very rare exception occurs when a member is reluctant to 
continue an alliance but does not break away immediately, so that the alliance treaty 
remains in effect while substantive security cooperation ceases. For example, 
Bangladesh made the decision not to renew its treaty with India in 1977, even though 
the treaty did not expire until 1997. During this 20-year period, neither India nor 




cases, the alliance is coded as having ended in its expiration year because, theoretically, 
these allies might have resumed their cooperation at any time before their treaty expired.  
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of dependent variables in my dataset. Among 125 
alliance treaties, there are 55 incidences of successful renegotiation and 47 incidences 
of abrogation. Among the 26 treaties that were still in effect in 2001, eight underwent 
negotiation without any agreement being reached to change their respective alliances.  
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variable  
 Renegotiation  Abrogation  SQ with 
renegotiation 
request 




No.  55 47 8 18 128* 
*Note that some alliances experienced more than one renegotiation.  
Independent Variables 
To test H1, I reexamine the renegotiation request variable and code a new variable, 
public request. A public request is defined as an announcement at the start of a round 
of negotiations between members. I exclude incidences that are revealed to the public 
at a later time. Some negotiations continue for several years, so only if new progress is 
reported does a revelation count as another public request. The total number of public 
requests is 70. Most public requests resulted in treaty revision, but some of them led to 
abrogation.  
H2 posits that the investment of alliance-specific assets increases the likelihood 
of treaty revision. Military installations represent long-term and costly investments in 
an alliance relationship. The binary variable military installation indicates whether 




H3 argues that institutionalization facilitates communication. The variable 
military/political organization is coded 1 if the alliance treaty establishes a formal 
organization for a military or political purpose. These organizations will require regular 
contact between government officials and high-ranking officers.  
The variable of external alliance tests H4. This variable is drawn from data used 
in Leeds and Savun (2007). It is coded 1 if any member of an alliance establishes 
another alliance with a third party during the original alliance relationship. I cross-
examine these alliances to ensure that no allies have colluded with an adversary. 
I expect a public request to have a positive effect on both treaty revision and 
abrogation, since it compels members to renegotiate. Military projects and 
institutionalization have positive coefficients. The direction of the effect of external 
alliance is yet to be determined. 
Control Variables 
Several variables are included as controls. First, the variable of executive turnover 
is coded 1 if any member installed new executives who were independent from their 
predecessors, 0 otherwise. This variable is drawn from the CNTS Data Archive. I lag 
this variable for 1 year because a new executive may require some time to stabilize 
domestic political power. 
Next, power parity is measured as the ratio of the capability of the weaker member 
in the dyad to that of the stronger member. This capability measure is based on COW’s 
CINC index (4.0), and ranges from 0 to 1 (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972). Power 
parity is an indicator of bargaining power. As the capability balance becomes closer to 




readjusting burden-sharing or other obligations. On the contrary, in a preponderance 
alliance dyad, the stronger side is less motivated to change the status quo and the 
weaker side lacks the bargaining leverage to do so. I also include the squared term of 
power parity to test the non-linear effect. 
Some alliance treaties specify a dispute resolution mechanism when allies have 
disagreements. It is expected that these alliances are less likely to be renegotiated 
because major disputes are apt to be resolved without revisiting the treaty. I include a 
variable from ATOP indicating whether or not such a mechanism is established in a 
given treaty. 
The external security environment has a direct impact on the alliance relationship. 
Involvement in a militarized dispute (MID) represents the security threats that a state 
faces. Using MID 4.0 data (Ghosn and Bennett 2003), I create two variables to capture 
changes in the security environment. The first variable indicates whether any member 
is a target of an MID, and the second whether any member initiates an MID against a 
third party. Since the MID data contain many low-intensity disputes, I include only 
MIDs that produced fatalities. 
I include two self-coded dispute variables. A diplomatic dispute occurs when a 
member expresses discontent or concerns through diplomatic channels. These disputes 
focus on such political or security issues in a bilateral relationship as border or foreign 
policy disputes, while such issues as trade or human rights are not included. Another 
variable records disputes over alliances that are directly related to alliance obligations 
or complaints about the alliance relationship. These variables represent serious political 




numeric distance between the capitals of member states. Finally, I control for temporal 
dependence using suggestions from Carter and Signorino (2010). The statistical results 
are tabulated in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Multinomial Logit on Alliance Treaty Revision 
 (1) 
full 
(R vs. SQ) 
(2) 
selection  
(R vs. SQ) 
(3) 
full 
(A vs. SQ) 
(4) 
selection  
(A vs. SQ) 
(5) 
full 
(R vs. A) 
(6) 
selection  
(R vs. A) 
Public request  1.729**  1.561*  0.168  
 (0.49)  (0.62)  (0.76)  
Predicted probability   8.489**  3.415  5.074 
  of request  (2.50)  (2.84)  (4.09) 
Alliance-specific  1.978** 1.950** 0.864+ 1.241* 1.114 0.709 
  assets (0.70) (0.70) (0.52) (0.56) (0.82) (0.81) 
Military/political  0.426 0.486 0.380 0.335 0.046 0.151 
  organization (0.53) (0.60) (0.54) (0.57) (0.73) (0.78) 
External alliance 2.213** 2.269** 0.538 0.426 1.675** 1.843** 
   (0.33) (0.37) (0.33) (0.34) (0.47) (0.51) 
Lag executive  0.866** 0.611* 0.142 0.020 0.724 0.591 
   turnover (0.28) (0.28) (0.37) (0.41) (0.45) (0.48) 
Power parity  3.900* 4.759* 4.655 5.500+ -0.755 -0.741 
 (1.56) (1.90) (2.94) (2.88) (3.38) (3.66) 
Power parity squared -2.611 -3.555 -7.773+ -8.587* 5.162 5.033 
 (1.74) (2.20) (4.07) (4.10) (4.47) (4.82) 
Treaty has measures  -1.720** -1.843** -0.028 0.008 -1.692* -1.851* 
  to resolve disputes (0.64) (0.64) (0.42) (0.40) (0.80) (0.75) 
Any member targeted  -0.479 -0.568 1.006** 1.114** -1.485* -1.682* 
   by a fatal MID (0.63) (0.66) (0.37) (0.38) (0.71) (0.77) 
Any member  1.300** 1.051* 1.193** 1.388** 0.107 -0.337 
 initiates a fatal MID (0.43) (0.47) (0.37) (0.38) (0.52) (0.62) 
Diplomatic dispute -14.603** -14.394** 1.937** 2.008** -16.540** -16.402** 




Dispute on alliance -14.523** -15.853** 2.096** 1.762+ -16.619** -17.615** 
 (0.52) (1.56) (0.58) (1.00) (0.68) (1.89) 
Distance -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -7.984** -8.776** -4.335** -4.719** -3.649** -4.057** 
 (0.99) (1.25) (0.61) (0.71) (1.14) (1.51) 
Observations 2046 1994 2046 1994 2046 1994 
 (R) Revision. (A) Abrogation. (SQ) Status Quo. Coefficient reported. Robust 
standard error in the parenthesis. Models are clustered by dyads. Cubic time splines 
are omitted from the report.  
+ p<.10.  
* p<.05.  
** p<.01. 
 
Result and Data Analysis 
 The public request variable is positive and statistically significant in models 1 
and 3. This variable receives support in the revision equation, but it also affects the 
decision to abrogate. The result is consistent with H1. It is unclear whether a public 
request is more likely to lead to revision or abrogation, but members are in either case 
compelled to change the status quo. A public request signals the intent to renegotiate, 
but it does not signal the preference of allies. In this case, a public request may either 
drive allies to reach a new arrangement or may force an uncommitted member to reveal 
its intention prematurely. The data for comparison may also affect this result; there are 
only 55 incidences of revision and 47 of abrogation in the data, and the multinomial 
model simply cannot distinguish the effects of a public request on revision from the 
effect on abrogation using so small a number of cases. Nevertheless, the coefficients 
show the expected direction in both the revision and the abrogation equations and are 




Alliance-specific assets, represented by military installations, has a positive and 
significant effect in models 1 and 2, which lends support to H2. This variable does not 
predict abrogation well, since it loses significance in model 3, but is significant in the 
selection model. The variables show no statistically meaningful impact in models 5 and 
6. Although the direction of coefficient is expected, it is not statistically significant, 
suggesting that the variable does not cause allies to prefer revision to abrogation.  
The institutionalization variable is not statistically significant in any model. I 
operationalize institutionalization with two other variables, namely regular contacts 
between militaries from ATOP and the level of military integration during peacetime 
from Leeds and Anac (2005), and both fail to show statistical relevance. Thus, H3 is 
not supported. This negative result is of interest because previous literature suggests 
that institutionalization tends to facilitate bargaining. Perhaps, once allies feel 
dissatisfied, the institutional design established at the time of alliance formation 
becomes obsolete and can no longer help allies to resolve their differences. This 
outcome also suggests that allies are unlikely to quarrel when institutions are still 
effective. Serious disputes among allies may signal a failing alliance institution. 
The variable of external alliance shows a positive sign. It receives consistent 
support from the first 2 models but no support from models 3 and 4, a finding that 
strongly supports H4a. This result is still robust with a one-year lag. Establishing a new 
alliance reflects updated security interests and allows members to reach a solution with 
greater ease. Models 5 and 6 further strengthen this impression: building an external 




Most of the control variables show the expected effect. The lagged executive 
turnover variable also has a positive and significant effect in the first two models. An 
alliance treaty is likely to be subjected to change after a new government takes power. 
The coefficient for power parity is positive and significant. A balance of power directly 
translates into bargaining effectiveness and fosters treaty revision, though there is no 
U-shaped effect. The results for external threat variables are noteworthy: being targeted 
by an MID that results in casualties has no significant effect on revision, but a positive 
effect on abrogation. This result holds even with a one-year lag. Increasing tension with 
a third party, therefore, makes allies more likely, not to revise their treaty, but to 
abandon the alliance. This is perhaps because allies do not want to send a signal of 
weak alliance cohesion to external rivals that would diminish the deterrence effect of 
the alliance.  
Additionally, being a challenger in an MID increases the likelihood of revision as 
well as abrogation, a result that may suggest concern about entrapment. This result 
echoes the findings regarding moral hazard in alliance politics (Yuen 2009; Benson, 
Bentley, Ray 2013).  Members are more likely to change their alliance relationship 
when a member provokes a conflict, and such conflicts are associated with 
renegotiations that weaken the treaty or maintain the same degree of defense 
commitment, which suggests that an entrapment concern arises when one ally provokes 
a third party, in which case the other partner will try to limit its commitment to the 
alliance.23  
                                                 
23 The author thanks Ashley Leeds for sharing unpublished data on treaty revision. This variable shows 




Diplomatic disputes and those in particular relating to alliances show a negative 
effect. The large coefficients suggest that these variables are closely related to 
renegotiation failure. Indeed, a prior dispute may cause renegotiation to fail and 
therefore potentially presents a multicollinearity problem. However, dropping these 
variables does not change the effect of other variables.  
To understand the substantive effect, I adopt the observed value approach 
developed by Hanmer and Kalkan (2008). Their method is very similar to the 
CLARIFY program, with which the researcher manipulates the variable of interest 
while holding other variables at their means or specific values (Tomz, Wittenberg, & 
King, 2001). Hanmer and Kalkan recommend randomly drawing the actual values from 
the dataset and calculating the predicted probability. The effects of each variable and 
their confidence intervals are listed in Table 3.3. The calculation is based on model 1, 
3, and 5.  
Table 3.3: Predicted Probability of Effects (base: status quo) 




Difference Confidence interval 
of difference 
Revision vs. Status quo     
Public request .026 .095 .069 [.022~.141] 
Alliance-specific assets .023 .099 .076 [.012~.162] 
Organization+ .028 .041 .014 [-.013~.055] 
External alliance .011 .069 .058 [.040~.081] 
Abrogation vs. Status quo     
Public request .006 .010 .004 [.001~.013] 
Alliance-specific assets+ .020 .039 .018 [-.006~.052] 
Organization+ .022 .031 .009 [-012~.043] 
External alliance+ .020 .028 .009 [-.004~.023] 
Revision vs. Abrogation      
Public request+ .026 .095 .069 [.020~.137] 
Alliance-specific assets+ .020 .039 .018 [-.005~.054] 
Organization+ .022 .032 .010 [-.014~.063] 
                                                 
newly renegotiated treaty. More rigorous research design is needed, but preliminary analysis suggests 




External alliance .019 .028 .009 [-.004~.023] 
+Statistical significance fails to reach conventional level.  
The predicted probability rises from .026 to .095 if any ally makes a public 
renegotiation request, so that the probability of treaty revision increases by roughly 7 
percentage points. This means that making a public request makes allies 3 times more 
likely to achieve treaty revision. At the same time, a public request increases the chance 
of abrogating an alliance by 0.4 percentage points, an effect that is rather small 
compared with the effect on treaty revision.  
Allies with fixed assets invested in their alliance relationship are 3.5 times more 
likely to revise their treaty compared with those who have no such investment. Finally, 
the effect of an external alliance is particularly large: if a state builds an alliance with 
a third party, the probability of treaty revision increases from .011 to .069, meaning 
that the probability of success is five times greater than in cases where no external 
alliance is entered into. 
All of the variables show the expected effects in the revision vs. abrogation 
equation, but few of them are statistically significant. The only exception is external 
alliance, where the effect is .009, meaning a quite small impact. 
In sum, all hypotheses are confirmed except for the one regarding alliance 
institutionalization. The variables proposed show the expected effect and are 
statistically significant. A public request tends to change the alliance relationship, and 
alliance-specific assets and external alliance show a large impact. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides empirical tests of hypotheses H1-H4, which were 




lead to alliance treaty revision. Testing of these hypotheses using a large-N model 
resulted in empirical support for all except H3. I confirm that public requests for 
renegotiation, construction of a military installation on the territory of one or another 
ally, and building external alliances all have positive effects on treaty revision. Only 
alliance institutionalization fails to show any impact.  
The statistical results presented above prove the theory presented in chapter 2. 
Alliance members need information to confirm their allies’ commitment to a treaty and 
their mutual security needs. This chapter enhances our understanding of renegotiation 
behavior in alliance politics. Alliance treaties do not always bring stable, long-term 
cooperation, which requires a constant management effort in order to eliminate 
concerns, misinterpretation, and distrust. More importantly, the commitments that have 
been made during the formation of the alliance will be of little help if any member 
believes that the treaty has become obsolete.  
The empirical test here is limited to bilateral alliances. There are reasons to believe 
that the variables proposed may also be relevant to renegotiation in multilateral 
alliances, but the effect is more complicated. For example, the fixed assets invested in 
a multilateral alliance may affect one member more than others. Each member receives 
a different security externality from the fixed assets. Thus, members value the alliance-
specific assets differently, and their desire to reach an agreement subsequently varies.  
Multilateral alliance renegotiation is inherently more complex because all 
members need to consent, while the threat perception of each varies based on its 
geolocation, contribution, and military strength. The incoherent interests among allies 




accordingly quite uncommon. Only 22 treaties were renegotiated among all ATOP 
alliances from 1815 to 2003, compared to 115 renegotiated bilateral treaties.24 This 
disparity shows that renegotiation in a multilateral setting is more difficult on account 
of the sheer number of actors. In addition, a multilateral alliance usually has one or 
more “principal members” that dominate the decision making in an alliance. The 
interests of the principal members are essential because the security benefit they 
provide is vital to other members. Their support for a change in the alliance relationship 
will attract followers within the alliance. If the challenger is not such a principal 
member, bargaining can be simplified into a bilateral scheme in which other members 
merely choose sides. If, on the other hand, a principal member wants to renegotiate the 
alliance, the question is whether it can credibly communicate its commitment and avoid 
raising concern about abandonment concern among the less powerful members. Again, 
the variables proposed in this chapter have theoretical implications for such alliances.  
 
                                                 




Chapter 4 The Anglo-Japanese alliance: a relationship salvaged 
by renegotiation 
Overview of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902-1921 
The Anglo-Japanese alliance was formed in 1902 and had been revised twice, in 
1905 and 1911. These revisions were a joint effort in response to the changing 
international security environment, particularly in East Asia. Relations between Britain 
and Japan had been lukewarm since the Meiji Restoration.25 Britain helped Japan to 
train its modern navy and, at Japan’s request, had given up its right of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction.26 Britain was Japan’s largest trade partner, taking into account the trade 
flow from British India and Hong Kong.27 The Sino-Japanese War in 1895 was a 
turning point for Anglo-Japanese relations.28 Japan’s victory granted it the status of a 
regional power and it joined the competition of interests in China with other Great 
Powers. 
The Anglo-Japanese alliance started with a shared external threat. At the dawn of 
the 20th century, Britain and Japan found a mutual interest in deterring Russia’s 
expansion in northeast China. Russia had deployed five battleships in the Far East 
                                                 
25 For more on Anglo-Japanese relations during the Meiji era, see (Checkland, 1989).   
26 For the treaty ports that the Great Powers forced Japan to open after 1858 and its effort to eliminate 
the unequal treaties, see (Hoare, 1994; Hosoya, Nish, & Kibata, 2000, Chapters 5–6; Perez, 1999). 
27 Trade statistics are compiled by Nish (1985, p. 8). 
28 The War started as Japan tried to gain control over the Yi court of Choson. For Japan’s expedition in 
Korea, see (Conroy, 1960, Chapter 6). For the Sino-Japanese War, see (Lone, 1994; Mutsu & Berger, 




following the Sino-Japanese War. Its naval force in the region surpassed that of the 
Royal Navy, and a Franco-Russian coalition would outmatch the British China Fleet.29 
Britain tried to balance Russian expansion using diplomatic means. In a Railway 
Agreement signed in 1899, Russia promised not to extend its influence south of the 
Great Wall. However, Russia dispatched land forces to Beijing during the Boxer 
Rebellion that remained after the crisis. Russia also significantly increased its 
deployment of troops in Manchuria.30 Since Britain did not have a large force in Asia, 
the increase in Russian forces constituted a potential threat to British possessions, the 
vulnerability of which had become evident during the Boxer Rebellion. Given that most 
of the forces went to Beijing, Lord Walter Kerr admitted that it was impossible to 
defend British treaty ports along the Yangtze River against Chinese attack.31 
The Russian presence in Manchuria posed a direct threat to Japan’s position in 
Korea, as Russia competed with Japan for the influence over the Chosen court. Emperor 
Gojong was eager to introduce Russia in order to counterbalance Japan.32 Russia also 
opposed Japan’s plan to build a railway in Korea. The expansion of Russian military 
strength was therefore concerning to both Britain and Japan.33  
                                                 
29 See (Hosoya et al., 2000, vol. 3 p.38). In 1902 the British China Fleet consisted of five battleships and 
16 cruisers based in Singapore, Hong Kong and Weihei Wei (Redford & Grove, 2014, Chapter 1). 
30 For the Anglo-Russia Railway Agreement and Russia’s violation of it, see (Hosoya et al., 2000, vol. 
3 p.153; Papastratigakis, 2011, Chapter 6). 
31 For Kerr’s response to the request for military aid from Shanghai, see (G. Kennedy, 2005, p. 52) 
32 For the effort to introduce Russian influence to Korean Peninsula, see (Lee, 1997, pt. III). 




To be sure, an Anglo-Japanese alliance was not the only available option for 
Britain and Japan, each of which considered allying with Germany. 34  Germany, 
however, had a smaller naval force in the region and, seeing that its naval expansion 
might cause friction with Britain, was reluctant to confront a Russian land force in the 
service of British interests.35 Japan stood out as an ideal candidate because it was a 
naval power and had a direct conflict of interests with Russia. On the other hand, it was 
Japan’s priority to find a European ally in order to advance its interests in Korea.36  
Britain and Japan entered into negotiations on the formation of an alliance in late 
1901, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance agreement became operative in January 1902. 
With the neutrality commitment from Britain and its military support in the event of 
third party intervention, Japan had greater confidence about confronting Russia 
militarily. The Russo-Japanese War two years later put the alliance on the test, and 
Britain proved to be a reliable ally. 
Japan’s victory ensured the expansion of its influence in Northeast Asia, 
especially Korea. Japan also took possession of Manchuria in place of Russia. As 
Britain’s security concerns eased, it was left with a significant strategic interest in 
renewing the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japan also wanted to revise the treaty in order 
to protect its newly acquired territories. So while the first Anglo-Japanese Treaty was 
not set to expire until 1907, changes in the security environment compelled both 
                                                 
34 For Japan’s internal meeting and Britain’s negotiation with Germany, see (Hosoya et al., 2000, vol. 3 
p.165-7; Massie & Rogers D. Spotswood Collection, 1991). 
35 For a detailed discussion of the relevant history accounts, see (P. M. Kennedy, 1973). 
36 This policy was forged by Prime Minister Katsura himself, who had been a keen advocate of the 




members to revisit it ahead of the scheduled renewal. The renewal in 1905 is thus an 
example of a situation in which allies intend to continue security cooperation after the 
original purpose of the alliance recedes or no longer exists. Britain and Japan 
renegotiated their treaty and revised some obligations in order to continue their security 
partnership.  
Early renewal occurred again in 1911, as the second treaty was not scheduled to 
be renewed until 1915, but internal preparation for renegotiation was underway by 1910. 
Japan was eager to reconfirm the alliance as its expansion in East Asia had created 
uncertainty regarding Britain’s commitment to the alliance. Russo-Japanese 
reconciliation and the growing role of the US in East Asia impacted the founding 
purpose of the alliance. The interest divergence between allies had increased 
dramatically since the first renewal. Prospects for the alliance relationship were 
therefore dim, but the allies nevertheless reached an agreement to revise their treaty 
further. The alliance was thus able to endure despite the differences between the allies.  
These treaty revisions in fact prolonged the Anglo-Japanese alliance for nearly 
two decades. In the end, the demise of the alliance was due to the intervention of the 
US, which placed great pressure on Britain to abandon it. Britain, however, did not give 
up the alliance tie easily, and was still seeking ways to maintain it on the eve of the 
Washington Naval Conference. Likewise Japan, despite its growing suspicion, 
maintained the hope of continuing the alliance.  
The three Anglo-Japanese treaties established no formal institutions. All security 
cooperation was conducted by professional diplomats and military officers. Notably, 




treaties being revealed to other countries via diplomatic channels only after 
negotiations had been completed.    
The following sections of this chapter discuss the main reasons for the success of 
the renegotiations in 1905 and 1911, as well as the failure to maintain the alliance in 
1920. A close examination of the discussions between the British and the Japanese 
governments shows that their interests with regard to their overseas territories played a 
key role in their decision to renew the alliance. The following table summarizes the 
reasons behind the treaty revisions, which mainly correspond to the variables of 
alliance-specific assets and alliance with third parties proposed in chapter 2. 
Table 4.1: Interests of Britain and Japan in Anglo-Japanese Alliance  
 Britain  Japan Variable  
1905 
renegotiation  
 The German threat 
increased in 
continental Europe. 
Britain needed to 
divert its overseas 
forces back closer to 
home, leaving its 
overseas territory in 
Asia vulnerable.  
 Britain feared that 
competition between 
Russian and Japan 
would force it to 
invest in more 
military capability in 
the Far East.  
 The Liberal Party 
was likely to take 
over government in 
early 1906.  
 Japan needed a 
European power to 
vouch for its 
territorial gains in 
the aftermath of the 
Russo-Japanese 
War. 
 Katsura faced 
pressure from 
Rikken Seiyukai to 








 Britain decided to 
sign an Arbitration 
Treaty with the US. 
 The German threat 
continued to 
increase, while 













British defense in the 
Far East further 
weakened.  




 The pressure from 
the US increased. 
Japan was reluctant 
to fight Britain if 
conflict erupted 
between Japan and 
the US.  
 Japan needed 
British approval of 
its annexation of 
Korea. 
 Japan needed 
Britain to support 
its investment in 
Manchuria 
Railway.  




 Japan replaced 
German and Russian 
as a competitor with 
Britain in China.  




 The US forced 
Britain to terminate 
the alliance. 
 Japan’s conflict of 
interests with the 
US increased.  
 Japan believed that 
Britain would 
abandon the 
alliance to keep its 
security tie with the 








Britain and the 
US 
First Renewal: 1905  
As discussed, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was established by a treaty in 1902 to 
counter the expansion of Russia in East Asia as Japan and Russia competed for 
influence over Korea.37 Japan wanted to ensure Britain’s neutrality if its competition 
with Russia in Northeast China were to lead to military conflict. The alliance was a 
precursor of the Russo-Japanese War, and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty had a large 
                                                 
37 For the competition between Russia and Japan for influence in the Korean court and the origin of 




impact on Japan’s decision to enter that conflict.38 After a failed attempt to negotiate 
with Russia over Korea and Manchuria,39 Japan made preparations for a war against 
Russia immediately after signing the Treaty.  
Britain proved to be a reliable ally, assisting in Japan’s military modernization by 
sending military officers to advise the Japanese army and selling to the Japanese navy 
two new battleships that were very useful during the war.40  In fact, Japan deliberately 
delayed declaring war against Russia until these new ships safely arrived in East Asia 
(O’Brien, 2004, pp. 67–69). British assistance continued to play a role in the battles 
during the Russo-Japanese War, deterring potential intervention from France so that 
Japan could proceed without concern over French involvement.41  After Russia’s land 
campaign failed and it sent its Baltic Fleet from Europe, Britain provided intelligence 
concerning the whereabouts of the Russian ships and refused to provide supplies. This 
                                                 
38 Okamoto (1970, pp. 96–7) argues that some of the Japanese officials were optimistic about entering 
into peace negotiations over the Russian presence in Korea and therefore prevented war. However, Prime 
Minister Katsura and Foreign Minister Komura were both, to the contrary, pessimistic about the 
prospects for negotiations and prepared for war by appointing Kodama Gentaro as the Vice Chief of the 
Army General Staff.  
39 For the negotiation between Japan and Russia, see (Kajima, 1976, vol. 2 ch. 3). 
40 These battleships were built for Chile, but the Chilean government was unable complete the purchase 
after it agreed to an arms control treaty with Argentina. Russia, Germany, and Japan showed interest in 
purchasing these battleships. However, Japan was unable to secure the necessary funds from the Imperial 
Diet. The British government decided to buy the ships to prevent Russia from doing so, and then a few 
months later Japan, having secured emergency funding, approached Britain, which sold it the ships. This 
was a clear sign of Britain’s determination to deter Russia in the Far East. The battleships provided a 
tactical advantage to the Japanese fleet in various sea battles and the siege of Port Arthur (Towle, 2006, 
pp. 19–22).  
41 France and Russia issued a declaration after they learned the content of the 1902 Treaty that hinted at 
the use of force should the Anglo-Japanese alliance disrupt their interests in China. For the full text of 




indirect assistance gave Japan a tactical advantage in the Battle of Tsushima, where it 
decisively defeated the Russian Fleet.42 
The Russian Revolution in early 1905 and the defeat of the Russian army 
significantly weakened Russia’s strength overseas. Japan filled the power void in 
Northeast China. For Britain, the Russian threat to India and Arabia greatly diminished, 
and it therefore had fewer security concerns about Russian aggression. The alliance 
with Japan had successfully served its purpose, and the security interests of both 
alliance members had changed significantly during the Russo-Japanese War. Since 
Britain had achieved its objective, Japan worried that the alliance would dissolve and 
that it would lose its strongest ally. Therefore, Japan formally proposed renegotiating 
the treaty in December 1904, requesting to “strengthen and extend” the alliance “should 
the [Russo-Japanese] war end successfully for Japan” (BDOW, 1927, vol. 4). The 
renegotiations accordingly started in January.  
The timing of the proposal was unusual, as the War was not yet settled and the 
future balance of power in the Far East remained undecided. It should be noted that 
Britain’s coming election in January 1906 was one reason that the Japanese pushed for 
early renegotiation. The split within Britain’s Conservative government and its 
declining popularity decreased the party’s political strength, and Japan was concerned 
that a Liberal government might oppose the renegotiation of the alliance. The Japanese 
Cabinet decided that the alliance should be concluded quickly “while…her [Britain’s] 
present Government does not go out of office, and while the conditions inside and 
outside our country do not change” (Kajima, 1976, vol. 4 pp. 410, 418). In Japan, 
                                                 




Katsura faced such strong pressure from members of the Rikken Seiyukai 
(Constitutional Association of Political Friendship) that he had to appoint its leader, 
Saionji Kinmochi, as his successor (McClain, 2002, p. 325). The possible government 
turnover in the future, both in Britain and in Japan, would create uncertainty regarding 
treaty renewal. If Japan had to negotiate the alliance with a Liberal government, the 
talks would have been more difficult, or the new treaty, if ever achieved, would have 
favored the British position.  
The renegotiation was concluded with a new treaty that was signed during the 
negotiation of the peace between Russia and Japan, which timing indicated that Japan 
and Britain had already planned their relationship before the order of Far East had been 
settled. Both governments conducted internal discussions on the utility of the alliance 
and considered carefully the design of the treaty. Japan wanted to keep a powerful ally 
and to secure its interests after the impending naval battle with the Russian Baltic Fleet, 
since, regardless of the outcome of the battle, Britain would thus continue to stand with 
Japan. For this reason, Japan wished to prolong the treaty as far as possible. It initially 
requested to extend the treaty period, but Britain had no interests in obligations similar 
to those specified in the 1902 agreement (BDOW, 1927, vol. 4). The allies later 
exchanged their demands and negotiated new obligations.  
The alliance-specific assets were among the most important reasons that the allies 
agreed to renegotiate. Although the 1902 Treaty did not specify any military 
installations or building fixed assets, both countries had substantial investments in the 
Far East. The primary purpose of this alliance was to protect these assets from the threat 




Britain signed the 1902 Treaty to protect its interests in the Far East. The end of 
Boer War alarmed Whitehall regarding its inability to defend its overseas territories 
effectively. The cost of the war significantly increased the financial burden of British 
defense.43 As a result, Britain found it difficult to defend its interests in East Asia. This 
concern persisted despite the defeat of Russia in the Far East, for the Russians still 
posed a threat to British India from Caspian Sea after the Tsar managed to calm the 
domestic unrest.44 The challenge from German Reich likewise continued unabated. 
Although Britain was confident of its ability to secure India, its most important 
overseas territory, it worried about military threats in Europe and Asia. In addition to 
India, Britain had several territories in the Far East, including the Yangtze River Valley, 
Hong Kong, Tibet, British Malaya, Singapore, Burma, British Borneo, and the Strait 
Settlements. Hong Kong and Singapore were among the most important strategic 
possessions, since they hosted the command of the British China Squadron. Britain had 
governed these territories for decades, investing heavily in infrastructure and defense. 
These territories were also strategic points along Britain’s trade routes. However, the 
German naval bases in Tsingtao (Kiaochow Bay) and the North Pacific, along with the 
Russian presence in Northeast China, constituted a genuine threat to these territories. 
In the event of conflict between Britain and a German-Russo coalition, British overseas 
territories would become vulnerable targets. In addition, the Russo-Japanese War 
changed the strategic interest with regard to retaining Weihei Wei, a military post 
                                                 
43 For the impact of the Boer War, see (Carter, 1900; Wilson, 2001). For the impact on British defense 
budget, see (Redford & Grove, 2014, fig. 1.8). 
44 Despite Russia’s defeat, British military leaders believed that Japan’s strength might be exaggerated. 




meant to counter Russian forces in Port Arthur, though its defense infrastructure was 
poor and its commercial potential was unclear. Whether Weihei Wei would be a 
strategic asset after Russian withdrawal from Port Arthur was a matter for debate in 
Whitehall.45  
The rising threat from Germany forced Britain to redirect its deployment back to 
Europe, leaving its overseas territory isolated and vulnerable. 46  Britain needed a 
regional security partner in East Asia that could respond quickly to a military crisis, a 
trustworthy ally that would help defend the British belongings in the Far East.47 Japan 
was a fine candidate given its military power after the Russo-Japanese War; it would 
become the largest naval power if the Russian Fleet were to fail in the coming naval 
battle. An Anglo-Japanese alliance would provide Britain with a powerful ally with the 
support of which the Royal Navy would be able to redirect its attention to threats in 
Continental Europe (Best, 2002, p. 15). 
Britain had no concerns that Japan would violate the treaty and attack British 
territories because there was no conflict of interests between Britain and Japan in the 
Far East, at least in 1905. Britain had no interests in Korea, nor did Japan have any 
intention to impinge on British interests in China or South Asia. On the other hand, 
Britain worried that the competition between Russia and Japan would persist after the 
war, and that Russia would maintain a large naval force in the Far East to seek revenge. 
                                                 
45 For internal debate on maintaining the base at Weihei Wei, see (G. Kennedy, 2005, Chapter 1). 
46 Germany’s naval development started in 1898, when Britain began to see the German navy as a rival 
that could cripple the Royal Navy as the Royal Army had been crippled during the Boer War (March & 
Olsen, 1989, vol. 1 p. 11-2). 




This being the case, Britain needed to establish a strong presence in the region to 
counterbalance Russia, which would dilute its effort in order to concentrate on Europe 
(BDOW, 1927, vol. 4). As Britain planned to redeploy its fleet and concentrate on home 
waters, it was reluctant to maintain a large military force in the Far East.48 
Britain’s concern regarding its overseas territories was evident during the 
negotiations for renewal of the Treaty. Whitehall recognized that mere renewal would 
not advance British interests, and Japan had little to contribute to the defense in Europe. 
Since Britain needed to counterbalance Germany at home, its defense in South and East 
Asia would inevitably be weakened. Furthermore, a simple renewal of the 1902 Treaty 
might intensify competition between Japan and Russia, leading to a naval arms race in 
the Far East. A new treaty would not be attractive to Britain unless Japan were to pledge 
to protect its overseas interests, particularly India (O’Brien, 2004, pp. 56–57).  
Britain therefore proposed a defense obligation in the new treaty. During the latter 
phase of the negotiations, Britain asked Japan to pledge a specific number of troops 
dedicated to the defense of India in the event of a conflict. Japan quickly rejected this 
draft clause and insisted that such an obligation would be inappropriate when the nature 
of the conflict remained unknown (BDOW, 1927, vol. 4). Japan for its part was 
reluctant to become involved in armed conflict outside the Far East. Britain eventually 
accepted Japan’s position and made the clause more general. Article IV of the 1905 
Treaty specifically mentioned Britain’s interests in India and Japan’s obligation to 
safeguard them.  
                                                 




Britain was able to communicate credibly to Japan its interests in its overseas 
assets, and  Japan understood Britain’s security concern because Russia was still 
powerful and posed a direct threat to India via Afghanistan (Williams, 1966, p. 362). 
Japan well knew how threatening Russia could be from the tremendous cost that it had 
suffered in order to achieve victory in the Russo-Japanese War. Japan also recognized 
that France might join in aggression against British territories in the Far East owing to 
the Franco-Russian coalition, and the rising German Reich posed still another threat. 
These threats were well known to the public. Britain’s possessions were highly exposed 
to military attacks by potential rivals. Its forward military post in Weihai Wei was very 
close to Port Arthur and the German treaty port in Shandong.49 Britain indeed needed 
a security partner to ensure its territorial interests.  
Japan was more concerned about its overseas territories than Britain because it 
was expected to increase its influence in Northeast Asia after the Russo-Japanese War. 
Japan deeply worried that the kind of intervention undertaken by the Great Powers after 
the 1895 Sino-Japanese War would reoccur. After the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Russia, 
Germany, and France forced Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China.50 This 
diplomatic defeat significantly communicated to Japan that European powers might 
intervene to secure their own interests, for which reason it wanted a supporter among 
them. Britain was the best candidate since it was a Great Power by capability and 
                                                 
49 Weihei Wei had been a forward military base intended to counter the Russian military establishment 
in Port Arthur since late 1897. Germany acquired a treaty port in Kiaochow in 1898 and in Tienjin in 
1895. Russian and German possessions in these places were a result of China’s effort to introduce the 
Great Powers into the Liaotung Peninsula in order to counterbalance Japan. For the acquisition of treaty 
ports, see (Abend, 1944; Knoll & Hiery, 2010, 2010, pp. 52–56; Tai, 1976). 
50 For the diplomatic records on the triple intervention and Japan’s reaction to the loss of the Liaotung 




reputation, and cooperation under the alliance had been smooth before and during the 
Russo-Japanese War. British approval would help secure the benefits that Japan hoped 
to enjoy after the War.  
Japan was eager to obtain British support for its position as a great regional power. 
Korea was already under the influence of Japan as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, 
and Japan later eradicated the pro-China factions in Korea in the Eulmi Incident.51 
Japanese migrants, including soldiers, businessmen, and workers, flooded into the 
Korean Peninsula. Between 1890 and 1900, the Japanese population in Korea 
doubled.52 A few years later, Japan’s influence expanded greatly as a consequence of 
its 1905 agreement with the Korean Empire, according to the terms of which Korea 
transferred the responsibility for post, telegraph, and telephone services into the hands 
of Imperial Japan. As Japan gained control over Korea, it faced challenges from Russia. 
Part of the reason for the Russo-Japanese War was Emperor Gojong’s reliance on 
Russia to counterbalance the influence of Japan.  
China was another place where Japan had invested a great amount of capital and 
labor to develop its newly acquired islands, Taiwan and the Pescadores. Before the 
establishment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japan secured special rights in Fujian 
and a lease on the port of Foochow from the Qing court.53 At the end of Russo-Japanese 
War, Japan was expected to take over Russian rights and possessions in Manchuria, 
                                                 
51 For more detail on the Eulmi Incident, see (Duus, 1995, Chapter 3; C. I. E. Kim & Kim, 1967; Lone 
& McCormack, 1993, Chapter 1). 
52 For number of Japanese residents in Korea, see (Duus, 1995, p. 290) 




and it was eager to secure the fixed such assets as Port Arthur, the Chinese Eastern 
Railway, and the coal mines along in Manchuria.  
For Imperial Japan, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was the best option to introduce a 
European power into the region and to endorse the new order that had formed after the 
Russo-Japanese War. Although Britain would not offer to defend Japan’s overseas 
territories, its involvement would deter Germany and the US from intervening in the 
post-War order in Manchuria and Korea.54 As British foreign minister Lansdowne 
warned Japan, Russia could seek a chance for revenge even if Japan were to prevail in 
the impending naval battle.55 This concern suggests that Russia would still pose threats 
to Japan’s territorial interests after the War. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was the ideal 
security guarantee to keep Japan from finding itself in diplomatic isolation. Japan 
therefore asked Britain to recognize its rights in Korea, which became Article III of the 
1905 Treaty. In return, Japan agreed to expand the scope of the treaty beyond the Far 
East and pledged to defend India.  
Britain ended its “splendid isolation” mainly because of Russian expansion in 
Manchuria,56 and it welcomed the rise of Japan since this would weaken Russian 
influence in Northeast China. Japan needed support from Britain in order to deter 
Russia in the region. Britain recognized that Japan needed this renewal in order to 
secure its war gains. Britain was not concerned that helping Japan to acquire Korea and 
                                                 
54 Whitehall anticipated that the US might intervene and asked its embassy in the US to convey the 
British position of upholding the Treaty of Portsmouth.  
55 This worry was apparent in a report to Komura from Ambassador Hayashi, and the Japanese cabinet 
agreed with him on this point (Nish, 1985, pp. 390–1).  




Manchuria would make Japan into a threat, since it was still weak compared to the 
European Great Powers. Japan’s request for renewal was reasonable to Britain since it 
could clearly observe Japan’s territorial interests. On the other hand, despite Japan’s 
inferior military capability, Britain believed that Japan would help defend its overseas 
territories, which again was crucial because it could not spare more military strength to 
be scattered throughout East Asia.  
Japan also knew that the alliance would not add much to its military strength given 
that Britain aimed to pass the burden of defense in the Far East on to Japan. Japan had 
a reasonable fear that hostilities in northern India would drag it into an unwanted 
conflict with other Great Powers. Nevertheless, the alliance was the ideal solution to 
guarantee its investments in Korea and Manchuria, since no other European power 
would provide such support. 
Britain and Japan showed resolve to maintain their alliance because of the desire 
of each to protect its own overseas territories in the Far East, in which respect each 
supported the other after the War ended. Britain supported Japan’s efforts to secure 
Korea and the Russian properties in South Manchuria, while Japan supported the 
continuing British military presence in Weihai Wei (BDFA, 1989, vols. 8, 10).  
As George Clark, the secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defense, said “I 
cannot see that a mere renewal would be of great advantage to us” (O’Brien, 2004, p. 
56). If Japan insisted on renewal without revision, the alliance would probably have 
broken down. Again, the overseas possessions of both countries informed the core 
interests of each and allowed them to find mutually acceptable terms to revise their 




in the Far East, freeing up time and resources for the Royal Navy to redeploy its forces 
and update obsolete vessels.57  
A few months later, Japan defeated Russia in the Battle of Tsushima, and the need 
for a new treaty became more obvious. The Second Anglo-Japanese alliance was settled 
in July while Russia and Japan were negotiating peace. Renewal of the alliance renewal 
facilitated these negotiations to some degree because it boosted Japan’s confidence in 
the post-War order. Russian delegates sought ways to assure Japan that their country 
would not seek retaliation or start an arms race in the future. When they heard the news 
of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, the Russians were more confident that 
their offer could settle the peace with Japan (Korostovet︠ s︡, 1920, pp. 57, 99). 
Second Renewal: 1911  
The international security environment changed quickly after the Treaty of 
Portsmouth. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty successfully prevented Russia from rebuilding 
a large Far East fleet. It also deterred Russia from launching a revenge attack. The 
threat along the Indian frontiers proved to be exaggerated. In addition, the Russian 
threat decreased after the 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente, as a result of which Russia 
recognized Tibet and Afghanistan as buffer territories and Britain’s concerns about the 
security of India were assuaged.58 Meanwhile, Germany increasingly became seen as 
                                                 
57 In the following years, the vulnerability of the British China Squadron was discussed in the Colonial 
Defense Committee, which pointed out that Japan could contribute to the defense of Far East, and that 
Britain did not need to reinforce the China fleet until the alliance was close to expiration (G. Kennedy, 
Neilson, & Schurman, 1997, pp. 58–61). 
58 For details of Anglo-Russian rapprochement after Russo-Japanese War, see (Massie & Rogers D. 




Britain’s major threat. The German navy was the world’s second largest by 1906, and 
after the HMS Dreadnought began service in 1907, Germany started building its own 
Dreadnought-class battleships. The British government had a grave concern about 
home security as its naval race with Germany intensified.59 Whitehall therefore again 
had a pressing need to concentrate its defense activities in Europe to the detriment of 
its defense in the Far East. 
In that arena, Japan and Russia reached reconciliation and the former successfully 
secured its war gains. The Treaty of Portsmouth divided their spheres of influence in 
Manchuria. The Chinese Eastern Railways was divided into two parts. Russians 
controlled the northern portion, still called the Chinese Eastern Railways, and Japan 
the southern part, which was renamed the South Manchurian Railway. In the following 
years, tension between Russia and Japan cooled down, and the nations reached two 
agreements in 1907 and 1910. It was in a secret part of the 1907 agreement that they 
defined their spheres of influence in Manchuria.60  
The 1910 Russo-Japanese agreement was a joint response to an American 
proposal. At the end of 1909, American Secretary of State Knox requested that Russia 
and Japan place their share of the railways in Manchuria under international control by 
allowing the Chinese government to buy them back (LaFeber, 1998, pp. 92–98). Russia 
and Japan adamantly opposed Knox’s plan. Their agreement, like the 1907 agreement, 
included a public convention and a secret one. The public part again pledged friendly 
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cooperation in regard to Manchuria Railway. The secret convention again confirmed 
their exclusive rights in Manchuria, and Russia also approved the Japanese influence 
in Korea (Berton, 2012, pp. 2–6). The two Russo-Japanese agreements showed a 
convergence of interest between the former rivals. As the Russian threat diminished, 
the confrontation between Japan and the US became more intense. Another concern 
was the Franco-Russian alliance, which no longer existed following the Entente 
Cordiale. Japan’s outright rejection of the Knox plan was one of the events showing 
that Japan was on a collision course with the US.61  
Facing challenges from the German Reich, Britain found itself increasingly reliant 
on the US in world politics, and the disputes between the US and Japan suggested that 
the Anglo-Japanese Treaty might become a burden in the Anglo-American friendship. 
In addition, the expansion of Japan to the south of the Great Wall created a conflict of 
interests between the allies because the Yangtze River Valley had long been part of the 
British sphere of influence. 
The changing course of Japanese foreign policy was an indirect result of the 
Russo-Japanese War. Japan, as mentioned, paid a significant price for its victory. Its 
deteriorating financial situation forced the Japanese government to accelerate its 
expansion in China and Korea after the second cabinet of Katsura Taro in 1908 
(O’Brien, 2004, p. 102). There were complaints inside the Imperial Japanese 
government that British policy regarding China, especially its support for the Open 
Door policy, had become an obstacle to Japanese interests. Criticism also arose from 
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the general public in Japan and Britain that the alliance hampered the national interests 
of their respective countries. The increasing divergence between allies was no secret to 
either government. There was a growing sense in Japan that, despite the lack of 
confirmation from London, Britain would not renew the alliance when it expired in 
1915 (Nish, 1972, p. 47). However, it was not in Japan’s interest to enter into a rivalry 
with Britain. Japan wanted to sustain the alliance as a way to hedge its conflict of 
interests with Britain. Japan thus searched tor opportunities to continue the alliance. 
After all, Britain had been a firm supporter of Japanese interests in the Far East. The 
Anglo-Japanese alliance was very important to Japan, and the government believed that, 
at this point, it was deriving greater benefit from the alliance than its ally.  
The renegotiation of the third Anglo-Japanese alliance was not prompted by either 
ally but by the action of a third party. Relations between the US and Japan were tense 
in 1910. The diplomatic frustration over the Manchurian Railway caused discontent in 
the White House as well as among the American public. The US blamed Britain for not 
using its position as an ally to pressure Japan. Furthermore, the defense obligation in 
the alliance treaty suggested that Britain might become a hostile party if conflict 
erupted between Japan and the US. With this concern in mind, the US approached 
Britain to propose a general arbitration treaty that would deal with disputes between 
the US and Britain. Britain gladly entertained President Taft’s proposal because it 
would strengthen bilateral security ties. Owing to the good relationship between the US 
and Britain, the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty was signed in early 1911. This 
treaty, however, created a conflict with the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, since that alliance 




in conflict with Japan. Britain would have to fight against the US instead of using the 
arbitration procedure. It was, therefore, necessary to revise the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.  
When the proposal for an arbitration treaty was circulated within the British 
cabinet, Britain consulted Japan about it. Britain originally planned to revise the Anglo-
Japanese Treaty when it expired in 1915, but Japan took the opportunity to request an 
early revision and extension of the treaty after it learned about the proposal (Nish, 1972, 
p. 49). 
Japan knew well that the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty was an important 
security agreement that Britain would not deny. Japan also knew that Britain was 
unlikely to join in a conflict against the US because it saw the US as a potential ally 
against Germany. It would be impractical to ask Britain to drop the Arbitration Treaty 
or to make an exception in the Treaty for Japan. Japan believed, however, that this 
might be a good opportunity to revisit the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Its goal was to 
reconfirm the security partnership and, more importantly, extend the period of the 
alliance in order to keep Britain and Japan on the same side as long as possible.  
The Anglo-American relationship played an important role in shaping Japan’s 
attitude during the renegotiation. Throughout the negotiation of the third agreement, 
Japan did not ask Britain to change the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, nor did it 
complain that its security interests might be hurt as a result. On the contrary, Japan 
reiterated its support for Anglo-American cooperation and emphasized the need to 
revise the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, voicing the opinion that 
It is obvious that with respect to Anglo-American relations, Britain 




economic needs as well as the close relations between Canada and the 
United States. If a conflict between Japan and the United States were to 
arise, Britain would avoid being involved by all means, notwithstanding 
the stipulations of the Alliance. Consequently, it is inevitable that the 
Alliance would have no practical value at all if Japan were to fight 
against the United States. (Kajima, 1976, vol. 2 p. 464) 
Despite some opposition, the mainstream view in the Japanese cabinet was that 
the alliance was valuable, even vital, to Japanese interests. Foreign Minister Komura 
was among its strongest advocates. The internal discussion in the Japanese government 
showed that Korea was again the major concern in extending the Anglo-Japanese 
Treaty. As discussed, Korea had been under Japanese influence since the Russo-
Japanese War drove the Russians out of the peninsula. After an unsuccessful attempt 
by the Emperor Gojong to seek assistance from Russia, Japan forced him to relinquish 
his political authority in 1907 and then formally annexed Korea in early 1910, and so 
was eager to get recognition from other powers.62 Japan recognized that Britain had 
important role in supporting its expansion in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia (Kajima, 
1976, vol. 2 p. 460).  
Compared to the situation five years earlier, Japan now had a more urgent need to 
obtain British support for its plans in the Far East. Its fixed investment increased 
significantly in Korea and Manchuria. Japan retained regular military bases in Korea 
after the Russo-Japanese War. Under the 1907 Japan-Korea Treaty, Korea reduced its 
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military to only a garrison of Imperial Guards. The Japanese Garrison Army in Korea 
and Kempeitai (military police) assumed control over defense affairs. The military 
force in Korea, along with the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and the Formosan 
garrison, were Imperial Japan’s most important overseas military bases.  
Japan also invested heavily in constructing railways in Korea to connect the 
Peninsula with Manchuria. To shorten the transportation distance between Seoul and 
the Japanese mainland, the Japanese government raised a large amount of capital, more 
than 12 million yen, to construct a railway between Seoul and Fusan (Myers & Peattie, 
1984, Chapter 3).  
Korea was Imperial Japan’s major source of primary products and minerals even 
before the annexation, and it invested vast resources to develop agriculture sectors there 
and in Taiwan. Japan had started surveying uncultivated lands in Korea as early as 1904 
(Gragert, 1994, Chapter 4). Agriculture imports, primarily rice, from these places 
resolved a shortage of food in Japan. The Japanese government established the Oriental 
Development Company to modernize the agriculture sector and systematically moved 
Japanese settlers to Korea.63 As a result, the Japanese population in Korea grew from 
15,891 in 1900 to 126,168 in 1908. By 1910, the Oriental Development Company 
owned 8,500 hectares of lands (Beasley, 1987, p. 151; Moskowitz, 1974). These 
Japanese-owned lands supplied agricultural goods to the Empire. To facilitate trade and 
investment, Japan established the Bank of Korea and charged it with reconstructing the 
financial order in Korea (Kimura, 1986, 1995). The bank funneled funds into 
                                                 





investment in local agriculture, and these efforts significantly increased the 
productivity of the agriculture sector in Korea. 
For these reasons, recognition of its annexation of Korea was very important to 
Japan: it had made significant investment in the fixed assets on the Korean Peninsula, 
and feared that other powers would intervene and stop its plan for annexation. This is 
why Japan requested that Britain recognize the annexation, and had made a similar 
proposal during the negotiation of the 1905 Treaty when it asked Britain to pledge 
support if Korea became a Japanese protectorate. Britain had rejected that proposal, 
which made Japan unsure of British support for the annexation, so it felt the need to 
secure British approval as part of the revision of the treaty. Japan knew that British 
support would help it to resist pressure from other powers, particularly the US.  
During the negotiation of the Third Anglo-Japanese Treaty, Japan used similar 
rhetoric to that which Britain had used in 1905. It emphasized that Korea was part of 
Japanese territory, making its importance comparable to that of British India. If the 
allies decided to keep the article concerning India, it was argued, there should be a 
similar article related to Korea (Kajima, 1976, p. 474).  
On the other hand, Japan was also making an increasingly deep investment in 
Manchuria, and the Anglo-Japanese alliance guaranteed Japan’s expansion in 
Northeast China. Through the operation of the South Manchuria Railway Company 
(SMR), the Japanese government monopolized a 700 mile long transportation corridor 
in Manchuria. The total revenue from transportation increased from 9 million Japanese 
yen in 1907 to 15 million in 1910. SMR owned various properties along the railway 




mines, and factories, giving it a total asset value in 1911 of 246 million yen. In addition 
to the economic profit that it reaped, the SMR also owned extensive lands along the 
railway lines.64 It in effect governed 106 cities in Manchuria, and the population in the 
SMR-controlled area, including Chinese and Japanese immigrants, as discussed, 
doubled between 1907 and 1911. Manchuria thus constituted an important part of 
Japan’s economic development.65  
The SMR received loans from British investors with a value of close to 150 
million yen (O’Brien, 2004, p. 179). Although Whitehall did not oversee these loans, 
they helped to shape the British position of maintaining the status quo in Manchuria. 
Britain believed that a strong Japan in Asia served its interests. Unlike the US, Britain 
did not see Japan as a competitor in the region and therefore had no interest in changing 
the status quo of Japan’s status in Northeast Asia. For example, Britain in 1909 rejected 
a US proposal to help China construct the Jinzhou-Qiqihar Railway on the grounds that 
it would undercut the SMR. In addition, Britain refused to provide loans for China to 
buy back the SMR when Knox proposed internationalizing it.  
From Britain’s point of view, the alliance still had the important function of 
reducing its military deployment in the Far East, though this was not as pressing an 
issue as it had been in 1905. Despite public anger at Japan, the Liberal cabinet valued 
the alliance relationship and believed that it was in Britain’s interest to keep an ally in 
the Far East (Nish, 1972, p. 62). The primary objective of Whitehall remained 
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concluding the Arbitrary Treaty with the US, but it was reluctant to sacrifice the Anglo-
Japanese alliance in the process.  
Whitehall understood that such a treaty might cause concern for Japan. From the 
beginning of the renegotiation, British officials tried to convince the Japanese 
government that the Arbitration Treaty would not sabotage the Anglo-Japanese 
friendship. Britain repeatedly assured Japan that the alliance would be renewed. For 
instance, British Foreign Minister Edward Grey told the British Ambassador in Japan, 
“I am anxious that nothing should happen which would give the impression that the 
Alliance was weakening, or was not going to be renewed” (BDOW, 1927, vol. 8 no. 
411). 
To be sure, Britain had a problem communicating its commitment to the alliance 
credibly, since the Arbitration Treaty suggested a change in Britain’s main security 
partner in Asia. In order to minimize Japan’s concern, Britain kept the Japanese well 
informed about the progress of the Arbitration Treaty and agreed that the alliance 
renewal should take place around the same time that the Arbitration Treaty was signed. 
The British cabinet also agreed that extending the period of alliance would send a signal 
of friendship (BDOW 1927, vol. 8 no 420). During the negotiations with Japan, the 
British government used unanimous consent in the Imperial Conference to demonstrate 
its resolve to maintain the alliance. Several British dominions raised objections to the 




nevertheless managed to secure unanimous agreement. 66  This move showed that 
Britain indeed wanted to extend the alliance.   
More importantly, Britain recognized the annexation of Korea in the early stages 
of renegotiation, which boosted Japan’s confidence in the alliance. The two allies did 
differ on the wording of the arbitration clause. Britain encouraged Japan to become part 
of the Arbitration Treaty with the US, but Japan rejected this and was anxious to clarify 
the condition that the Arbitration Treaty would nullify the defense obligation in the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japan was very careful to reiterate that a conflict with the US 
would be improbable and indeed avoided even mentioning the US in the Treaty 
(BDOW, 1927, sec. 8 no 429). It was eager to clarify the British military commitment 
because it wanted to know whether Britain would intervene in a conflict between Japan 
and the US. Britain gave a clear explanation of the application of the Arbitrary Treaty, 
though it rejected Japan’s original desire for a secret memorandum to illustrate the 
contingencies (Kajima, 1976, p. 486). 
The British intention to protect Japanese interests in Korea earned Japan’s trust, 
but Japan failed to secure British recognition of its sphere of influence in China. Grey 
was concerned that Japanese expansion in Asia would eventually threaten British 
interests in China. Nevertheless, Britain was able to signal its commitment to the 
alliance by candidly revealing information about the Arbitration Treaty with the US, 
agreeing to support Japan’s annexation of Korea, and marshaling support from British 
dominions. The rapprochement between the US and Britain clearly signaled the latter’s 
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updated security interests. Japan did not insist on a secret memorandum because it 
understood that Britain was reluctant to engage in secret diplomacy without informing 
the US about it. The alliance-specific assets and external alliance were thus the main 
causes for successful renegotiation. 
The 1911 renewal fulfilled the interests of both Japan and Britain. With Japan’s 
help in defense, Britain transferred the majority of its Far East naval capability back to 
Europe.67 The Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, however, failed to be ratified by the 
US Congress. Despite this unsuccessful alignment effort, Whitehall still maintained a 
close relationship with the US government.68 Japan continued its colonization in Korea 
with no interference from the Great Powers. Its influence in Manchuria remained 
unchallenged, and its expansion in China was more active after the Chinese Revolution 
opened an era of conflict among Chinese warlords. 
The End of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
The Anglo-Japanese alliance in the following years turned into a “hollow 
friendship,” in the words of Nish. A few years after the alliance was renewed, Britain 
took notice of the Japanese intelligence operation in India and suspected that Japan had 
secretly aided the Indian nationalist movement.69 The alliance nevertheless survived 
                                                 
67 Churchill decreased the battleship fleet in the Far East from five to two and replaced other ships with 
cruisers (Saxon, 2000, p. 65).  
68 Although the Taft administration strenuously supported the Arbitration Treaty that it had signed with 
Britain, the US Senate refused to ratify the treaty and suggested revision, and Taft refused to alter it. The 
treaty thus did not go into force. For the struggle between the Taft administration and the Congress, see 
(Noyes, 2011). To some extent, the Senate’s rejection of that treaty defeated the purpose for the revision 
of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, but this did not impact Anglo-Japanese relations.  




the First World War, for Japan joined the Triple Entente and occupied the German 
territories in China and Pacific Islands. During the War, Japan deployed its fleet to the 
Mediterranean to assist the Royal Navy, and it also helped Britain to defend its Far East 
dominions and colonies.70   
World War I significantly hampered the development of British military strength, 
while Japanese military power, by contrast, increased significantly.71 The rise of Japan 
in the Far East after the Great War eroded British interests, particularly in China. 
Moreover, the antagonistic relationship between the US and Japan and Britain’s 
coalition with the US made Japan believe that the alliance was becoming unreliable. In 
such an uncertain atmosphere, both Britain and Japan worried about the future of their 
friendship after the Agreement expired in 1921.   
In order to avoid diplomatic isolation and in particular to maintain amicable 
relations with Britain and the US, Japan expressed its intention to renew the alliance in 
1920. Britain replied that this matter should be discussed in the summer Imperial 
Conference.72 The allies came to an agreement to issue a joint declaration of their 
intention to continue the alliance. Japan felt reassured by Britain’s gesture, but was still 
unsure whether it actually would keep its word. In fact, the British cabinet supported 
                                                 
70 Britain originally planned to acquire destroyers from Japan to replace vessels lost in the War. For 
Anglo-Japanese cooperation during the Great War, see (Field, 2004, p. 19; Saxon, 2000). For Japan’s 
interest in joining the Great War, see (Kajima, 1976, vol. 3 Ch. 4-5). 
71 Despite Japan’s rise, its naval power still could not compare with that of Britain in the 1920s. 
72 Britain was reluctant to renegotiate the terms of the treaty until it had canvassed opinions in the US 
and British dominions in Asia; see (Braisted, 1971, p. 557). Japan was aware of this, and feared that 
abrogation of the alliance would create a British-American coalition against it. The Japanese cabinet 
decided to maintain the alliance, or at least to sign a new agreement among the three; see (Kajima, 1976, 




renewal, and wanted to include the US in the alliance. With the proper revisions, Britain 
could draw the US into the treaty and create a tripartite alliance to ensure the members’ 
territories and special rights in the Far East. 73  This was the reason that Britain 
repeatedly requested a preliminary meeting among the three nations before the 
Washington Naval Conference. Britain wished to deal with the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance in tri-party talks, but this proposal was rejected by the US.74 As a result, Britain 
found it hard to communicate its benign intentions toward Japan. The Imperial 
Conference in the summer of 1921 further weakened Japan’s confidence, as it was 
informed that Canada, one of the most important dominions in the Commonwealth, 
firmly opposed another renewal.75  
At the invitation of the US, the Washington Naval Conference opened in 1921. 
Japan was full of dismay and suspicion when it attended the Conference, believing that 
Britain had dragged it to an arena in which the US planned to constrain its military 
power. The US wanted to link the disarmament with the Pacific naval issue, which 
Japan opposed, and Britain did not speak up in its defense.76 Although the Anglo-
Japanese alliance was not an official part of the conference proceedings, the US was 
                                                 
73 Britain still saw in Japan a strong protector of its overseas interests such as Hong Kong and India. It 
was also concerned that Japan might ally with Germany if the alliance were to be terminated (Nish, 1972, 
p. 310).  
74 Britain asked the US three times to open a preliminary meeting, continuing this effort until the end of 
August; see (Vinson, 1955, pp. 121–2). 
75  Canada threatened to leave the Commonwealth if Britain renewed the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
(Brebner, 1935; Nish, 1972, p. 339). 
76 For US policy regarding the Washington Conference, see (Buckley, 1970; Vinson, 1955). The hostility 
between the US and Japan had been manifest; public discussions were taking place on whether the two 




determined to terminate it from the beginning, despite several attempts by Britain to 
convince its allies that the Anglo-Japanese alliance could coexist with Anglo-American 
friendship.  
Britain’s effort to preserve the alliance eventually failed because there were no 
more common territorial interests that Britain could endorse for Japan, which sensed 
Britain’s reluctance to support its adventures in China. For Britain, the informal 
coalition with the US superseded the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The external alliance 
with the US sent a negative signal to Japan, contrary to what Britain had hoped. Britain 
wanted to preserve the Anglo-Japanese alliance while weakening the Japanese threat 
to the US by limiting its navy; this was the main reason it invited Japan to the 
Conference. The US, however, had a different plan: it was adamant about ending the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance regardless of the British desire to maintain it. Britain found it 
difficult to navigate between its allies, and reluctantly accepted the termination of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance, which confirmed Japan’s suspicion that Britain was willing 
to abandon the Anglo-Japanese alliance in order to strengthen its friendship with the 
US. Japan made the decision to terminate an alliance that no longer protected its 
territorial interests.  
Conclusion 
The renewals of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty showed that these allies consolidated 
their alliance relationship by treaty revision when their alliance was in danger of 
collapsing. The general historical account for such success builds on the shared 
interests between allies. The British and Japanese interests in the Far East were quite 




and Japan suggests that these allies had different security needs, and that each tried to 
persuade the other to commit to obligations that were favorable to their own. For 
example, in the 1905 renegotiation, Britain tried to stipulate the type and amount of 
Japanese military support for the defense of India, but Japan resisted and a bargain was 
made in the final text of the treaty. Britain and Japan both genuinely pushed for the best 
possible distribution of treaty obligations. If any party had decided to be unyielding 
during the negotiations, it would have been difficult to reach the final bargain.  
The allies needed to ensure that their partners were still committed to the alliance 
and that renewal of the treaty would create a sustained cooperative relationship. In the 
1905 renewal, the alliance-specific assets affected the allies’ bargaining behavior, since 
they both recognized that their investments in China (and Korea) should be protected 
by the agreement. Britain and Japan were cooperative during the bargaining because 
they recognized that some demands regarding obligations, such as specific 
requirements for Japanese support for Britain in India, were in effect not feasible or 
distracted from the overall purpose of the alliance.  
Britain and Japan were aware of each other’s main interests in Asia, and it was 
clear that the alliance would provide each with the necessary security benefit. They 
realized that the fate of their own territorial possessions highly depended on the security 
of the other’s territory. This understanding generated credible commitment to future 
alliance relationship. Because each ally was confident that the other had a substantial 
interest in maintaining the alliance, both were able to communicate their demands 
credibly and to appear more accommodating during the renegotiation. Even after their 




accepted the Japanese objection to specifying military assistance to India because it 
realized that Japan’s ability to project military power was limited. Japan accepted the 
British refusal to recognize Korea as a Japanese protectorate because such a status was 
not yet justified in 1905, and no schedule for progress toward it was set.  
Moreover, Japan and Britain understood that further delay in announcing the 
renewal might impact the pending Russo-Japanese peace negotiations. The renewal 
would continue to signal a cohesive alliance and deter Russia from attempting revenge. 
Further, were the alliance not to be renewed in 1905, the British election the following 
year might elect a Liberal government that would oppose extension of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance, in which case the window of opportunity for renewal would have 
been lost.  
In 1911, the need to revise the treaty was more urgent because the interest 
divergence between allies enlarged. The alliance-specific assets took on a larger role, 
since Japan needed British recognition of its annexation of Korea, and the British navy 
needed to concentrate on the German threat in Europe. The Russo-Japanese 
rapprochement and Anglo-American friendship signaled updated security interests for 
both Japan and Britain. Again, the allies discussed the fate of their alliance. The British 
recognition of the annexation of Korea from the start increased Japan’s confidence in 
Britain’s commitment. Realizing that Japan had become a strong military power that 
could significantly contribute to the security of its oversea possessions, Britain used its 
prestige to protect Japan’s interests in Korea and Manchuria in order to secure the 
colonies in the Far East. Not only did Britain and Japan recognize each other’s strategic 




made significant investment in those territories and could not afford the security risk 
were the alliance not to be renewed.  
The 1920-21 renegotiation, by contrast, failed. Despite Britain’s efforts to signal 
its friendly intentions, Japan became increasingly uncertain about the British position 
regarding renewal. During the Washington Naval Conference, Japan had the 
impression that Britain was joining hands with the US to suppress the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance. Britain was aware of Japan’s frustration, but the unbending attitude of the US 
and its growing importance in maintaining peace in the Far East made Britain unable 
to propose an effective alternative. Japan realized that the US would force Britain to 
abrogate the Anglo-Japanese alliance even against British wishes.  
In the case discussed in this chapter, successful renegotiation depended on the 
ability of each ally to verify its partner’s commitment to their alliance. Each ally relied 
on public information regarding military deployment, military strength, and the balance 
of power in international politics in order to understand the other’s core interests in 
relation to the alliance. These core interests only matter when they cannot be easily 
ignored and are threatened when not protected by the alliance. In the case of Britain 
and Japan, territorial interests in the Far East, along with large investments in those 
territories, were evidence of their sustained loyalty to the alliance. As these interests 
faded during the interwar period, Britain found it increasingly difficult to communicate 
to Japan its intention to maintain the alliance, as was evident during the Washington 
Naval Conference. Japan also found it difficult to convince Britain that it did not intend 
to infringe on the latter’s exclusive interests in China. Although Japan had no plans to 




a cause of concern to Whitehall. Japan’s rising ambition made Britain unable to verify 





Chapter 5 The Sino-Soviet alliance: a lost opportunity  
Overview of the Sino-Soviet split 1950-1969 
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the People’s Republic 
of China. The CCP’s victory in the Chinese Civil War largely depended on the support 
of the Soviet Union.77 With Chiang Kai-shek’s retreat to Taiwan, the main security 
agenda of the CCP was to eliminate the remaining Nationalist (KMT) forces in 
Southern China and Taiwan, and this required Soviet support. The CCP and Moscow 
maintained a close relationship. As the PRC inherited the international status of the 
Nationalist regime, so the “Treaty of Friendship and Alliance” signed by the KMT and 
the Soviets in 1945 was still effective. The Soviets wanted the PRC to continue this 
treaty, but the CCP refused owing to provisions regarding Manchuria and Mongolia. 
Moscow then agreed to write a new treaty with the PRC and made several concessions 
regarding Manchuria.78 In 1950, Zhou Enlai and Andrzej Wyszyński signed the Treaty 
of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, which provided for a defense 
obligation and economic assistance from the Soviets. This treaty formally established 
the Sino-Soviet alliance.79 
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See (Radchenko, 2009, p. 8). 
79 See (Z. Shen, Li, & Stiffler, 2010, pp. 395–7). For detailed background on the formation of the alliance, 
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The relations between the two fellow communist nations reached their apex when 
Mao voiced support for the Soviets during the Polish-Hungarian Crisis, but 
dissatisfaction gradually grew.80 After Stalin died and Khrushchev assumed leadership, 
the Soviet Union altered its Stalinist policy and the divergence between the allies 
became salient. Mao Zedong confronted Khrushchev openly, denouncing him and his 
followers of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as “revisionists.” 
Irritated by China’s disobedience and challenges, Khrushchev ceased all economic and 
military assistance to its ostensible ally.  
Efforts were made to remedy the broken friendship. In 1963, delegates met for 
negotiations that eventually fell apart. In October of the next year, Khrushchev was 
forced to step down, after which the Soviets stopped criticizing the CCP and an 
opportunity for reconciliation emerged. Mao seized this opportunity and sent a Chinese 
delegation to meet with the new Soviet leaders, but this did not mend the broken 
relationship. The Soviet Union and China resumed criticizing each other in party  
publications, but in the spring of 1965, despite Brezhnev’s pessimism, Kosygin made 
two visits to Beijing to seek friendship; these trips proved to be a disappointment, 
however, and no further attempt was made to maintain the alliance. 
When the US intervened in Vietnam in 1965, China and the Soviet Union 
competed with each other in sending support to the Vietcong, and China went so far as 
to sabotage the Soviet effort to bring an end to the war. In 1967 and 1968, skirmishes 
between forces from the two sides took place along the Sino-Soviet border in Northeast 
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China, and these disputes quickly escalated. In the spring of 1969, a military conflict 
erupted over Zhenbao (Damanskii) Island, an uninhabited island on the Ussuri River.81 
Although neither China nor the Soviets formally abrogated the Sino-Soviet alliance, its 
obligations no longer bound either party, and neither evoked their treaty in reference to 
their relationship in this period until it expired 11 years later. The relationship had 
remained tense, and both side prepared for a large-scale conflict.82  
There has been a tremendous amount of literature on the Sino-Soviet split 
published in the post-Cold War era. With the partial declassification of primary 
documents in China and Russia, scholars are able to piece together the opinions of 
leadership circles in the period between 1956 and 1969. In this chapter, I do not intend 
to make any new claims regarding the reasons behind the Sino-Soviet split. The aim is 
instead to investigate Sino-Soviet relations from the perspective of reasons why China 
and the Soviet Union could not maintain their alliance through renegotiation. Not only 
did they fail to show continuous commitment to a common course, but they also had 
little evidence of each other’s sincerity. The following discussion takes into account 
the Soviet specialists assigned to China, Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear 
program and ballistic missile development, the issues of a joint submarine force and 
long-wave radar, the negotiation in 1964-5, competition during Vietnam War, and the 
Soviet alliance with Mongolia. I will discuss the relevant variables and shed light on 
the two sides’ failure to renegotiate. Table 5.1 lists important developments in the Sino-
Soviet relationship and a brief summary of the reason for their renegotiation failure. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of Sino-Soviet Split 
Year  Event Consequence Variable  
1958  
 
 Dispute on long 
range radar and joint 
submarine fleet  
 Second Taiwan 
Strait Crisis 
 Disagreements emerged between 
communist partners. 
 The Soviets saw China an unrestrained 
partner that might entrap them in a 
conflict with the US. 
 China became dissatisfied regarding 
Soviet intervention on the question of 
Taiwan and Sino-India border conflict.  
 
1960   Withdrawal of 
Soviet specialists 
 Ceased nuclear and 
missile assistance.  
 The polemic 
between CCP and 
CPSU began.  
 The Soviets withdrew their most 
important investment in bilateral 
relations.  
 The Soviets’ reservations regarding 
defense technology transfer made China 
doubt its ally’s willingness to cooperate.  
 The security benefit of the alliance 
weakened as China was uncertain about 
the Soviet commitment.  
 China managed to develop its economy 
and weaponry without the Soviet help. 








 China was unsure of the attitude of the 
new Soviet leaders toward the alliance. 
 The Soviets were too optimistic about 
China’s change of policy.  
 The Soviet leaders failed to provide 
substantive cooperation that satisfied 






1966  The formation of 
Soviet-Mongolian 
alliance 
 The alliance signaled the Soviet’s 
determination to counter China on 
northern Chinese border. 
 Chinese leader believed that the Soviet 
Union would attack and redirected its 




It is widely recognized that the personalities of Mao and Khrushchev and their 
divergence on ideological grounds were crucial to the Sino-Soviet split. Mao’s 
insistence on Stalinism and world revolution created a rift with the Soviet leadership 
that continued to shape the Sino-Soviet relationship during the Brezhnev era. Personal 




story. These allies’ lack of confidence in each other was not based on prejudice but on 
the lack of dedicated commitment on the part of either. The Sino-Soviet alliance 
resulted in the investment of a very limited amount of fixed assets in the relationship, 
which made it difficult to guarantee a long-term partnership. When the allies’ interest 
divergence grew larger over the issue of Taiwan or India (Tibet), it became more 
difficult to coordinate common security goals, since neither felt the need to make 
concessions in a process of intra-alliance bargaining.  
As this chapter will show, the ten years of polemics over Marxism did not fully 
represent how the leaders viewed their relationship or each other’s ideology, but a were 
rather a bargaining tool in a struggle in which each side tried to compel the other to 
concede. Some concessions were offered after Khrushchev stepped down, but not 
enough to constitute a credible signal that their divergence could be resolved. Later on, 
the Soviet alliance with Mongolia confronted Beijing with the prospect of a Soviet 
presence on China’s northern border and signaled the Soviets’ new strategic interests. 
These moves reinforced Beijing’s fear of a pending Soviet attack and foreclosed any 
hope of restoring friendship between the two communist nations. 
Sovereignty above All 
The Sino-Soviet alliance treaty did not mandate any military installation on either 
party’s territory; any talk of doing so was thought to impede rather than to promote 
their relationship. The Treaty with the KMT did allow for a Soviet military presence in 
Manchuria. Most of the Soviet troops withdrew when the CCP established the PRC, 




contention during the negotiation of the 1950 Treaty.83 China insisted on the return of 
Port Arthur, and Stalin eventually conceded, though the Soviet troops did not 
completely withdraw from the city until five years later. This act alerted the Chinese 
leaders that the Soviet Union, like Tsarist Russia, still wanted to maintain an influence 
over China. The “hundred-year humiliation” created a strong aversion to military 
cooperation in the form of troops or equipment on Chinese soil.84 To prevent any Soviet 
control over China’s internal affairs, Zhou Enlai signed a supplemental document along 
with the alliance treaty in which China declared that no treaty ports or foreign 
investment would be allowed in Manchuria or Xinjiang.85 Beijing meant to consolidate 
its sovereignty and to counter Soviet influence in these regions. 
An event in summer of 1958 showed the difficulty of Sino-Soviet military 
cooperation in the context of China’s fear of infringement on its sovereignty. The 
Soviet military had no ballistic missiles that could strike the western coast of the US. 
The military suggested deploying a submarine fleet on the eastern coast of China. To 
do so, the Soviets would need a long-wave radio station in Asia for communication 
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with the fleet.86 The Soviets had already been helping the Chinese to build several radio 
stations upon the establishment of the PLA’s submarine fleet, but China needed a high 
power, long wave radio station to command deep sea submarine operations. Given the 
high cost of building such a station, the Soviets proposed sharing expenses; return, they 
would have access to the station for ten years. At the same time, Soviet Ambassador 
Yudin proposed joint construction of a submarine fleet in his offer of Soviet naval 
assistance to Mao. Mao, however, was immediately on guard against the proposal and 
suspected that the Soviets intended to use the joint fleet as a prerequisite for future navy 
assistance. 
The proposal touched a sensitive nerve in China. The Soviet Union simply wanted 
to build a submarine fleet in concert with its allies and jointly defend against the US. 
China, however, believed that this was an attempt to exert control over the PLA navy. 
The next day, Yudin was summon to meet Mao again, who lamented that: 
 You do not trust the Chinese at all, only the Russians. Russians are superior 
while the Chinese are inferior and careless. So you want a joint venture? 
Since you want a joint venture, let us discuss everything---army, navy, air 
force. Industry, agriculture, culture, and education. Is this okay? Maybe we 
should give you the entire Chinese coastline of over then thousand kilometers, 
while we only keep a guerrilla army. You possess only a little nuclear power, 
yet you want to control and lease. (Z. Shen & Xia, 2015, pp. 311–14) 
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Mao believed that the long-wave radio and joint fleet proposals violated Chinese 
sovereignty. These proposals recalled painful memories of the European powers 
establishing settlements in China. To be sure, the Soviets did not plan to take advantage 
of China. The CPSU was concerned about its struggle with the US and wanted Chinese 
help for the sake of Chinese interests. From the Chinese perspective, however, any joint 
security cooperation would fall under the suspicion of foreign control. This incident 
was not a simple miscommunication or mistranslation between Yudin and Mao. 
Claiming that a cooperative fleet would be a means of “control and lease” showed that 
China was deeply concerned about Soviet involvement in its military affairs. 
The Soviet relationship with the Eastern bloc countries was mostly hierarchical. 
The Sino-Soviet alliance was an exception. China feared any sign of dependence on 
the Soviets in bilateral cooperation, and the Soviets usually tolerated this concern. 
Mao’s rage quickly got back to the Kremlin. Khrushchev immediately arranged a secret 
visit to meet Mao in person. He blamed the Soviet military for the manner in which 
they had presented the two proposals and claimed that Yudin sent the wrong message. 
He guaranteed that the CPSU had never considered a joint command or joint possession 
of the Chinese fleet. Mao and Khrushchev agreed to scrap the joint fleet proposal. As 
for the long-wave radio station, China insisted on paying for the construction but agreed 
to allow the Soviets access to it.  
A similar interaction occurred in 1957, when the US deployed tactical missiles 
(MGMs) on Taiwan. This significantly increased Taiwan’s deterrence capability, 
further strengthened Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, and dimmed Beijing’s hope to take 




ask if they should issue a similar statement. Ambassador Yudin then proposed to help 
China build its missile defense. It was not clear whether the missiles would be operated 
by the Soviet military or the PLA, but Zhou declined the proposal without further 
clarification (Z. Shen, Li, & Stiffler, 2010, p. 222). China believed that the US was 
deploying the MGM missiles to restrain Chiang. Mao and his leadership circle feared 
that direct Soviet intervention in the Taiwan Strait would bring similar Soviet influence 
in China.87  China was resolute about preventing any foreign encroachment on its 
autonomy.  
These events demonstrate why Sino-Soviet security cooperation was limited to 
financial and technical assistance. Owing to sovereignty concerns, the Sino-Soviet 
militaries had no joint exercise or operation. The Soviet Union helped China to build 
up its military strength, but it seldom asked China to defend its security interests. Most 
of the alliance relationship was handled through the foreign services, and there were no 
regular communication channels between leaders or high-ranking officers. Leaders in 
Beijing and Moscow were therefore often unsure about the attitude of their counterparts. 
The lack of substantive cooperation brought with it a lack of trust and room for 
suspicion.  
Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the leaders knew clearly that their 
security interests were parallel and they made attempts to reach reconciliation. The 
problem was that neither could convince the other to concede or to join in crafting a 
solution that would transcend their differences. Beijing and Moscow relied on a fragile 
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prospect of cooperation and empty promises when evaluating their alliance relationship, 
and it gradually lost its function.  
Nuclear and Missile Assistance 
Nuclear cooperation and ballistic missile technology transfer were of great 
importance for the Sino-Soviet alliance. Both sides saw this kind of cooperation as key 
to their friendship and symbolic of their commitment to the alliance. The withdrawal 
of the Soviet specialists was part of the larger program of Soviet military assistance to 
China. The struggle between Mao and Khrushchev ended the Soviet specialists 
program and with it Soviet assistance with nuclear and ballistic missiles. 
The CCP showed interest in developing nuclear weapons before 1950. Stalin was 
willing to extend the Soviet nuclear umbrella to include China, but was hesitant to share 
nuclear technology with it. In the draft alliance treaty proposed by the Soviets, the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry wrote that the defense obligation included “military and other 
assistance with all the means.” This implies that the Soviets would use nuclear weapons 
to defend an ally. Mao, however, was not satisfied with the treaty. He asked the Soviets 
to help China to obtain its own nuclear capability, but Stalin refused.  
After Stalin had died, Mao asked Khrushchev in 1954 whether the Soviet Union 
would provide assistance with the development of atomic energy and nuclear weapons. 
Although the Sino-Soviet relationship was then at its height, Khrushchev only went so 
far as to promise to help China build a prototype reactor for research purposes. A few 
months later, the two reached an agreement in accordance with which the Soviets 
dispatched experts to help China build the research reactor and promises were made to 




quickly under Soviet guidance. The team of a dozen Soviet nuclear specialists was 
behind the design and construction of China’s first nuclear reactor and cyclotron. It 
also brought teaching curriculums to train Chinese scientists and engineers, and 
supervised experiments with the nuclear reactor. In 1956, the Soviet Union and China 
jointly established a nuclear research institute in Dubna that housed a physics 
laboratory with the most advanced equipment and was focused on scientific research 
and training. Many Chinese nuclear physicists received instruction during their visits 
and went on to form the core advisors for China’s nuclear weapon program (Z. Shen et 
al., 2010, pp. 213–6).  
Between 1955 and 1957, Soviet nuclear assistance was forthright and prompt. 
China had a very limited technological foundation in terms of nuclear science. The 
Soviets not only delivered necessary equipment and fissile materials, but also offered 
the most advanced training to Chinese experts, so that China was able to establish its 
own nuclear industry within just a single decade.  
Despite their generous assistance, the Soviets did not want China to produce a 
nuclear weapon. Their assistance focused on civilian rather than military use of nuclear 
energy, with the goal of helping China to build the basic infrastructure that was severely 
lacking. Starting in 1956, the Soviets tried to negotiate a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with 
the US and Britain, and it would have been inappropriate to allow China to build a 
nuclear bomb while asking other nuclear states to stop nuclear tests.  
This attitude became clear with regard to the technological transfer of ballistic 
missiles. The Soviets had been unwilling to respond directly to China’s requests, and 




(PAKETA-2) missiles, related training equipment, and a team of 102 rocket engineers 
and technicians. These missiles were an outdated model, first tested in 1946 and retired 
in 1953. It was clear that the Soviets wanted to limit the development of ballistic 
missiles in China. Nevertheless, with the help of the Soviets Chinese missile 
technology progressed significantly. In 1958, China established its first missile unit and 
a ballistic missile training facility. The Soviets provided five SAM missiles for 
deployment and research. China was able to test its first short-range ballistic missile in 
1960.  
The Soviets were very careful, however, not to release the latest military 
technology to China. For example, before his trip to China, the Soviet missile expert 
Major General Aleksandr Savel’ev was summoned to Moscow and instructed not to 
reveal information related to equipment other than what that had already been delivered 
to China. Were he to become unsure about whether to discuss a certain subject, 
Savel’ev was to ask for instructions from Moscow through the Soviet embassy. The 
Soviets refused to provide the key parts, materials, and specialized equipment 
necessary to produce advanced weaponry. China was aware of Soviet reservations. Nie 
Rongzhen, the head of China’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, commented that 
“Soviet aid was with reservation and limitations … They wanted us to copy their third 
line or outdated equipment, but did not give us the latest first or second line products” 
(Nie, 1983, p. 805).88  
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The Soviet Union gradually reduced its nuclear assistance to China in late 1950s. 
Khrushchev purposefully delayed the delivery of a nuclear bomb sample and blueprints 
in 1959 (Z. Shen et al., 2010, p. 239). To alleviate China’s security concerns, the 
Soviets reemphasized their security guarantee, including the nuclear umbrella, on 
various occasions (Jersild, 2014, p. 148). All the same, they recalled some of their 
nuclear specialists the next year, stopped sending the specialists who were essential to 
China’s ballistic missile research, and tightened control over those specialists who still 
worked in China. The Soviets ignored China’s requests for specialists and equipment. 
When, in 1960, Moscow terminated all nuclear and ballistic missile assistance to China, 
only seven of 30 nuclear projects were complete.  
The Soviets thus cut off the most important, if not the only, cooperative venture 
in the Sino-Soviet alliance, a move that suggested that they no longer believed China’s 
support to be vital for advancing their own security interests. Indeed, Mao’s radical 
ideology made China seem more like a saboteur rather than an ally in the Soviets’ 
attempts to reconcile with the US. Recalling their specialists was a strong signal that 
the Soviets might back away from their alliance commitment. The most important 
problem was, however, the ease with which the Soviets were able to withdraw all their 
assistance. The withdrawal of specialists and halt on equipment supply had an 
immediate impact to China’s industrialization and weapons development. China 
struggled to complete the work that had been begun jointly on its own and realized that 
it had relied too much on aid that the Soviets might cease at any moment if China 
misbehaved; the same might be the case with the nuclear umbrella written into the 




were its security to be subject to the US nuclear threat. Fear of abandonment by the 
Soviets drove China from relying on the alliance and motivated it to continue its nuclear 
weapons program, since Soviet aid in the first few years had given China the capability 
to produce a nuclear bomb and ballistic missiles.  
Withdrawing specialists was meant to punish China and coerce it to cooperate 
with the Soviet Union in foreign policy. The Soviets also bore some cost since they had 
invested a significant amount of equipment and human resources in the Sino-Soviet 
relationship. But their loss was not permanent. The specialists went home to serve the 
Soviet Union and could be dispatched again should the program be resumed, in which 
case they would still have influence over China’s industrialization or weapon 
development. So it was during the temporary thaw in Sino-Soviet relations in 1961, 
when the failure of the Great Leap Forward brought pressure to bear on Mao’s 
leadership in CCP.89 The Soviet Union quickly restored its assistance, offering China 
equipment necessary for its nuclear industry and several nuclear specialists.90 The next 
year, when Sino-Soviet tension rose owing to the Cuba Crisis, the Soviets again put an 
end to the assistance. The mercurial nature of Soviet assistance was a problem that 
contributed to the lack of trust in the Sino-Soviet alliance.  
The Soviet Specialist Program 
The Sino-Soviet alliance did not have any fixed assets on the part of either side at 
any point during the alliance relationship, or at least no military establishment that was 
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meant to protect the security of the allies. The closest the Soviets came to investment 
in the alliance relationship was the specialist program. The Soviets sent thousands of 
experts in various fields to assist China who contributed to China’s technological 
development in industry, agriculture, higher education, and national defense. The 
Kremlin made a friendly gesture by allowing these experts to share technology and 
scientific research. The program was intended to show that the Soviets treated China 
with respect and as an equal, unlike the imperialists of the previous era.  
Between 1950 and 1956, 5092 Soviet experts worked in China, most of whom 
were engineers and factory chiefs. Some worked for the universities in fields including 
philosophy, economics, engineering, and languages. The assistance of Soviet experts 
and the equipment was crucial to the establishment of industries in the new China. The 
Chinese media reported that about a quarter of newly founded enterprises received the 
Soviet support, but the actual number was higher. 91  Before the Soviet specialists 
withdrew, they helped build 265 enterprises in China. Goncharenko estimates that the 
Soviet Union spent about 100 billion rubles on construction enterprises in China (in 
terms of the domestic price), representing about 7% of the Soviet annual national 
income in 1959.92  
This type of assistance, however, failed to signal commitment in  the Sino-Soviet 
relationship. The specialists were short-term contractors, and the Soviet government 
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took a passive role in the process. Beijing made the demand for specialists and the 
Kremlin selected suitable candidates. When the specialists came to China, the 
institutions for which they worked would sign contracts with them. China paid for the 
specialists’ salary, housing, part of their living expenses, and sometimes airline tickets. 
If the specialists wanted to bring family with them or their family wished to visit, the 
Chinese government covered the expense. China also paid compensation to the 
institutions at which these experts originally worked (Z. Shen, 2003, pp. 219–26). The 
Soviet specialists themselves enjoyed extraterritoriality: Chinese courts could not 
convict Soviet citizens.93  The true burden of the specialist program was therefore 
mostly on the Chinese government, which, when the program became an increasing 
financial burden, reduced the number of specialists to the minimum possible level and 
paid the expenses with loans from the Soviets (Z. Shen, 2003, p. 227).  
The Soviets did not pay a large cost in this relationship. Moreover, they had full 
control over the knowledge that the specialists shared with China, and were careful not 
to release sensitive technology. The specialist program soon became a problem when 
the Chinese found that the specialists could not meet their demands. China complained 
about the working discipline of some of the specialists. A report submitted to the CCP 
Central Committee in 1957 claimed that the Soviet instructors and educators were free 
to contribute their knowledge, but other specialists were usually unwilling to pass along 
key technological information for fear of punishment by their home government. The 
report also complained that the Soviets sent incompetent workers to China: some 
specialists had no preparation for their job, some were undisciplined, and one violated 
                                                 




local law. Although most of these complaints were due to the heavy workload 
demanded by the Chinese, they showed that the specialist program gradually had 
become an unwelcome part of the Sino-Soviet cooperation. China still appreciated the 
Soviet help, but it began to feel that the Soviet Union did not put enough in the 
relationship.  
To make matters worse, the Chinese believed, perhaps mistakenly, that these 
problems were evidence that the Soviets were not treating China as an equal partner 
and were not sincere about helping China to modernize. This discontent had long 
existed in the Sino-Soviet relationship. In a reply to Khrushchev’s request to supply 
workers for logging projects in Siberia, Mao sharply commented: “You know, 
Comrade Khrushchev, for years it’s been a widely held view that because China is an 
underdeveloped and overpopulated country, with widespread unemployment, it 
represents a good source of cheap labor. But you know, we Chinese find this attitude 
very offensive” (Kissinger, 2011, p. 163).  
The Soviets, however, had no intention of using the specialist program to impede 
China’s development. In an internal meeting before he departed for a visit to China, 
Khrushchev told his comrades, “If we do not help China to develop the foundation of 
its socialist industrialization in the next five years, we will miss the historical moment 
to establish and consolidate friendship with China.” Nevertheless, the Soviets did see 
China as an underdeveloped country in need of help, and the Chinese felt offended 
when the Soviet government or its specialists occasionally showed this attitude.  
When it became clear that Khrushchev’s foreign policy collided with Mao’s, the 




alliance bargaining. The Sino-Indian border clashes and the Second Taiwan Strait 
Crisis stunned the Kremlin.94 Differences began to increase in the course of these 
events in 1958 and 1959. During the Sino-Indian clash, Khrushchev’s suggestion of 
settling the border issue with India displeased Mao, and his criticism of China’s policy 
in Tibet also irritated the leaders in Beijing.95  
During the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Soviet Union was upset that China did not 
consult Moscow before the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu. At that time, the US already 
deployed tactical nuclear weapons on Taiwan. A surprise attack on the Nationalist-
occupied off-shore islands might drag the Soviet Union into a nuclear standoff. The 
Soviets had also heard that the US seemed to believe that Beijing’s military move had 
happened with Moscow’s acquiescence.96 Mao made the situation worse by openly 
advocating the use of nuclear force against the US. His provocative rhetoric suggested 
that Beijing might risk war with the US over Taiwan.97 Not knowing how Chiang Kai-
shek or the US would respond to the shelling, the Soviet Union had a grave concern 
about entrapment. Khrushchev believed that it was necessary to rein in China. 
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In addition to the unnerving military conflicts with a third party, the Soviet-
American rapprochement increased the rifts between China and the Soviets. 
Khrushchev’s visit to the US in 1959 was his first step to seek reconciliation with the 
US, and although this trip did not settle bilateral disputes, it nevertheless opened the 
window for “peaceful coexistence” and a series of disarmament talks. Khrushchev’s 
new direction, however, went against Chinese foreign policy interests. Mao had 
advocated the struggle against capitalist countries, mainly the US. His radical views on 
the West were partly the result of political tensions within the CCP, but they inevitably 
impacted the Sino-Soviet relationship. Mao alleged that Khrushchev “betrayed the 
Marxist, proletarian undertakings; he had changed into a revisionist” (Luthi, 2008, p. 
151). The CCP-controlled media then started to attack the Soviets and targeted 
Khrushchev personally. The Soviets responded with the same criticism of China. A 
grand polemic between allies began.98  
Khrushchev decided to punish the aggressive and reckless attitude of Mao. The 
Soviets recalled all of their specialists in the summer of 1960 without prior warning. 
Even the specialists themselves were unprepared for the withdrawal.99 The Soviets 
claimed that increasing friction between the specialists and their Chinese co-workers 
led to the decision to the withdrawal. According to the available records, each side held 
the other responsible for the tense relations that characterized the specialist program. 
The Soviets claimed that the Chinese deliberately provoked the specialists into 
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arguments and that China’s disrespect of and suspicion toward the specialists violated 
the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (Z. Shen, 2003, p. 384). The Chinese complained 
that the Soviet military specialists became cold and unresponsive to Chinese hospitality 
(Jersild, 2014, pp. 162–3). It is difficult to judge which side was initially responsible 
for the tension. In any case, both the Soviet specialists and the Chinese had transferred 
the fraught state of relations between their governments to their daily interactions.  
After the specialists returned to the Soviet Union, the CPSU issued a statement 
blaming China for not cooperating with them and purposely disrupting their work. The 
Soviets did not hint at any possibility that the specialist programs might resume should 
China improve its attitude. The withdrawal had an immediate impact on the Chinese 
economy, which was already on the verge of collapse owing to the disastrous Great 
Leap Forward. The sudden withdrawal meant that most of the specialists had not 
completed their work. According to the Chinese government, the Soviets scrapped 600 
contracts, withdrew 1390 experts, cancelled sending 900 experts that were slated to 
come to China, and halted the delivery of equipment vital for construction projects (Xin, 
1989, p. 461).  
The Soviet Union had had no substantive investment in the alliance relationship 
since the withdrawal of the specialists. More importantly, the Soviets refused to discuss 
how or when the specialist program would resume. The connection between the allies 
had already been weak. Withdrawing the experts sent China a strong signal that the 
Soviets would no longer invest resources in their relationship. Furthermore, this event, 
along with the start of polemical exchanges, impacted China’s trade dependency on the 




p. 179). Losing a major trade partner, China enforced a “self-reliance” policy and 
purchased the equipment needed for industrial enterprises from West European 
countries. As China slowly decreased its dependence on the Soviet Union, it became 
reluctant to negotiate with its ally.  
A Change in the Wind 
In 1964, the Kremlin underwent a quiet revolution. While Khrushchev was on 
vacation in Abkhazia, his colleagues conspired to remove him from power. On October 
13, Khrushchev was back to Moscow to attend a Presidium meeting, only to find other 
Presidium members attacking him for policy failures. Khrushchev resigned the next 
day. The news of leadership change reached Beijing soon after the Presidium 
meeting.100  
The leadership change seemed to offer a good opportunity for Sino-Soviet 
reconciliation. The Chinese and the Soviets had criticized each other openly for the 
past few years. Many of these criticisms targeted the leaders, Khrushchev and Mao. It 
was true that Khrushchev’s crotchety temper caused a feud with Mao, and that his 
foreign policy since the 20th Congress of the CPSU had been the main source of strife 
between the two communist nations. The removal of Khrushchev suggested that 
cardinal members of CPSU might reverse his policies and treat China differently, 
respecting its foreign policy goals and the Chinese leader.  
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To be sure, Mao and his colleagues were unclear about what had happened in 
Moscow. They did not know who had assumed leadership or what the new leader 
thought about relations with China. Judging from the information brought to the 
embassy in Moscow, Khrushchev had been criticized for the deterioration of the Sino-
Soviet relationship and the new regime was expressing the desire to resume a friendly 
relationship with China. But an op-ed in Pravda showed that the Soviets would 
maintain the policy guidelines after the 20th Congress of CPSU. This corresponded with 
public statements by Brezhnev on October 19. Despite the mixed signals, Mao decided 
to probe the Soviets’ position. China suspended all its attacks on the Soviet Union in 
its media and released a message of reconciliation. Then Mao proposed sending a high-
level delegation to participate in the 47th Anniversary of the Russian Revolution, led 
by Zou En-lai and He Long. The appointment of such high-ranking delegates showed 
that the Chinese leader valued this opportunity highly. According to Mao, the mission 
of the delegation was to establish contacts, probe the Soviets’ intentions, and determine 
the proper response (Radchenko, 2009, p. 130). 
Although the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing remained doubtful about Mao’s 
intentions, the leadership circle in Moscow was optimistic about the visit of the Chinese 
delegation.101 They believed that China was ready to mend the bilateral relationship. 
Moscow carefully prepared for the delegation’s arrival. Before the Chinese delegation 
departed for Moscow, the Soviet embassy in China was informed that all the events 
involving the Chinese delegates “will proceed in a friendly and relaxed atmosphere. 
                                                 




The Chinese comrades should clearly feel that we are ready to contact and discuss 
subjects in which we are mutually interested” (Z. Shen et al., 2010, pp. 379–80). 
The Soviet leaders may have been too optimistic about China’s signal. Although 
Mao wanted to seize the opportunity to improve Sino-Soviet relations, he was not ready 
to abandon the ideological polemics or the competition for leadership of the communist 
world with the Soviets. Appointing Zhou as the head of delegation was a friendly 
gesture to signal China’s good will, but Zhou was not authorized to discuss substantive 
cooperation with the Soviets. The delegation went to Moscow to reestablish 
communication, not to negotiate. The Chinese also overestimated the impact of the 
leadership change on the Soviets. The removal of Khrushchev did not mean that the 
Soviet leaders would embrace China’s position; they wanted a compromise, or at least 
to set the policy disagreements aside.  
In this uncertain atmosphere, an event at a Kremlin banquet aggravated the tension. 
Soviet Marshall Rodion Malinovskii, apparently drunk at that time, made a provocative 
speech. He first attacked the US, and then told Zhou that “we should not allow the 
devils to hamper our relationship, Khrushchev or Mao alike.” Since Khrushchev had 
stepped down, this statement implied that China should remove Mao.102 The Chinese 
delegates angrily protested and left the cocktail party. Zhou held a long meeting that 
night and concluded that Malinovskii’s statement was not merely a reckless move 
under the influence of alcohol but a feeling shared among the Soviet leadership. 
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As a result, the official meeting between the Soviets and the Chinese delegation 
two days later did not go well. The Soviet leaders knew that Malinovskii had made a 
grave mistake. They offered an apology and insisted that Malinovskii’s remark did not 
represent the overall opinion of the Soviet leaders. The Chinese delegates disagreed 
and claimed that “truth lies in wine” (Luthi, 2008, p. 291). The Soviets would have 
liked to move on to the practical issues, but were disappointed when Zhou avoided 
those matters by claiming that he had no authority to negotiate. Since Mao was not 
ready to change the Chinese stance and did not authorize negotiation, Zhou’s hands 
were tied and he had to avoid discussions on resuming bilateral cooperation. The 
meeting ended with no substantive conclusion. The public polemics resumed and Sino-
Soviet relations remained tense.  
The removal of Khrushchev was indeed a chance for reconciliation. The Soviet 
leaders were determined to earn Mao’s friendship again. Unlike during the Khrushchev 
period, the new Soviet leaders were more willing to grant concessions to China and to 
continue the alliance relationship despite differences. The incident sparked by 
Malinovskii was unexpected. The Soviet leaders made it clear that they had no intention 
of disrespecting Mao in front of his loyal ministers. Zhou and Mao were also aware of 
this, but Mao decided to use this incident to pressure the Soviets, forcing them to grant 
greater concessions and perhaps to join with China in fomenting world revolution. This 
bluff caused more suspicion on the part of the Soviets as they began to question whether 
Mao really wanted to reconcile.  
With or without Malinovskii’s drunken speech, prospects for Sino-Soviet 




new leaders in the Kremlin and was unsure whether they would follow China’s idea for 
world revolution. He may have mistakenly believed that he had played a role in 
Khrushchev’s ouster, since China had openly pointed out Khrushchev’s wrongdoing.103 
The Soviet leadership, however, never abandoned Khrushchev’s foreign policy and 
recognized that disagreement still existed with China, but hoped that reconciliation 
might decrease the polemics and lead to the resumption of a partnership similar to the 
one enjoyed in the 1950s. While the Soviets were candid, their message failed to 
convince their Chinese counterparts because the Soviets refused to make a substantive 
commitment. The same applies to China. The Chinese delegation offered no 
substantive contribution to the bilateral security relationship, and Zhou’s claim that he 
was “not authorized to negotiate” disappointed the Soviet leaders, obstructing further 
discussion on improving the relationship. 
China and the Soviet Union each probed the other’s attitude, looking for signs of 
policy change. They failed to recognize the significance of the fact that their alliance 
relationship had involved no substantive cost to either side. China’s reliance on the 
Soviet defense decreased significantly after 1960, and the Soviet Union would not 
provide China the technology it most desired, namely nuclear weapons. The Soviets 
had little strategic interest in China, which did not provide any unique strategic value 
in the Soviets’ conflict with the US. Soviet investment in the alliance relationship 
during the Khrushchev era was already minimal, and the new Soviet leadership had no 
plans to increase it. To resume a friendly relationship, each ally needed to show its 
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commitment by supporting the other in defense matters or political goals, but neither 
did so during the closed-door meetings.  
After the failed meetings with Zhou, the Soviets did not give up all hope. In 1965, 
Kosygin visited Beijing twice to seek reconciliation. Mao received him with 
coldness,104 and the meeting failed to repair the Sino-Soviet relationship. Kosygin 
intended to use diplomatic connections to mend the relationship. He did not offer 
substantive security cooperation that interested China, but mildly persuaded Mao to 
abandon public polemics and encouraged unity among the fellow communist states.105 
Kosygin’s gentle diplomatic language failed to move Mao. The meeting showed that 
neither the Soviets nor China entertained the idea of investing more resources in their 
relationship and that each intended the other to make the first contribution. Both sides 
failed to see the potential future gains from their cooperation because they did not 
observe any alliance-specific assets in their current alliance relationship.  
An Ally at the Doorstep 
The Sino-Soviet disharmony naturally affected both countries’ relations with 
other communist governments. Research on the Sino-Soviet split often examines the 
triangular relationship with Vietnam to illustrate the rivalry between China and the 
Soviets. Christensen, for example, has drawn attention to how the two powers 
competed for the loyalties of the Vietnamese communists (Christensen, 2011, p. 181). 
This rivalry did not contribute to the suspension of the Sino-Soviet alliance, but was 
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rather the result of hostility between the allies. Sino-Soviet cooperation on assisting the 
Vietcong would have been the most effective way to influence the war in Indochina in 
a way that would benefit both China and the Soviets, so their inability to cooperate over 
Vietnam is an example of failed alliance management. Both allies tried to gain the 
upper hand in intra-alliance bargaining by earning the friendship of a third party. 
Immediately after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the US escalated its intervention 
in the Vietnam War. The Soviets decided to supply military aid to North Vietnam while 
seeking a negotiated resolution with the US. China, by contrast, opposed any form of 
negotiated settlement regarding Vietnam. When the Soviets proposed a conference on 
Indochina, China refused to participate and persuaded Vietnam to back out of 
Moscow’s peace initiative (Radchenko, 2009, pp. 148–50). Moscow and Beijing then 
became mired in quarrels over the transfer of Soviet supplies to Vietnam. The Soviets 
claimed that China deliberately delayed the shipments; China responded that the delay 
was due to bureaucratic procedure and Soviet failure to abide by the rules (Z. Shen, 
2011, pp. 422–8). Meanwhile, China massively increased its assistance to Vietnam, 
encouraging the Vietcong to escalate military activities against the South. 
These disputes between Moscow and Beijing again showed that their interests 
failed to cohere and, more importantly, that the allies were unwilling to accommodate 
each other over the course of an enduring relationship. China was eager to show other 
communist governments that the Soviet Union was an unsuitable leader that colluded 
with the US. The Soviets accused China of sabotaging Soviet assistance to a fellow 
communist nation. The allies shared the same goal, but instead of coordinating their 




War. This struggle was a follow-up to Zhou’s Moscow visit. Both sides were reluctant 
to contribute resources directed at sustaining a mutual relationship, but instead each 
expected the other to make the necessary effort.106  
Another key event that further deteriorated bilateral relationship was the Treaty of 
Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the Soviets and Mongolia in 1966. This 
defense treaty aggravated Beijing’s concern regarding border security in the north. The 
border issue between the Soviets and China was nothing new, being largely based on 
treaties between Tsarist Russia and Qing China. For a very long period of time, China 
found it hard to control and monitor the border effectively. Even after the establishment 
of the People’s Republic, China took a passive stance on the border issue and was 
reluctant to contest it with the Soviets. In 1951, China did manage to resolve part of the 
dispute regarding border territories in Northeast through an agreement with the Soviets.  
The border issue was not mentioned until the Sino-Soviet tension increased, and 
it continued to foster disputes. According to the Chinese government, the Soviets 
provoked 1674 border disputes from 1960 to 1964. The Soviet Union also claimed that 
Chinese citizens and soldiers frequently violated its border (Z. Shen, 2011, p. 389). At 
China’s request, the Soviets started border negotiations in 1964, but the negotiations 
ended with no formal agreement because the ownership of Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island 
remained unsettled (Chou, 2007, p. 48). 
The stalled border discussions and the increased number of disputes led to an 
increased Soviet military presence along the Sino-Soviet border. Beginning in 1960, 
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China replaced the US as the main target of Soviet military deployment in the Far East. 
The Soviets increased their infantry divisions in East Asia to the point that their 
deployment in the region accounted for about 27% of their total forces.107  
China’s worry was not unwarranted. The Soviet Union had a well-known record 
of invading communist nations that drifted away from its leadership. The invasion of 
Czechoslovakia was a recent example. China had become a renegade state, in the 
Soviets’ eyes, with the increased military tension along the Sino-Soviet border and 
China’s open challenges to Soviet leadership, making it the likely target of Soviet 
military intervention. 
The Soviet-Mongolian alliance made the Soviet threat more prominent because it 
decreased the distance for Soviet military projection. The closest point between the 
Sino-Mongolian border and Beijing was 560 kilometers, which meant that the Soviet 
mechanized force could advance to the Chinese capital within just two weeks (Kirby, 
Ross, & Gong, 2005, p. 150).  
As early as 1964, Chinese leaders received reports of Soviet military activities in 
Mongolia, including the deployment of mechanized forces. In February of 1964, Mao 
told Kim Il-Sung that the Soviets had exhausted all means of coercion, and “the only 
thing [they] had not tried was a war.”108 This security threat significantly altered the 
strategic thinking of Chinese leaders. The CCP Central Committee ordered three 
northern theater commands to strengthen their defense in preparation for a Soviet 
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invasion as China abandoned the strategy of “holding fast in the north, while retreating 
in the south” (bei ding nan fang).109 For the first time since 1949, China included the 
northern theaters in its main strategic build-up. Major cities in the north were reinforced 
for war (Z. Wang, 2002, p. 51). 
The Soviet-Mongolian treaty was established at the request of Ulaanbaatar.  
Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal, the Prime Minister of Mongolia, was concerned about the threat 
posed by China. Although the treaty specified no aggression toward China, it inevitably 
aggravated China’s security concerns because it called for the permanent stationing of 
a large number of advanced Soviet troops along the Sino-Mongolian border. The treaty 
sent a simple message: the Soviets deemed China a threat and were prepared to engage 
in a large-scale conflict if circumstances so demanded.  
The external alliance in this case served a different purpose. China originally did 
not see Mongolia as either a threat or a target of military attack. It was Tsedenbal who 
had persistent fear of Chinese economic and political control. Once Mongolia allied 
with the Soviets, however, the threat from the north increased significantly. The Soviet-
Mongolian alliance gave the Soviets a tactical advantage in launching a military attack 
and thus directly threatened Beijing. China could not ignore the security threat posed 
by the Soviet-Mongolian coalition.  
At this point, when the political dispute had escalated to military confrontation 
along the northern border, China realized that the Sino-Soviet alliance no longer 
protected its security. The Soviet-Mongolian alliance made clear the Soviets’ updated 
                                                 
109 The core of this strategy was to rely on Soviet help to retain full control over the north. Since the 
Soviet Union was unlikely to be a defender, the PLA was unlikely to hold the north and needed to divert 




security interests: they had no plan to ease the tension with China but rather were 
choosing military containment.110 Under such circumstances, China had no interest in 
reopening negotiations with the Soviets. It deployed heavy force to respond to the 
Soviet threat. The alliance treaty thus became obsolete with the establishment of the 
Soviet-Mongolian alliance, and the tension eventually pushed China and the Soviets 
into armed conflict. 
Conclusion 
The question raised in this chapter is whether Sino-Soviet relations could have 
been salvaged by renegotiation. China and the Soviets had several chances to 
renegotiate their relationship, but every attempt to reconcile ended in arguments and 
mistrust. The Sino-Soviet alliance lacked the kind of cooperation that could sustain a 
long-term commitment or could guarantee the core security interests for each side. 
Unlike the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Sino-Soviet alliance lacked territorial interests 
that helped the allies to confirm their future commitment to each other. Although China 
depended on the Soviets to extend deterrence in the first half of 1950s, the security 
cooperation between the communist nations remained weak. Besides the defense 
commitment written into the treaty, the relationship was maintained on the basis of 
one-sided assistance provided by the Soviets.  
To be sure, the asymmetric contribution did not necessarily cause the alliance to 
break down. The main problem was that the military and economic assistance failed to 
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create alliance-specific assets for both parties. Even during the Korean War, the arms 
and diplomatic support provided by the Soviets did not include combat troops but only 
military consultants. The cost of the war was almost entirely on the shoulders of the 
Chinese. The allies had no joint military operation, no regular exercises, no joint 
defense strategy, and no channels for sharing intelligence vital to their territorial 
interests. On the contrary, both sides kept a wary eye on each other. The Soviet Union 
was concerned about the use of force against Taiwan; it also refrained from supporting 
China in its border dispute with India. China was unwilling to provide ports or bases 
that would have allowed the Soviets to extend their military strength to counter the US. 
The alliance failed to promote the security benefits that both members were pursuing. 
Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the alliance relationship was maintained 
by the specialist program, which the Soviet Union could start or stop at any time. Soviet 
assistance created two problems. First, despite tight control and monitoring by the 
Soviet embassy, the Soviets could not guarantee that their experts would meet the 
demands of the Chinese institutions that they served. Specialists in defense technology 
were constrained by confidentiality, which was a source of great dissatisfaction for the 
Chinese. In addition, the burden of hiring the Soviet specialists should not be 
underestimated; even before the Sino-Soviet relationship became tense, the Chinese 
leaders lowered the number of specialists being brought in owing to financial 
constraints. Subsequently, the Chinese leadership was suspicious regarding the 
intentions behind the Soviet aid. The Soviets, on the other hand, believed that the 
Chinese failed to appreciate their forthright efforts. The specialist program by its nature 




Second, the importance of Soviet specialists dwindled after two five-year 
programs. With the help of Soviet experts, China gradually gained the ability to develop 
its own heavy industries, especially in the areas of nuclear weaponry and ballistic 
missiles. These weapon programs were the priority of the Chinese government. 
Recalling the specialists did not have as much impact as the Soviets expected; the main 
repercussion for China was that it would take few more years to complete the weapons 
programs. As China became less dependent on the Soviet specialist program, the value 
of the alliance decreased. When Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the 
specialists, the first concern the Chinese leaders had was not the suspension of 
industrial development but the reliability of the Soviets as an ally. Contrary to 
Khrushchev’s intention of sending a warning, the withdrawal of the specialists was 
taken as a strong signal of abandonment.  
The specialist program represented the closest thing to fixed assets in the Sino-
Soviet alliance, but it failed to constitute an alliance-specific assets. The tension might 
have been relieved when Khrushchev was ousted. However, the allies failed to improve 
their relationship during Zhou’s visit to Moscow because neither was willing to put 
forward substantive plans for mending the alliance relationship. The Soviet leadership 
did not intend to capitulate to China. Apart from good will, it offered no proposal that 
would enable China to soften its provocative attitude.  
The cooperation between allies was thus suspended, and the chances for resuming 
their relationship looked grim. Foreign policy disputes intensified territorial disputes. 
After 1965, the Sino-Soviet treaty completely lost its function. It did not encourage the 




respecting existing borders. The Soviet Union derived no security benefit from China. 
In fact, China had become a challenger with regard to Soviet territorial interests, an 
unlikely role for an ally. As a result of the worsening security dilemma, both sides 
reinforced the border. The Soviet-Mongolian defense treaty in 1966 signaled that the 
Soviet Union deemed China a threat. China realized that a military clash with the 
Soviets might be imminent and increased its counterbalancing effort. In the end, the 
alliance relationship became unsalvageable.  
In the aftermath of the 1969 border conflict, the Soviets twice proposed a non-
aggression treaty, in 1971 and 1973. China rejected these overtures and argued that the 
Treaty of Friendship already served such a purpose. The 1950 Treaty was, however, 
obsolete and incapable of reconciling the differences between the allies. This response 
only showed that China had no interest repairing the bilateral relationship. It was not 
until 1979, with the expiration of the 1950 Treaty and the normalization of the Sino-
American relationship, that China proposed terminating the Treaty and negotiating a 
new bilateral relationship (Z. Shen, 2011, pp. 459–63). Although both sides were 
willing to improve their relationship, it was clear that China would not join an alliance 
with the Soviets on account of the newly established Sino-American relationship. 
Negotiations stalled on the issue of the Soviet military presence in the Far East, and 
then completely stopped when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.  
None of the Western countries anticipated this change. Even after the Soviets 




not hamper the Sino-Soviet alliance.111 The US analysis neglected to give sufficient 
weight to the fact that the alliance cooperation did not require members to invest 
resources in order to protect vital interests, nor did allies intend to build such 
cooperation after alliance formation. The foundation of the alliance was in fact very 
weak. The Treaty had been written to cope with the security environment during the 
1950s, and it no longer served the security interests of the signatories.  
As a result, bilateral disputes made the allies concerned about each other’s 
continued commitment to the alliance. Both China and the Soviet Union made attempts 
to bridge their differences, but the nature of their alliance relationship prevented them 
from making concessions because both allies paid a relatively small cost for suspending 
the alliance, and the renegotiation failed quickly. This outcome is quite different from 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Britain and Japan bargained with each other knowing that 
each would remain committed to the alliance. There was no back-and-forth exchange 
of benefits in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Whenever one member made a demand, the 
other started to question its loyalty. In addition, neither side offered to stabilize the 
alliance relationship, nor did either think that it had anything to offer by way of 
furthering joint security interests. In the end, the Sino-Soviet alliance reached a dead 
end. Each side believed that it had been forced into an aggressive stance. The Sino-
Soviet split readjusted alliance politics in East Asia. China reconciled with the US and 
assisted in the containment of the Soviet Union. The chance for renegotiation never 
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Chapter 6 The US-Taiwan Alliance: a strenuous decade 
The Strategy of Delay 
This chapter examines the strategy of delay in intra-alliance bargaining. This 
strategy occurs when a partner evades or ignores the challenger’s demand. Instead of 
seeking a solution to a bilateral dispute, the partner insists on maintaining the status 
quo. To keep the challenger interested in the alliance, the partner reiterates its 
commitment to the current alliance by granting additional benefits. This chapter 
presents the US-Taiwan alliance as an example of the strategy of delay. From 1969 to 
1978, the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) and the US experienced a tense 
relationship. Taiwan kept asking the US to strengthen bilateral security ties, whereas 
the US endeavored to channel its commitment in different ways. The US found it 
necessary to delay its dispute with Taiwan for two reasons. First, strengthening the 
security relationship would inevitably be detrimental to the developing relations 
between the US and the PRC, which were a priority for the US government. The US 
would not upset Beijing by placating Taipei. Maintaining the status quo prevented 
Taiwan from sabotaging the negotiation between the US and PRC because the US had 
the leverage to restrain Taiwan. Second, any sign of abandoning Taiwan would impose 
a serious audience cost in domestic politics. The ROC had strong support within the 
Republican Party in the US, so the administration faced pressure from the Congress to 
maintain its security tie to Taiwan. The US was also concerned about the reputation 
cost to other allies in Asia. If the US had gone back on its promises to Taiwan, Korea 
and Japan would have become concerned about the US’s commitment to themselves. 




costs. The strategy of delay maintained the balanced relationship between Taipei and 
Beijing: it stabilized the tense US-ROC relationship and left room for the US-PRC 
relationship while also allowing the US government to respond to its pro-ROC 
domestic audience.  
The promises made by the US hardly eliminated Taiwan’s security concerns, and 
it therefore sought ways to decrease its dependence on the US for military protection. 
For nearly a decade, then, the relationship between Washington and Taipei was 
uncertain and quite tense. But the alliance managed to continue right up to the moment 
the US established a formal relationship with the PRC. The US provided credible 
signals about its future commitment to the security of Taiwan, which for its part was 
dissatisfied with the US-PRC reconciliation, but remained passive. Taiwan did not 
attempt to sabotage the US-PRC relationship, nor did it seriously consider dropping the 
alliance.  
An Overview of the US-Taiwan Alliance 
Since the establishment of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the 
ROC regime of Chiang Kai-shek (CKS) in 1954, the US maintained a close security 
partnership with CKS and helped him to repel military threats from the PRC. The ROC 
was one of the closest allies of the US during the Cold War. Bilateral security 
cooperation was close and stable throughout the 50s and 60s. Taiwan played an 
auxiliary role in spying on the communist world and in the Vietnam War. The ROC air 




intelligence on Soviet territory and Northern Vietnam.112 The US had maintained a 
significant ground force on Taiwan since 1951. MGM missiles were deployed after the 
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Later on, these missiles were equipped with nuclear 
warheads. In 1960, the US deployed strategic nuclear weapons on the island. By 1968, 
the number of US military personnel assigned to Taiwan had reached 9,800 (FRUS, 
2006 Doc. 216). 
CKS was eager to reinstate his control over Mainland China. When the Mainland 
suffered famine as a consequence of the catastrophic Great Leap Forward in 1962, CKS 
believed the time for counterattack was ripe. The US, however, forcibly intervened and 
stopped CKS’s military mobilization. Despite CKS’s repeated requests, the US rejected 
his proposals to launch a large-scale military operation.113 In 1964, seeing that Taiwan 
had become vulnerable after the PLA successfully tested a nuclear bomb, CKS became 
more anxious to launch a military invasion. His counterattack plan became 
impracticable when the ROC navy lost two surface ships in a battle in 1965.114 After 
that time, the ROC government abandoned plans to return to the Mainland and focused 
on economic development. For the next 30 years, the ROC government maintained its 
plan to return to Mainland China, but it focused on repelling a PLA invasion.    
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Staring in the early 60s, CKS arranged for his eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo 
(CCK), to be his successor. CCK assumed various senior positions in the ROC 
government and became the core decision-maker in Taipei. CKS still retained the title 
of President, but CCK had effective control over the ROC government. CCK 
maintained very close relations with the US. Thus he visited the US five times during 
the 1950s and 1960s as an ROC official. The US diplomats in Taipei always discussed 
important matters with CCK, and knew that he was the most effective channel to reach 
CKS.  
 The Sino-Soviet split naturally caught the attention of the US. The isolation of 
the PRC during its open conflict with the Soviet Union created an opportunity for a 
US-PRC coalition against it. After Nixon took office and appointed Kissinger as his 
National Security Advisor, the US government began to explore the possibility of 
building a relationship with Mao’s China. Taiwan was an important consideration in 
this matter since Beijing refused to establish relations with countries that recognized 
the ROC, so the US government accordingly explored options that would allow 
rapprochement with the PRC and maintenance of its tie with Taiwan.115  
On the other hand, Taipei anticipated what was for it an unwelcome change. The 
Nationalist elites were aware of Nixon’s article on foreign policy, which urged 
reconciliation with the PRC. CCK was informed about the change in the US policy 
after Nixon’s inauguration. He received promises that the US defense commitment to 
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Taiwan would remain unaffected in the future. However, Kissinger’s secret visit to 
China in 1971 stunned Taipei, which received no notice or hint prior to the trip.  
Meanwhile, the change in the US policy weakened the ROC’s already fragile 
diplomatic relations with other countries. In December 1971, the ROC lost its United 
Nations (UN) seat to the PRC. The US made an effort to maintain a Taiwanese 
representative at the UN, but the ROC government rejected the US’s dual-
representation proposal and withdrew from UN. Many free world allies subsequently 
cut off diplomatic relations with the ROC and recognized the PRC. Although the US 
still stood by CKS during the ROC’s diplomatic isolation, this friendship became 
unstable as Nixon accelerated contact with China and visited the Mainland in 1972.  
The US-ROC alliance relationship became rocky after the Sino-American 
rapprochement began. Taiwan felt the US’s security promise no longer to be solid. 
Being excluded from the Sino-American talks, Taiwan seized every opportunity to 
gather information about the progress of normalization. The Nationalist elites feared 
that the US would withdraw from the island and leave the Nationalist army to face the 
PLA threat alone. This fear was immense, as the ROC had discovered that its ally was 
not being entirely honest about the progress of reconciliation with Beijing. The 
relationship was therefore full of suspicion and distrust during the 1970s. The US was 
unable to assuage Taiwan’s security fear; after all, it was seeking reconciliation with 
Taiwan’s archenemy.  
As a result, Taiwan sought other ways to ensure its security. I discuss two 
examples in this chapter. First, Taipei once seriously considered rebuilding relations 




cooperation, Taiwan was using this tie to pressure the US not to abandon their alliance. 
Second, Taiwan started a covert nuclear weapons program in 1965 and had made 
significant progress by around 1973. Despite Taiwan’s denial of such a program, the 
US was deeply concerned about its potential to disrupt the effort to build relations with 
Beijing. The US repeatedly inspected nuclear facilities in Taiwan and even threatened 
to end all nuclear assistance, but Taiwan managed to continue its nuclear program in 
secret, and did not terminate it officially until 1988.  
Throughout the 1970s, Taipei constantly lodged complaints against Washington. 
The US, however, delayed pursuing any substantive solution to Taiwan’s concerns. 
Instead, it tried to calm its ally with verbal commitments and minor favors. As 
demonstrated in the following sections, US officials used various means to signal their 
country’s resolve to defend Taiwan. These efforts did not fully meet the demands of 
Taiwan, but boosted Taiwan’s confidence in continued US involvement in the Taiwan 
Strait. 
Taiwan was a key topic during US-PRC talks. Not only did the State Department 
use the issue of Taiwan to elicit cooperation from Beijing, but it even promised a 
gradual withdrawal from the island. The State Department was aware that any policy 
guaranteeing US military intervention in the Taiwan Strait would harm the US-PRC 
relationship and close the door for Sino-American normalization. The Nixon 
administration thus chose to act ambiguously on the Taiwan issue. It refrained from 
any clear response to Taiwan’s concerns and repeatedly claimed that the US would 
abide by the defense treaty. At the same time, it told Beijing that the US needed to stand 




peace in the Taiwan Strait. The Johnson and Ford administrations adopted the same 
policy. The US kept Taipei at a distance, but issued constant reassurances of its 
commitment to the alliance.  
Despite this tense relationship between Washington and Taipei, the alliance did 
not reach the brink of dissolution. The US military installation on Taiwan decreased in 
size, but military cooperation remained unchanged. According to the US Department 
of State, Taiwan received 933.5 million dollars’ worth of US arms from 1974 to 1978 
(Kirby et al., 2005, p. 249), and the arms transfer increased each year. The alliance 
relationship thus endured for nearly a decade, with Taiwan neither abrogating nor 
seeking other security allies. At the same time, the US proceeded to negotiate 
normalization with Beijing. 
The US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty remained in force until the US established 
a formal diplomatic relationship with the PRC during the Carter administration. The 
formal alliance with Taiwan ended owing to US abrogation in 1979, but the US 
maintained security cooperation with its former ally under more ambiguous terms 
according to the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act. 
The following paragraphs review several important incidences in the US-ROC 
alliance relationship. In addition to pointing out the mutual suspicion and distrust, I will 
discuss the US response to problems in the alliance relationship. The US consistently 
tried to avoid providing quick and clear responses to Taiwan’s security concerns. It 
tirelessly repeated its allegiance to the alliance and obscured the impact of US-PRC 
rapprochement on Taiwan. Moreover, the US offered military assistance to calm 




The US Withdrawal and Nixon’s Trip to China  
Upon Nixon’s inauguration, there was suspicion that the US would change its 
China policy. As early as August 1969, Chou Shu-kai, the ROC Ambassador to the US, 
cautiously inquired of Kissinger, then Nixon’s National Security Advisor, if the US 
government had had any secret contact with Communist China (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 21). 
Although Kissinger replied that there had not been any such contact, Nixon had in fact 
decided to establish relations with Beijing. The change in the US policy quickly 
affected the US-ROC alliance. In order to send a positive signal to Beijing and open 
dialogue, the US announced that the Seventh Fleet would suspend its regular patrol of 
the Taiwan Strait starting in November 1969. The level of its naval force in the region 
was also reduced. A mix of combat and auxiliary units replaced two destroyer escorts. 
Taiwan immediately protested this decision. US Ambassador McConaughy attributed 
the decision to budget constraints and ensured CKS that more American ships would 
be passing through the Taiwan Strait and that the nature of the patrol remain unchanged 
(Elleman, 2015, pp. 112–3). CKS was not fully convinced, but nevertheless accepted 
the explanation. He then requested that the US review the “plan of Rochester,” a 
military coordination plan established in 1955 that would be enforced in the event of 
conflict in the Taiwan Strait (Garver, 1997, p. 213). CKS wanted to strengthen security 
ties with the US, which was showing signs of attenuating its military assistance.  
The suspension of the patrol was only a beginning. In the next few months, the 
US sought direct contact with Beijing. In January, it reopened the Ambassadorial 
meeting in Warsaw and made a secret concession on the Taiwan issue, agreeing to 




exchange with the PRC, learned about the Warsaw talks afterward and immediately 
expressed “vehement objection.” CKS sent a personal letter to Nixon to express his 
deep concern about the implications of this meeting. With a slight tone of warning, 
CKS said that he hoped that Nixon “will carefully consider the consequences and take 
timely measures to prevent any distortion of your well-meaning policy during its 
implementation” (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 71).  
In order to calm Taipei, the US government invited CCK to visit the US and meet 
with Nixon.116 The President emphasized that the US would provide more military 
assistance to its allies under the so-called “Nixon Doctrine,” but allowed that the 
government might be unable to secure the necessary funding from Congress. He then 
offered reassurances about Taiwan’s security by saying that “under no circumstances 
will we abandon this commitment [to Taiwan]” (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 76). The next day, 
CCK received a similar response from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird when he 
formally requested F–4 aircraft and submarines. Laird then gave CCK a more concrete 
prospect; he anticipated that the ROC might be able to acquire the military equipment 
in next two years (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 78). 
In the following years Taiwan secured several arms packages, but these amounted 
to far less than what CCK had requested. The US agreed to sell to Taiwan two Guppy 
II-class submarines in 1971, but these vessels were incapable of actual combat since 
the US refused to sell torpedoes to go with them. On the other hand, Taiwan never 
acquired F–4 aircraft, since the US was unwilling to sell an advanced fighter with a 
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combat radius over 400 miles. Instead, the US authorized Taiwan to produce the F–5E, 
a less advanced aircraft with a shorter range. The US had no interest in fulfilling the 
entirety of Taiwan’s request for fear that the weaponry might be used for an offensive 
purpose. Nixon and Laird may have promised military aid simply as a diplomatic 
courtesy. It was a clear that, behind their diplomatic language, they intended to reassure 
Taiwan regarding its security concerns with a substantive proposal, even though the 
government might not carry it out in the end.  
1971 was a difficult year for the ROC government. Without any consultation in 
advance or any notice afterward, Kissinger made a secret mission to Beijing in July and 
arranged for Nixon’s visit the following year. The news shocked Taipei when Nixon 
announced his coming trip to China on television. The newly appointed ROC 
Ambassador James Shen met Assistant Secretary Green the next day and strongly 
protested, saying that the trip could “hardly be described as a friendly act.” He then 
warned that the action “would have consequences not only for both our countries, but 
for the whole free world” (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 145).117 Later, when Shen spoke to the 
press, he railed against Nixon’s new China policy: “What do we get out of this shabby 
deal?”118 The higher authorities in Taipei shared Shen’s rage. They had expected to be 
informed about such an important decision. Moreover, the details of Kissinger’s talk 
with Zhou En-lai were uncertain and the US government refused to clarify how the 
Taiwan issue was discussed in their meeting.  
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Kissinger’s visit realized Taipei’s deepest fear: that the US was not being entirely 
honest regarding its engagement with the PRC. The fact that Taipei was excluded in 
the rapprochement caused extreme uncertainty. Even when Taiwan received an 
explanation from the US, it could not verify whether the State Department was being 
truthful. The Nationalist elites knew well that Beijing would ask the US to cut off 
diplomatic relations with the ROC if the US wished to establish a formal relationship 
with the PRC. If Beijing could not convince the US to break with Taiwan, it would at 
least demand that the US stay out of the Taiwan Strait, which would make Taiwan 
vulnerable to a PLA invasion. Another concern was UN membership. The ROC seat 
on the Security Council faced great pressure from the PRC and its allies in a diplomatic 
battle that had gone for years. Taiwan worried that the change in the US policy would 
cause more UN members to support the PRC’s accession. 
A few days after his TV announcement, Nixon sent a personal letter to CKS to 
express his “deep regret” that the ROC had not been informed beforehand. His letter 
had a limited effect in repairing the relationship. Taiwan had received verbal 
commitments before, and the US had nevertheless arranged Nixon’s visit to China in 
secret. Kissinger understood well that verbal assurances were not enough to calm 
Taipei. When he met with Shen in late July, he declared that “assurances were cheap” 
and voiced his desire to “express his sentiments in terms which would be more valuable 
than formal assurances” (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 152). When their discussion was finished, 
Kissinger stated that he had many friends in the ROC and that it pained him to visit 
Beijing, but that he had to arrange another trip in order to discuss Nixon’s visit next 




Holdridge obviously tried to show friendship, but their over-enthusiasm only 
heightened Shen’s suspicions.119  
The Sino-American rapprochement had a greater impact on the ROC’s foreign 
relations than the administration anticipated. In late October, when Kissinger made 
another trip to Beijing, the ROC delegation at the UN fought a strenuous diplomatic 
battle to keep its UN seat. 120  After a protracted war of attrition and the US’s 
reconciliation with the PRC, though, many countries decided to support the PRC 
accession. It was doubtful that the ROC could keep its China seat on the Security 
Council. The ROC and its diplomatic allies failed to make the Albania Resolution an 
important question that would require a higher threshold of affirmative votes. The 
Resolution was scheduled for a vote and its passage was almost certain. The PRC would 
assume all the rights that the ROC had enjoyed as the representative of China, and the 
ROC delegates would be expelled from the UN. The US tried to keep the ROC in the 
General Assembly, but the ROC representative was pessimistic about the US proposal 
and decided to withdraw from UN.121 After the UN withdrawal, Taiwan again received 
a guarantee that the US would maintain a diplomatic relationship with the ROC. To 
strengthen diplomatic ties between two countries, the US allowed the ROC government 
to open new consulates in Atlanta and Kansas City.  
                                                 
119 Holdridge’s words are not documented, but he apparently told Shen that he found it uncomfortable 
to visit Beijing so soon after he had escorted Shen out of the State Department, see (J. C. Shen, 1983). 
120 The UN vote took place earlier than the State Department anticipated. Nixon requested that Kissinger 
delay his return from China to avoid any impact on the UN vote. Kissinger objected at first, but agreed 
to delay his return by one night.   
121 For the ROC government’s view of the UN withdrawal, see (J. C. Shen, 1983). For a detailed 




These new consulates seemed to suggest a thaw in bilateral relations, but in fact 
the relationship with Taiwan increasingly became an obstacle to US foreign policy. 
Nixon’s visit to China was an important achievement during his presidency, and 
Taiwan was an inconvenient ally in this atmosphere. The State Department worried 
that the Nationalists might attempt to sabotage Nixon’s visit by provoking crises in the 
Taiwan Strait or along the coast of the Mainland. As a precaution, Kissinger agreed to 
monitor Taiwan’s armed forces and prepared to respond if Taipei made any move that 
might jeopardize Nixon’s visit. He also requested that the ROC government not to issue 
any public comments on Nixon’s visit. Moreover, Nixon sent a personal letter to CKS 
in which he reiterated that it was US policy to honor the treaty with the ROC. He also 
stressed that he would not discuss the establishment of a formal relationship with the 
PRC. Taipei remained deeply concerned about the prospect of Nixon’s trip, but he acted 
to prove that his promise was not empty, reaffirming the US commitment to the ROC 
on his way back from the PRC. Kissinger made a similar comment earlier during the 
press conference held in Shanghai.122 
Despite Nixon and Kissinger’s public statements, the ROC suffered a serious blow 
when the Shanghai Communiqué was announced. In the Communiqué, the US declared 
its goal eventually to withdraw all of its armed forces from Taiwan. Taipei worried that 
this might affect security cooperation between the allies. When Ambassador Shen 
inquired about this, Kissinger repeatedly promised that Taiwan would continue to 
receive military assistance. He contended that the delay or apprehensions Shen 
observed might be more of a bureaucratic problem than a change in US policy, and that 
                                                 




some of the troop redeployment decisions had been made before the Shanghai 
Communiqué. Kissinger also tried to alleviate Taiwan’s concern about its vulnerability, 
arguing that the PLA was unlikely to invade because it lacked amphibious capability 
(FRUS, 2006 Doc 206).  
The US continued to make reassuring gestures. After Kissinger’s first visit to 
China, the U.S.S. Oklahoma City, flagship of the Seventh Fleet, visited Taiwan, as did 
the Navy’s air demonstration squadron. The militaries of Taiwan and the US also held 
annual joint exercises as usual (Garver, 1997, pp. 276–77). 
The ROC did not know that the US had already planned to decrease its military 
presence on Taiwan significantly. In an internal meeting in March 1972, the 
administration decided to withdraw 2,540 personnel, about one-fourth of its total 
deployment, from Taiwan within two years. In addition, the CIA shut down all of the 
radio broadcasts of propaganda to the Mainland (FRUS, 2006 Doc. 216, 257). In the 
following years, the US withdrew more troops; it removed F–4 Phantom squadrons, 
terminated the U–2 reconnaissance project, and transferred all MGM missiles and 
tactical nuclear weapon (FRUS, 2008 Doc. 56). The Military Assistance Advisory 
Group (MAAG) in Taiwan underwent a significant reduction in personnel. By the end 
of 1976, there were less than 1,400 US armed personnel stationed in Taiwan (FRUS, 
2008 Doc. 155). The US also lowered the rank of the senior officers sent to Taiwan. 
All of these moves suggested a total withdrawal of US armed forces was coming and 
deeply troubled the ROC government.  
Ever since the Warsaw ambassadorial meeting, the US had been unwilling to share 




meetings with Kissinger after his trips to China and tried to pry information from him 
on various topics. Kissinger’s answers were always ambiguous and evasive; he usually 
repeated the US’s commitment to Taiwan and claimed that he too speculated about the 
direction of US-PRC relations. Shen felt that Kissinger was trying to alienate him, and 
even refused to meet with him (J. C. Shen, 1983, p. 181). Frustrated by the cold 
reception in Washington, Shen submitted his resignation, but the US refused to approve 
a successor (FRUS, 2008 Doc. 101). This incident alarmed Taipei. The refusal to 
receive a new diplomatic representative from the ROC reinforced the belief among 
ROC officials that the US would take the initiative to normalize relations with Beijing 
in the near future.123 Washington again tried to restore Taipei’s confidence by arranging 
a meeting between Shen and Kissinger.124 
Contrary to Taipei’s opinion that the US would eventually abandon the Mutual 
Defense Treaty in exchange for friendship with the PRC, the US government had been 
resolute about its commitment to Taiwan during internal discussions. Kissinger himself 
carried this basic stance from the Nixon to the Ford administration. At a minimum, the 
US would not hand over Taiwan to the PRC, nor would it allow a PLA military invasion. 
Taipei remained continually in doubt because all of the developments since 1971 
suggested the opposite. To make matters worse, Kissinger kept suggesting that the 
Nationalist government negotiate with Beijing to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully. 
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This only intensified Taipei’s fear, since a negotiated unification was against its policy 
toward the Mainland regime. If such negotiations had taken place, the result would 
likely have favored Beijing.  
In the meantime, Taipei constantly received promises that the alliance relationship 
would be maintained no matter how US-PRC relations developed. Kissinger subtly 
maneuvered between the PRC and ROC by sending favors to Taiwan. These favors 
were sufficient to quiet down the ROC, but small enough to avoid provoking the PRC. 
Substantive and protracted military cooperation strengthened Taipei’s confidence, 
preventing it from abrogating the alliance despite deep suspicions. The alliance 
managed to survive the Nixon and Ford administrations without a major split. 
In the first few months of the Carter administration, Taipei was relieved by the 
US’s hesitation regarding normalization of relations with the PRC. Ambassador Shen 
in Washington, however, was worried because he was denied meetings with high-
ranking officials in the Carter administration (J. C. Shen, 1983, pp. 205–7). The US 
decided to proceed with the normalization not long afterward, in late 1976. The ROC 
government, including CCK himself, repeatedly urged the US not to abandon Taiwan.  
In the next section, I describe efforts by the ROC to seek security assurance 
outside the US-ROC alliance. The ROC eventually abandoned these attempts and 
turned back to the US for its security. It still had hope that the US would support Taiwan 
even after its relationship with PRC was normalized. The strategy of delay was 
effective in this case. The US managed to postpone a clear solution to Taiwan’s security 




The Mystery of Switching Allegiance 
Although the US kept fulfilling its commitments to the alliance, Taipei was not 
entirely reassured. One of the options it sought was, as mentioned, resuming contact 
with the Soviet Union. To be sure, Soviet-ROC contact during this period was limited, 
and it did not expand into any form of alignment. Although the historical evidence for 
this interaction is quite limited, it suggests that, beginning in 1968, the ROC and the 
Soviets did approach each other and establish contacts based on their common interests 
in opposition to the PRC. The relationship was meant to keep the option open for both 
sides. From Taipei’s perspective, rumors about a Taiwanese-Soviet connection could 
put pressure on the US. If it could not halt US-PRC reconciliation, it might at least slow 
down the process or make the US more prudent when discussing the Taiwan issue with 
Beijing. 
ROC-Soviet relations had been very hostile since the Chinese Civil War. CKS 
never forgot how the Soviets forced the ROC to hand over Manchuria and Outer 
Mongolia after World War II, and Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists was 
the main reason that the Nationalists lost the Mainland. CKS even wrote a book 
condemning Soviet encroachment on China.125 Owing to this history and ideological 
differences, the ROC and the Soviet Union were the most unlikely friends. The 
intensified Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-American rapprochement, however, 
changed the situation. The Soviets and the Nationalists shared a common enemy. The 
Sino-American reconciliation brought heavy pressure to bear on the Soviets. As early 
                                                 




as late 1968, the Soviets warned the US government that the formation of a US-PRC 
alliance would be “extremely dangerous” (FRUS, 1998 Doc. 334).  
From the Soviets’ point of view, establishing a relationship with Taiwan could 
benefit both sides. The Soviet Union could be an alternative protector of Taiwan’s 
security. Taiwan was a strategic asset that could be useful in a military conflict with 
Beijing.  
The Soviets took the initiative to approach Taipei. In 1968, a Moscow reporter, 
Victor Louis (Vitauy Yevgenyevich Loui), contacted the ROC embassy in Tokyo and 
expressed interest in visiting Taiwan. He traveled to Taipei in October, where he met 
with CCK, then the Defense Minister. The substance of the discussion between Louis 
and the ROC officials is still unclear. According to Wei Jing-meng’s diary (1995),126 
Louis carried a friendly message from Moscow inquiring about the possibility of 
establishing informal relations. Louis represented the Brezhnev faction, which 
supported a more hardline attitude toward Beijing. In the following years, Louis paid 
several visits to Taipei, and Wei had face-to-face meetings with Louis in Vienna 
twice.127 They discussed potential military coordination if the ROC were to launch a 
military operation against the Mainland. The Soviets pledged to remain neutral in a 
conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists. They exchanged intelligence on 
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only firsthand account of Louis’s interaction with Taipei available today. However, this diary only 
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records of Louis’s visits after 1970 are unavailable. 
127 Louis cancelled a meeting in late 1969 because the dove faction in Moscow, represented by Kosygin, 
believed that such a meeting would impede negotiations with Beijing about the border scheduled for 
October 20. However, the negotiation ended with no reconciliation between Moscow and Beijing. This 




the political situation and nuclear weapons development in Mainland. Taipei and 
Moscow agreed to establish regular communication channels through unofficial 
liaisons. The Soviets also agreed to provide weaponry to Taiwan, but a specific list of 
arms was never made.  
After the second Vienna meeting in 1970, Taiwan released the crew of the Soviet 
tanker Tuapse, which it had held in custody since 1954. There is no direct evidence of 
a connection between two events, but the sudden change in Taipei’s attitude toward the 
Soviet hostages is suggestive, since there was no pressure on Taiwan to release the 
crew. Louis might have affected the decision. At the end of their talk in Vienna, Louis 
asked Wei whether he might visit the crew of the Tuapse and whether it might be 
released (Wei, 1995, p. 87). Taipei clearly intended to make a gesture of good will by 
freeing the crew. 
It is not clear how Taipei perceived Louis’s proposal of cooperation. The only 
thing can be sure is that his message was delivered to the highest-ranking officials in 
the ROC government. Even if Taiwan entertained the proposal, it probably had many 
reservations. There were no substantive interactions between 1968 and 1971 other than 
the visit of an ROC education delegation (Garver, 1978, p. 756). In the 1971 UN voting, 
the Soviets supported the PRC on the question of China representation, a position that 
in effect forestalled any practical possibility of ROC-Soviet alignment. However, Louis 
continued to visit Taiwan, traveling there four times between 1969 and 1975.  
There is no doubt that Taipei’s contact with the Soviets put pressure on the US. 
For example, CKS deliberately told the CIA about his meeting with a Russian reporter; 




The Soviets also wanted to use their contact with Taipei to pressure Beijing. Louis kept 
a low profile on his trip to Taiwan, but after his visit he went to Hong Kong and gave 
an interview in which he discussed his experience in Taiwan.128 In November, The 
Washington Post revealed his visit to public. The same news again appeared on 
Bangkok Post few weeks later (Tubilewicz, 2005, p. 80). These reports raised public 
worries that Taiwan might be leaning toward the Soviets, but Taipei denied such claims. 
Taiwan sometimes sent unclear messages about its interactions with the Eastern 
bloc. After the ROC withdrew from the UN, Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai spoke to 
the press and claimed that the ROC was willing to develop a relationship with any 
country. He mentioned that Taiwan was “prepared to trade with communist countries 
aside from Communist China” (Garver, 1978, p. 756). There were several rumors in 
news reports that the Soviets showed interest in constructing a naval base on the 
Pescadores Islands in the middle of Taiwan Strait, and these caught the attention of the 
US. When Kissinger confronted Shen about the rumors in March 1973, Shen abruptly 
denied them and ensured him that the ROC government had made no contact with the 
Soviets (FRUS, 2008, p. Doc. 46). 
The ambassador’s promise may not have been entirely ingenuous, since two 
months later an unusual event occurred that could suggest a concerted move by the 
ROC and the Soviets. Several Soviet warships, including destroyers and submarines, 
passed through the Taiwan Strait and circumnavigated Taiwan. This was the first time 
that Soviet naval vessels had ventured into the vicinity of Taiwan since 1949. The 
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timing was interesting because just a few days later David Bruce, the first director of 
the US Liaison Office in the PRC, departed for Beijing. Again, there is no evidence 
connecting these two events, but it is curious that the ROC government said nothing 
about the passage of the Soviet ships, about which it was very likely aware, nor did it 
express concerns after this unusual naval activity was reported in the news. 
ROC-Soviet relations during the 1970s were rife with unsubstantiated rumors. 
Partly because of the limited availability of archival material, it is unclear whether the 
ROC government seriously considered rapprochement with the Soviets, although many 
considered it a strong possibility given CCK’s personal connection with the Soviets.129 
Another view is that the rapprochement was merely a diplomatic tactic designed to 
intimidate the US and other ROC allies. Chou Shu-kai was particularly interested in 
counterbalancing the US-PRC friendship by engaging with the Soviets, 130  but he 
stepped down from the Foreign Minister post in 1972 and left the decision-making 
cadre. Chou’s departure might explain why Taiwan ceased to approach the Soviets 
openly in the following years. Whether or not the ROC ever decided to cooperate with 
the Soviets, it never considered the Soviets a viable substitute to the US-ROC Mutual 
Defense Treaty. This does not diminish the fact that Taiwan intended to use the alleged 
relations with the Soviets to pressure the US, and may even have wanted to sabotage 
the US-PRC rapprochement. In public, the ROC firmly denied any contact with the 
Soviets and claimed loyalty to the US-ROC treaty.  
                                                 
129 CCK spent a considerable amount of time in Moscow during his youth as part of terms of cooperation 
between CKS and the Soviets; he spoke fluent Russian and was married to a Russian woman. 
130 After the UN withdrawal, Chou proposed “flexible diplomacy”; see (Jin, 2005, pp. 99–100; Kirby et 




Taiwan eventually chose to stay with the US and to pin all its hopes on 
Washington. This result is not surprising, since the Soviets could not easily replace the 
US role. The US had tremendous influence over the ROC military and economy: it 
helped the ROC to build and train military professionals, provided weapons systems 
and logistics, and shared intelligence, while US economic assistance contributed to 
CCK’s development policy and was the key to its success. Taiwan relied heavily on 
trade with free world nations, and had very little commerce with the communist bloc. 
Moreover, Japan, another important military and economic partner of Taiwan, had 
interests in a stable US-ROC relationship. Since Japan deemed the Soviets an external 
threat, it also exerted pressure in opposition to Taiwan’s rapprochement with the 
Soviets. Finally, it was unclear that Sino-Soviet tension would persist. Taiwan could 
not rely on an ally with which it shared only a short-term common interest. Since the 
US still showed its intention to protect Taiwan, the ROC government had no 
compelling reason to switch allegiances in the first half of the 1970s.  
The Secret Nuclear Weapons Program 
In 1964, the PRC successfully tested its first nuclear weapon. The news shocked 
the political elites in Taipei. CKS was aware of the PRC’s nuclear program, but Beijing 
had acquired its nuclear capability earlier than Taipei and Washington anticipated.131 
This ultimate deterrence made the Nationalists’ return to the Mainland practically 
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impossible. The nuclear test significantly boosted the PRC’s reputation and 
strengthened its rule on the Mainland. A grave pessimism thereupon clouded the 
Nationalist regime and military, which CKS felt undermined morale (Lin, 2015, p. 316). 
He was further frustrated by the US attitude. The US rejected a plan to destroy the 
PRC’s nuclear facilities and decided to contain its nuclear capability through 
international institutions.  
 Although Taiwan was covered under a nuclear umbrella by US weapons stored 
at Tainan Air Station, uncertainty about the US’s willingness to carry out nuclear 
retaliation encouraged CKS to try to build an independent nuclear capability. 132 
Taiwan’s nuclear technology was, however, still in a nascent stage. In 1955, the ROC 
government and the US signed an agreement on the civilian use of atomic energy. As 
Fuhrmann (2009) argues, these agreements are likely the precursor of a nuclear 
weapons program because they allowed for access to professional training, relevant 
equipment, and nuclear fuel. Taiwan was a fine example. Under the agreement, the US 
helped Taiwan to build its first research reactor in 1961, which was fully operational 
four years later.  
The ROC government began systematically sending officers abroad to study 
defense technology. A few years later, the ROC military established the National 
Chung-Shan Institute of Science & Technology (NCSIST), which was responsible for 
weapons systems R&D. Taiwan secretly invited Ernst Bergmann, the father of the 
Israeli nuclear program, to Taiwan, and consulted the NCSIST. In the second half of 
the 1960s, Taiwan negotiated the purchase of a reactor from Siemens, but this deal was 
                                                 




eventually cancelled because some in the Nationalist government opposed the nuclear 
weapons program.  
The US adamantly opposed its ally’s development of nuclear weapons and made 
it clear that its assistance with Taiwan’s nuclear projects was strictly for civilian 
purposes. The US kept close surveillance on the nuclear program in Taiwan just as it 
monitored CKS’s invasion plan. In 1965, for example, the US received intelligence that 
two nuclear specialists from Taiwan had secretly visited Israel and been received by 
Bergmann. More visits to Israel were reported in 1966. The US immediately instructed 
its embassy in Tel Aviv to look into the matter.133    
Nixon’s inauguration highlighted the need to continue the nuclear weapons 
program. Starting in 1969, Taiwan secretly acquired the equipment and parts necessary 
to continue its nuclear weapons program, and a heavy water reactor became operational 
in 1973. In 1972, Taiwan secretly contacted the West German company UHDE to 
purchase a reprocessing facility. Taiwan had attempted to purchase such a facility from 
the US a few years earlier, but the sale was rejected by the Nixon administration. The 
State Department intervened after learning of Taipei’s deal with UHDE. 134  US 
Ambassador McConaughy delivered warnings from Washington and threatened to cut 
off the supply of nuclear fuel and equipment,135 so the ROC and UHDE were forced to 
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134 The State Department learned about this from its scientific attaché in the West German Embassy, 
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abandon the deal. A few months later, Washington learned again that Taiwan was 
seeking reprocessing technology from companies in Belgium and France, and the State 
Department sent a study team to inspect the nuclear facilities Taiwan. Though the team 
did not find evidence of nuclear weapons (Lin, 2015, pp. 333–334), the US was still 
suspicious.  
Taiwan continued to develop its nuclear program in secret. In 1976, the IAEA 
found suspicious activities in the heavy water reactor at the NCSIST. The State 
Department also found that Taiwan had not abandoned its hopes of acquiring 
reprocessing equipment. US Ambassador Leonard Unger delivered a very strong 
statement to the ROC Foreign Ministry, stating that the US “[does] not accept the 
argument that a reprocessing facility is required to support the ROC’s nuclear power 
program.”136 A few days later, CCK summoned Ambassador Unger and reassured him 
that Taiwan would not attempt to acquire reprocessing technology in the future. The 
ROC government also made a public statement in this regard. CCK proposed that the 
US send scientists to stay in Taiwan and monitor all nuclear facilities. This generous 
offer was quite unusual. It allowed for close monitoring by the IAEA and the US. CCK 
thus tried to assure the US with substantive action.137  
The US further tightened its inspection regime regarding the nuclear facilities in 
Taiwan. The next year, the US took a more coercive measure as the IAEA found more 
evidence of Taiwan’s determination to develop nuclear weapons. At this point, the 
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Carter administration was convinced that Taiwan was indeed building a nuclear 
weapon and was determined to stop it by any means necessary. Unger delivered the US 
government’s demands that the ROC government dispose of all spent fuel, the 
deactivated reactor, and facilities related to enrichment and heavy water production, 
and turn all of its plutonium over to the US (FRUS, 2013, p. Doc. 22). These demands 
were quite harsh. The US essentially cut off the means to continue nuclear research, 
including even civilian use of nuclear technology. Despite its resentment, the ROC 
government accepted these terms, and its cooperative attitude eased the concerns of the 
Carter administration to the extent that the US agreed to reactivate the heavy water 
reactor the following summer.  
In 1978, when Unger again inquired into the connection between Taiwan’s nuclear 
research and the alleged weapons program, CCK expressed rare anger. He complained 
that the ROC government had fully cooperated with US demands and had tolerated all 
the inspections. He then stressed that the ROC government avoided discussing the US’s 
attitude and actions in public in order to curb anti-American sentiment.138 CCK even 
made a latent threat to the US ambassador, showing how dissatisfied the Nationalist 
regime was.  
The US-ROC relationship in 1978 was very tense. The Carter administration 
would establish formal relations with PRC at any time, but Taipei had no way to 
anticipate precisely when. Taiwan thus still clung to US support despite the fact that 
the formal relationship might break off soon and the future US-ROC ties remained 
                                                 





unclear. The ROC government became impatient with the US’s suspicions and coercive 
demands, especially after CCK had made extensive concessions.  
The US’s concern was not unsubstantiated, for the NCSIST in fact continued with 
the nuclear weapons program for another decade after 1978. At that point, the deputy 
director of the NCSIST, Chang Hsien-yi, had defected to the US and revealed the 
details of Taiwan’s nuclear program, and Reagan then forced Taiwan to terminate it 
completely.  
From 1965 to 1977, Taiwan struggled to obtain nuclear capability as an alternative 
to the wavering US security guarantee. The ROC government consistently denied the 
US’s charges and reiterated its position that it was not developing nuclear weapons. 
CCK personally made multiple assurances in public. Some studies have expressed the 
suspicion that the ROC military secretly developed the weapons program without 
CCK’s approval, especially after 1976, and, so far, no archival records show his direct 
involvement in the nuclear program. It is, however, difficult to imagine that the 
program could continue without his approval. The NCSIST was a military institution, 
and CCK had the highest authority over the military until his death. In addition, 
according to Chang’s statement in 1998, he and his colleague had “completed the 
mission given by President CKS and President CCK: we have the nuclear capability, 
but we will not develop a nuclear weapon.”139 This suggested that CCK was aware of 
the nuclear weapons program, at least during the 1970s when his health condition was 
good and his rule solid.  
                                                 




The nuclear weapons program was a back-up plan that Taiwan wished to retain. 
The ROC might also want to use the nuclear weapons program as leverage during the 
negotiations over Taiwan’s security status after US-PRC normalization. Although 
Taipei never used the nuclear program to coerce the US, it did not shy away from 
showing its capability to develop nuclear weapons. For example, after Carter’s 
inauguration in January of 1977, CCK declared openly that “We consistently support 
the peaceful use of atomic energy. We have the capability to develop a nuclear weapon, 
but we will not produce one.” His words, according to the ROC government, were 
meant to support Carter’s nuclear arms reduction policy, but one could interpret them 
as a latent threat that Taiwan might choose the nuclear option if the US were to prove 
unwilling to protect its security. The US was alarmed by CCK’s statement and 
immediately sent Ambassador Unger to reaffirm the US position on anti-proliferation 
(FRUS, 2013 Doc. 11). The ROC seemed to signal the US that it was not currently 
seeking to develop nuclear weapons only because the US remained a reliable ally, but 
would do otherwise if the US planned on leaving Taiwan vulnerable.  
In any event, the nuclear weapons program was a result of US-PRC 
rapprochement. It started in response to fears about the PRC’s nuclear capability, but 
the ROC government seriously pursued the program only when the US began to 
alienate Taiwan. Throughout the 1970s, the nuclear question disturbed US-ROC 
relations. The US took harsh measures to limit Taiwan’s nuclear capability, and Taiwan 
responded with extremely cooperative gestures. Looking back from the present, it is 
clear that Taiwan was not entirely honest regarding its nuclear weapons program. Its 




weapons were seen as an insurance policy. Nevertheless, Taiwan always considered its 
relationship with the US as its priority. It cooperated with US demands because it 
wanted to maintain the US-ROC security tie. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examines the US-Taiwan alliance in an effort to understand the 
strategy of delay in intra-alliance relationship. Serious interest divergence emerged 
when the Nixon administration decided to approach Beijing, creating in Taiwan the 
constant fear of abandonment. As the US decreased its military installations on the 
island, Taiwan felt threatened and suggested extending bilateral military cooperation. 
Reviewing the Rochester Plan is an example of this. Taiwan understood that the wind 
was with Beijing and that, under these circumstances, it was in its own interest to force 
the US to reconfirm the US-ROC alliance in public or during its negotiations with 
Beijing. The ROC embassy tirelessly pursued this goal by inquiring into the US attitude 
regarding the Mutual Defense Treaty and the progress of US-PRC normalization. 
Sometimes these inquiries were overly sharp and caused displeasure among US 
officials.  
Despite much turbulence and uncertainty, the alliance relationship endured, and 
neither ally seriously considered abandoning it. Although Taipei had always believed 
that the US was accommodative during its negotiations with Beijing, Kissinger and his 
colleagues were actually quite tough on the issue of Taiwan. The Taiwan question was 
the most difficult one throughout the US-PRC negotiations. The US did not concede in 
the face of Beijing’s tough stance; on the contrary, it sent a clear signal that it would 




though it was less than compelling to the Nationalist elites. Having at least some 
evidence of the US commitment, though, Taiwan chose to continue relying on US 
security protection. 
One might argue that Taipei’s submissiveness was due to the large capability 
asymmetry in the alliance relationship, but Taiwan was not without alternatives. If the 
US seemed unreliable and potentially willing to hand Taiwan over to Beijing during 
Sino-American rapprochement, Taiwan would seek other means of guaranteeing its 
security. Building security ties with the Soviets and its own nuclear weapons program 
were the most obvious and practical objectives. However, Taiwan in the end remained 
loyal to its alliance. After all of the so-called “treacherous” acts that the US had pursued, 
the ROC government still pinned its hopes on the US. All of the challenges, public 
declarations, and sharp inquiries during closed-door meetings during the 1970s were 
meant to force the US to show its resolve to defend Taiwan. 
 Indeed, Taiwan used the contacts with Louis to pressure the US rather than to 
establish a new military partnership. This overture thus had no significant impact on 
US-ROC relations. The nuclear weapons program served a similar purpose. Given the 
difficulty of obtaining the fuel necessary to produce a plutonium bomb, it was difficult 
for Taiwan to commence production of a nuclear weapon without being detected. The 
plan of CKS and CCK was to acquire the capability to produce the bomb. Taipei could 
use this capability as a warning to the US not to abandon Taiwan. Taiwan hoped to 
slow the pace of US-PRC normalization, or at least to make sure that it was well 




Internally, CCK faced tremendous pressure. Nixon’s policy undermined morale 
in Taiwanese society. For years, the Nationalist regime had claimed that it would return 
to China, so the fact that the Nationalists could no longer hope to fulfill this promise 
greatly affected the support for the KMT regime. The rise of the PRC’s international 
status and the ROC’s withdrawal from the UN bolstered the Taiwan independence 
movement. CCK for his part relied heavily on the alliance to stabilize Taiwanese 
society. 
The US, however, needed to demonstrate its commitment to the US-ROC alliance 
constantly because its rapprochement with the PRC signaled otherwise. The US could 
not take an active role in strengthening the US-ROC treaty since this would damage 
relations with Beijing. The US government, especially Kissinger, knew well the 
political risk of a demoralized Taiwan. The conservative politicians, who were usually 
faithful allies of the ROC, would create a tense relationship between the White House 
and Congress. The American public would blame the administration for abandoning an 
ally. The US allies in Asia, especially Japan, would be very concerned. Obviously, 
Taiwan was not satisfied with repeated claims by the US that its defense commitment 
remained unchanged. In addition to verbal commitments, the US granted security 
benefits such as arms transfers and high level visits and meetings. During 1950s and 
1960s, such exchanges were part of normal interactions between military allies. When 
the dispute with Washington became acute, though, these gestures became valuable 
signs to Taiwan. It was the goal of the US government to avoid sending a confusing or 
worrisome signal during its interactions with Taiwan. The US continued to invest 




to limit misperceptions by Taipei, strengthened its confidence in the alliance, and kept 
it from abandoning the alliance out of disappointment.  
To be sure, the strategy of delay sends mixed signals to allies. The internal tension 
among them still exists, while there is hope that a dispute may be resolved in the future. 
It is a difficult task to maintain a workable balance. If the security benefit is insufficient 
to induce the dissatisfied ally to table the dispute, the alliance is still likely to dissolve. 
In the case of the US-Taiwan alliance, the cost of abrogation was very high. Taiwan 
was not about to leave the alliance without being absolutely sure about US’s attitude. 
The relatively limited capability of Taiwan was also a reason that the US needed to 
provide security benefits. With the cancellation of the U−2 missions, Taiwan had a very 
limited contribution to make to the alliance. As the strategic value of the alliance 
decreased, the US abandonment became more likely, at least from Taipei’s perspective. 
It therefore became necessary for the US to signal that Taiwan was still valuable to 
Washington.  
The strategy of delay was effective. The US successfully avoided any substantive 
solution to the dispute within the US-Taiwan alliance. It kept Taiwan from seeking 
other options but maintained the alliance until the last moment. The US boosted the 
confidence of Taiwan while pursuing its own strategic interests. The tension in their 
relationship did not cause a split like the one that ended the Sino-Soviet alliance, nor 
did the allies anticipate the dissolution of their pact before the Carter administration 
initiated the normalization process. The US made effective assurances through action, 
not words. Taiwan also contributed to sustaining the relationship with self-restraint and 




nor did it seek alliances with Japan or the Soviets. When the US coerced Taiwan to halt 
its suspected nuclear weapons program, Taiwan fully cooperated with the US’s harsh 
demands. Taiwan was willing to show a good deal of self-restraint because it believed 
that these cooperative gestures would keep the US as a faithful ally in the future.  
The strategy of delay is an alternative in intra-alliance bargaining in situations in 
which no other solutions seem viable and the cost of leaving the alliance is prohibitively 
high. The successful use of this strategy suggests that alliance management is in fact 
very flexible. Unlike disputes between rivals, disputes between allies can be put off to 
a later time if both sides can credibly communicate their allegiance to the alliance. The 
dissatisfied ally is likely to challenge the alliance relationship from time to time, and 
alliance cohesion may appear strained, but such developments do not mean that the 
alliance is falling. The turbulence, on the contrary, is intended to make clear the 
challenger’s position, that is, to serve as a reminder that the dispute still exists. The 
disputes in the Sino-Soviet alliance, however, were different. Neither the Soviets nor 
the PRC delivered side benefits as a sign of commitment. On the contrary, the Soviets 
withdrew all the security benefits they had provided as punishment for Beijing’s 
disobedience. This act made Beijing nervous, so that it decided to develop nuclear 
weapons without Soviet help. Had the US used similar punishment regarding Taiwan, 
it would have strengthened Taipei’s determination to produce nuclear weapons.  
The US-ROC alliance ended with the US’s abrogation in 1979. In 1977, the US 
evaluated the impacts of normalization on Taiwan and concluded that CCK would be 
able to stabilize Taiwanese society, and that Taiwan would be able to deter Beijing’s 




proceeded to begin normalization negotiations with the PRC. The security relationship 
between the US and Taiwan was sustained after 1979 by the Taiwan Relations Act. 
This ambiguous security partnership provided a de facto defense commitment, the 
reliability of which was tested in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The US managed 
the alliance relationship to serve its major interests. The strategy of delay kept the 
alliance together after the Nixon era. Taiwan, though resentful at the US’s betrayal, 
chose to remain US’s faithful security partner. The dispute between Taiwan and the US 
that began in 1969 never received a definitive resolution, but neither of the allies ever 




Chapter 7 Conclusion  
The preceding chapters explore the question of alliance renegotiation and how 
alliance members sustain their relationship by renegotiating their security obligations 
when the alliance no longer serves its purpose. Successful renegotiation leads to 
alliance treaty revision, while failure increases the risk of alliance breakdown. I present 
a theory of intra-alliance bargaining to explain the give-and-take of negotiation. I test 
relevant hypotheses regarding treaty revision with quantitative statistical models, and 
then present three case studies. 
I identify four structural factors that facilitate the establishment of a credible 
commitment and recognition of updated security interests. I find that a public request 
incurs audience cost on members and encourages them to change the existing alliance 
relationship. Alliance-specific assets increase stakes in the alliance relationship and 
help members to communicate their security needs credibly. The formation of external 
alliances delivers information regarding updated security interests. These two variables 
increase the likelihood of treaty revision. Alliance institutionalization does not, 
however, impact the decision to revise a treaty. 
The findings in chapter 3 correspond to the case studies in the following chapters. 
The evolution of the Anglo-Japanese and Sino-Soviet alliances shows that a sustainable 
alliance relationship requires the investment of observable assets. In the former case, 
Japan and Britain were able to observe the importance of Far East territorial possessions 
to their partners. Each was assured of the other’s commitment to the alliance in the 
future. The Sino-Soviet relationship, on the contrary, lacked the kind of incentives that 




to rebuild the relationship because it no longer counted on Soviet support. The 
foundation of these two states’ bilateral cooperation was in fact weak.  
Chapter 6 examines the US-Taiwan alliance in order to demonstrate how allies 
maintain the status quo despite differences. The use of the strategy of delay requires a 
qualitative examination since changes in such alliance relationships are lacking. The 
chapter shows that the US was able to table its dispute with Taipei by granting 
additional security benefits when it was developing relations with the PRC. Taipei 
repeatedly asked the US to demonstrate its commitment and quarreled with the US over 
several issues, but the latter managed to sustain the alliance by granting security 
benefits. 
Table 7.1 lists the attributes of the three cases using variables in a quantitative 
analysis. I add coding information for the Anglo-Japanese alliance. These attributes are 
not completely in line with the hypotheses, but a closer look at the cases shows the 
theoretical mechanism to be present. The renegotiations regarding the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance were conducted through secret diplomatic channels. Other great powers 
learned about the renegotiation, but the public was not aware of it. By contrast, the 
Soviets expressed their intention to rebuild Sino-Soviet relations through official media 
channels after Khrushchev stepped down, and although the Soviet leaders were not 
under public pressure to improve Sino-Soviet relations, their gesture attracted Mao’s 
interest, and he decided to probe the Soviets’ intention. The renegotiation did not 
proceed as both sides had hoped, but the public request did push both countries toward 
the negotiation table.  
Table 7.1: Case variation 




(success) (failure) (delay) 
Public request    
Military installation    
Military/political organization    
Military integration    
Contact among militaries    
External alliance    
 
The Anglo-Japanese alliance regulated no military installation. The alliance-
specific assets were the fixed investment that Britain and Japan had made in the Far 
East. Although they did not own these possessions jointly, the fate of their territories 
was tightly connected. Their collective assets could only be secured if each partner’s 
territories were protected. Meanwhile, the heavy investment in these territories signaled 
the importance of the alliance to both members.  The Sino-Soviet alliance, by contrast, 
had neither the military installations nor the coherent interests in territorial possessions 
that Britain and Japan did. In addition, the Soviets refused to endorse Beijing’s 
territorial ambitions concerning Taiwan. The alliance cooperation was based on 
assistance that could easily be withdrawn.  
The Anglo-Japanese alliance established solid cooperation between the respective 
militaries. These institutions were effective during the Russo-Japanese War and the 
First World War, as they facilitated joint military operation and intelligence sharing, 
but the role of the military was minimal when the allies negotiated revisions. To a 
certain extent, military cooperation provided transparent information for decision 
makers, allowing them to assess the tactical advantage of securing territorial 
possessions. The Sino-Soviet alliance, on the other hand, had institutionalized contacts. 




External alliances affected both the Anglo-Japanese alliance and Sino-Soviet 
alliances. The formation of an external alliance was a warning that the existing alliance 
had become obsolete. The realignment in the Far East after the Russo-Japanese War 
was the important reference point for Britain and Japan to adjust their relationship. In 
the Sino-Soviet relationship, the Soviet-Mongolian alliance was a result rather than a 
cause of the Sino-Soviet split, for the relationship had already foundered before the 
Soviet Union allied with Mongolia. 
The variables in Table 7.1 have a limited impact in the third case, for the US 
consistently avoided bargaining with Taiwan. The US military installation on the island 
provided a source of credible commitment. As the US withdrew most of its combat 
units stationed in Taiwan, the latter quickly became concerned. Alliance institutions 
did not mediate this concern, so the US thus had constantly reassured to Taiwan by 
means of substantive benefits.  
Future Prospects 
The findings presented in this dissertation explicate the dynamic of intra-alliance 
bargaining and the motivations behind treaty revision. The aim here is to make 
generalizable claims, but the mechanism is reduced to a model of two actors in order 
to maintain the simplicity of the theory, while the empirical test is constrained by 
available data and observable interactions between allies. The scope of empirical 
research is limited to alliances in the period after World War II. This is, of course, not 
the full picture of alliance renegotiation; there is considerably more to be explored in 




First, the theory elaborated in this dissertation is mainly monadic. I focus on 
structural factors that influence decision-making for both actors. However, the interest 
calculation may vary between the challenger and the partner. Some variables may only 
affect the bargaining behavior of specific members based on their perception of the 
utility of the alliance. The important variables may vary from case to case because 
members have different security priorities in different security environments, and the 
challenger and the partner each respond to structural variables differently based on their 
distinct roles. Causal mechanism may vary between these two actors. To uncover this 
dynamic, one needs to differentiate clearly the challenger and the partner in a dyad. 
The records of renegotiation requests in my data help in this regard, since they identify 
which party initiates the request to change the alliance relationship. 
In general, detailed case studies are better suited to detecting the effect of 
structural variables on each member (challenger or partner). The problem is that a 
number of cases may be required in order to generate a universal argument. A directed-
dyad design can test a relevant theory under a large-N scenario. The same structural 
variables proposed in chapter 2 may have different meanings for each actor, and their 
effects may be more informative. For example, such a design can differentiate the effect 
of external alliance formation by the challenger state from the effect caused by the 
partner state. The challenger has the incentive to form an alliance to replace the existing 
one, whereas an external alliance established by the partner is less likely to have to 
same purpose. Moreover, the direct-dyad design can better capture such individual 




more eager to change the alliance, whereas people in the partner state may prevent its 
government from making concessions. 
The time frame of this dissertation focuses on alliances from 1945 to 2001. There 
are reasons to believe that alliances during the Cold War were systematically different 
from those prior to World War II, beginning with the fact that almost all of them were 
linked either to the US or to the Soviets. Given the large capability and nuclear umbrella 
of these superpowers, states were less likely to change their alignment policies, which 
suggests that earlier alliances may have been subject to change more frequently. 
Alliance institution design after World War II aimed at maintaining a stable and long-
term security partnership. The case of the Anglo-Japanese alliance shows that the 
security interests of the allies changed quickly during the pre-war period. Inter-state 
wars were more frequent and states altered their alignments every few years, so intra-
alliance bargaining may have been more common. It is thus important to extend this 
research to earlier alliances and investigate whether bargaining behavior differed 
significantly in the post-war period.  
Extending the timeframe to the period after September 11 provides clues about 
renegotiation in recent years. ATOP is going to release its 4.0 version, adding the record 
of alliances after 2010. With two more decades of data, it will be possible to investigate 
renegotiation behavior during the period of US primacy for comparison with the pre-
war and Cold War periods. 
Also, as discussed in the end of chapter 3, the renegotiation of multilateral 
alliances is another important dynamic not covered in this dissertation. Multilateral 




bargaining among multiple actors, the mechanism of treaty revision is likely to differ 
from the one described here. Existing research on multilateral negotiation over trade, 
immigration, or environment issues may help to clarify the nature of multilateral 
security treaty revision.  
Implications 
The theory presented in this research can be applied to the field of governance and 
organizational behavior. To be sure, a security alliance involves core interests of states 
and therefore receives much more attention from its members. But the dynamics of 
intra-alliance bargaining are more likely to occur in the context of other issues, such as 
trade, international health, or production of extractive resources. Once the original 
treaty or regulation becomes obsolete, states revisit their relationship and renegotiate a 
new arrangement. In the case of these non-security issues, members have greater 
incentive to capitalize on the existing cooperation because breaking cooperation does 
not directly violate the survival of a state. States expect more bluffing and 
misrepresentation of information regarding the ability to fulfill obligations.  
For example, states may underreport their ability to contain an epidemic in order 
to seek external financial help, or energy exporting countries may exaggerate their 
energy reserves to earn a more lucrative contract. Cooperation may break down when 
states find it hard to coordinate their divergent positions. The theory proposed in this 
dissertation explains why some cooperation is more likely to endure in some situations 
than in others. Members assess the costs that are already invested in the relationship 
and the future benefit of cooperation. They also try to learn the interests of other 




bargaining and their differences are more likely to be resolved through a negotiated 
agreement.  
More importantly, my theory explains why some cooperation simply stagnates. 
States that refuse to change the status quo, usually because of a combination of heavy 
costs and little return in the future, are likely to leave the problem unresolved and to 
wait until future gains become more promising. Cooperation does not terminate the 
alliance, which continues to function, albeit inefficiently, until members decide to 
revisit the problems with it.  
Alliance renegotiation is a management effort that helps to reveal how alliance 
members resolve their differences and sustain their security cooperation. The empirical 
evidence shows that allies will try to salvage their relationship, sometimes with 
multiple attempts, before they believe abrogation is inevitable. This means that alliance 
termination is a complex process. It takes a long time before an ally makes the final 
decision. The reasons behind termination do not rest on the disputes between allies but 
on their inability to reach a new arrangement.  
On the other hand, bargaining between allies creates friction. It may appear that 
allies are struggling with their relationship and that alliance cohesion is low. This 
research shows that quarrels between allies do not necessarily suggest a broken 
relationship. One needs to observe the scope of substantive cooperation to understand 
how allies value the alliance tie. The cohesion between allies may be still solid if they 
both have an incentive to maintain the alliance. A challenge launched by a third party 
only strengthens alliance ties and encourages allies to resolve or temporarily suspend 




There is more to explore in alliance renegotiation behavior. The answers presented 
here are not complete, but this dissertation provides original data that facilitates the 
analysis of renegotiation. It also points out useful directions for future research. The 





Chapter 8 Appendix 
Data Construction 
The data in my analysis was constructed by taking the following steps: First, I 
used EUGENE to create a dyadic dataset with a timeframe from 1945 to 2001. I include 
the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) score of the Correlates of War 
(COW), distance between capitals, alliance ID from Alliance Treaty Obligation and 
Provisions (ATOP), coup data from Powell and Thyne (2011), and the polity scores 
from PolityIV. This data contains all of the state dyads, and I then merge it with Leeds 
and Savun’s (2007) data (hereafter L&S), keeping only bilateral alliance dyads and 
limiting the timeframe from 1945 to 2001. This creates a bilateral alliance-dyad dataset. 
I merge this data with the 2012 Cross-National Time Series archive (CNTS), ATOP 
alliance-level data, Militarized Interstate Disputes 4.0 (MID 4.0) data, and the variables 
I code. 
Next, I omit treaties related to the Czechoslovakia split because those 
renegotiations did not address any disagreement between members but were meant to 
continue the same alliance relationship with the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
separately. Members knew that the security benefits were unlikely to change and that 
renegotiation would succeed with no objections. I also omit treaties that were fulfilled 
and those that ended because a member state lost independence, for the reason that 
these alliances concluded under circumstances that were beyond the control of the allies. 
They could not renegotiate to prevent the termination of the alliances.  
The ATOP data records the “phases” of an alliance. A new phase means that treaty 




ATOP phases after omitting the treaties related to the Czechoslovakia split. All 
revisions are coded as new treaties in ATOP.  
I convert the data to fit the purpose of this research. The dataset based on L&S has 
overlapping observations. For instance, Hungary and East Germany established a treaty 
in 1967 and renegotiated a new one in 1977, but these are separate treaties in the ATOP 
dataset. In a bilateral alliance dyad dataset, there will be two overlapping observations 
in 1977. This applies to almost all renegotiated treaties. These overlaps were suitable 
for the study of L&S because the intent of that study is to understand the termination 
of each treaty. My purpose, however, is to find out how two states sustain their alliance 
relationship. Overlapping observations increase the number of “non-events” in the 
statistical analysis. I therefore omit these overlaps, keeping observations that record the 
final years of the earlier treaties (those that are renegotiated). This creates dyad-year 
data. Finally, I create a unique dyad ID for each pair of countries. The final data 
contains 2255 observations, 105 dyads, and 125 bilateral treaty alliances. 
Self-coded Variables 
I code three binary variables. The coding is based on such secondary resources as 
books, journal articles, and news reports in Keesings World News Archive and the 
LexisNexis databases. First, a variable indicates whether allies make a renegotiation 
request. Such a request is defined as any member asking to discuss, reexamine, or revise 
the security cooperation covered by a treaty to which it is a signatory. If a negotiation 
continued for several years, these years receive a coding of 1. I find a total of 85 
renegotiation requests. One is a secret request, the details of which were not revealed 




negotiations were concluded or represent continuous negotiations that did not reveal 
new information. There is thus a total of 70 requests made in public.  
Second, a diplomatic dispute is coded 1 if any member expresses discontent to its 
ally over matters unrelated to alliances. Such discontent includes statements expressing 
anger or frustration, disagreement over the ally’s foreign policy, and concerns about 
the ally’s domestic politics. Only political disputes between states count for the analysis. 
Disputes on trade, human rights, immigrants, extradition, NGO activities, or minor 
border violations such as those involving fishing do not count as diplomatic disputes in 
this variable. Some disputes may continue for more than a year, and these years also 
receive the same coding. 
Third, a variable for dispute over alliance indicates whether any member shows 
concerns about the enforcement of an alliance treaty. These disputes are directly related 
to security cooperation under the treaty and are different from renegotiation requests, 
in which the former complains about the alliance relationship and the latter shows intent 
to resolve the problems.  
It is important to note that the two above-mentioned variables describe different 
types of disputes; otherwise there would be a multicollinearity problem when including 
both variables in the same model. The correlation between the two variables is 0.1, and 
a t-test shows that they are statistically different. 
I find 105 diplomatic disputes among allies and 58 disputes over an alliance. In 
addition, I examine territorial disputes between allies, but find only nine cases. Also, 
the dataset by Huth & Allee (2002) yields only three cases of territorial disputes 




statistical analysis. This small number of disputes confirms Huth & Allee’s finding that 
alliances help members to resolve their territorial disputes and prevent future disputes. 
Table 8.1 shows the variables in my statistical analysis and their definitions. Table 8.2 
shows descriptive statistics. 
Table 8.1: Variables and Definition 
Variable 
Name 
Definition Source Coding Rule 
Dependent Variables 




An alliance is revised if allies 
decide to change treaty 
provisions or establish a 
protocol or memorandum to do 
so. An alliance is considered 
abrogated if any member decides 
to withdraw from the treaty or 
refuses to renew the treaty 
automatically. The variable is 
coded 0 if no changes take place.  
reneg_request Any member 
requests a 
renegotiation 
Author  One or both members want to 
discuss the security cooperation 
covered by their treaty.  
Independent Variables 
pubquest Public request  Author recode 
from 
reneg_reuqest 
Any member makes a public 





BASE in ATOP 
Members agree to station troops 






A treaty specifies the creation of 
a formal organization, the 
primary purpose of which 
involves military or political 
coordination.  
alform External alliance Leeds & Savun 
(2007) 
Any member signs a new 
alliance treaty with a third 
party.140  
                                                 
140 I cross-examine allies that form external alliances to check whether alliance members collaborated 
with the specified threat mentioned in their original treaty. Germany, Japan, and Italy are the most 
common specified threat, as countries feared their renewed aggression immediately after WWII. Such a 
threat was virtually absent during the Cold War owing to the division of Germany and occupation of 
Japan. Most of the Soviet bloc countries signed alliance treaties with East Germany; similarly, many 
Eastern bloc alliances specified West Germany as an adversary. Beginning in 1969, however, Willy 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik reconciled the tension between the FRG and GDR. Some Eastern bloc countries 






Definition Source Coding Rule 
exechang Executive turnover CNTS The control of executive power 
changes hands for any member. 
demdiff Regime similarity PolityIV The absolute difference of polity 
scores between members. 
powp Power parity  CINC The ratio of the capability of the 
weaker power to the stronger 
one.  
powp2 Power parity squared CINC Power parity squared. 
conwtind Treaty has measures  




A treaty mandates how to handle 
disputes regarding the 
interpretation of the provisions. 
fataltar Any member 
targeted by a fatal 
MID 
MID 4.0 Any member is a target in an 
MID initiated by a third party 
during the year, and the MID 
fatality level is ≥1. 
fatalcha Any member 
initiates  a fatal MID 
MID 4.0 Any member initiates an MID 
against a third party during the 
year, and the MID fatality level 
is ≥1. 
d_diplom Diplomatic dispute Author  Allies have a diplomatic dispute. 
d_alliance Dispute on alliance Author  Allies have a dispute over the 
implementation of their treaty.  
distance Distance COW Numeric distance between two 
capitals. 
t Time since last 
revision 
 Time variance control. 
t2 T squared   Time variance control. 
t3 T cubed   Time variance control. 
dpowp Change of power 
parity from last year 
COW Change of power parity from the 
previous year. 
coupatt Coup attempt Powell and 
Thyne 2011 
There is a coup attempt in any 
member state. 
demdiff_beg Regime types 
distance since 
formation 
PolityIV Regime type difference 
compared to the first year in the 
dyad. 
majb Both major power COW Both members are major powers 
in the international system. 
                                                 
the specified threat with the consent of West Germany, this did not amount to colluding with the enemy. 
In addition, almost all European countries signed the Helsinki Pact, a non-aggression alliance, in 1975. 
Given the nature of the Pact, signing it did not suggest that the Eastern bloc countries wanted to abandon 
their allies. After examining all cases, I do not find allies colluding with an external threat that was 






Definition Source Coding Rule 
maj1 One major power COW One member is a major power in 
the international system. 
wartime Wartime alliance ATOP An alliance is formed during a 
war. 
nonagg Non-aggression pact ATOP The treaty has a nonaggression 
obligation. 
peaceyrs Time since last 
renegotiation request 
 Time variance control. 
peayrsq Peaceyrs squared  Time variance control. 
peayrcub Peaceyrs cubed  Time variance control. 
 
Table 8.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 mean sd min max count 
renegml 0.066 0.322 0 2 2255 
pubquest 0.031 0.173 0 1 2255 
basein 0.197 0.398 0 1 2144 
milpur 0.173 0.379 0 1 2255 
alform 0.366 0.482 0 1 2255 
exechang 0.264 0.441 0 1 2255 
demdiff 5.482 6.472 0 20 2218 
powp 0.233 0.257 0 0.998 2255 
powp2 0.120 0.197 0 0.996 2255 
conwtind 0.165 0.371 0 1 2255 
fataltar 0.121 0.326 0 1 2255 
fatalcha 0.134 0.341 0 1 2255 
d_diplom 0.047 0.211 0 1 2255 
d_alliance 0.026 0.158 0 1 2255 
distance 2524.875 2420.752 79 8570 2255 
t 12.106 9.804 0 48 2255 
t2 242.614 355.394 0 2304 2255 
t3 6203.345 13348.850 0 110592 2255 
reneg_request 0.038 0.190 0 1 2255 
dpowp 0.002 0.035 -0.280 0.378 2148 
coupatt 0.045 0.207 0 1 2255 
demdiff_beg 2.407 3.668 0 18 2196 
majb 0.036 0.187 0 1 2255 
maj1 0.567 0.496 0 1 2255 
wartime 0.051 0.220 0 1 2255 
nonagg 0.394 0.489 0 1 2255 
peaceyrs 11.891 10.390 0 45 2255 
peayrsq 249.299 376.327 0 2025 2255 





Predicting Renegotiation Requests 
The main part of the paper uses the predicted probability of renegotiation requests 
to control for selection bias. I include this variable because it is unclear how changes 
in domestic and international politics increase the likelihood of members to initiate 
intra-alliance bargaining. There may be some requests missing because the bargaining 
remains secret or when such a process is unable to be verified in the resources on which 
I rely. Predicting renegotiation requests helps to determine which dyads are more likely 
to engage in bargaining in a given year. The logit model is reported in Table 8.3. I 
include variables that capture the changes in domestic and international politics, such 
as power balance, coup d’état, regime type change, and major power status. I then use 
the “predict” command in Stata to calculate the predicted probability for each dyad-
year observation.  
Table 8.3: Logit on Renegotiation Request 
 (1) 
full 
Change in power parity  5.576* 
  from last year (2.81) 
Dispute on alliance 1.780** 
 (0.49) 
Coup attempt 1.927** 
 (0.37) 
Regime type distance  0.064+ 
  since formation (0.04) 
Both major powers 1.530** 
 (0.42) 
One major power 0.173 
 (0.40) 
Wartime alliance 1.471** 
 (0.32) 
Nonaggression  -0.462+ 







Coefficient reported. Robust standard error in the parenthesis. Cubic splines are 
omitted. Models are clustered by dyads.  
Level of significance  
+ 0.10  
* 0.05  
** 0.01 
Two Types of Status Quo 
Figure 1.1 suggests that two types of status quo (SQ) may occur at the end of 
renegotiation. The first is an SQ in which no member wants to change the alliance. The 
second is an SQ in which members enter into intra-alliance bargaining and reach an 
agreement not to change their alliance. This latter SQ occurs when members table their 
disagreement by ignoring the challenger’s demands, or when both members agree on 
certain arrangements without changing the treaty content. Using the renegotiation 
request variable, I confirm eight cases in which an ally requested reexamination of the 
alliance, but the members decided to maintain the status quo. When I drop these cases 
and run the models represented in table 3.2, the result remains the same. A closer look 
at these cases shows that allies tend to delay bargaining when they are reluctant to make 
changes. For instance, Togo requested that France revisit their defense treaty in 1973, 
but was not able to convince the latter country, which saw no interests in increasing its 
defense commitment to Togo, to address the issue. Yet Togo did not negate the alliance, 
since it needed French military support; no other state was willing to provide the 
security guarantee France promised.  In other cases, negotiations were interrupted by 
domestic politics. For example, the US and Liberia decided to renegotiate their 
consultation pact by adding non-aggression and mutual defense provisions in 1978, but 
the negotiations were suspended when Samuel Doe launched a coup d’état and 





An event history model is an alternative model specification for this paper. A 
hazard model estimates the likelihood that an alliance treaty will survive, explaining 
how soon treaty revision will happen after the independent variables are present. It is 
not clear, however, whether the intervening variables specified in my theory actually 
accelerate the bargaining process and produce an outcome in a shorter (or longer) 
period of time. This is the main reason I use multinomial logit in chapter 3. The 
presence of these variables facilitates communication between members rather than 
pushing them to decide the fate of their treaty in a short period of time. The only 
exception is in the case of public requests, as the domestic audience could pressure the 
government to make its decision as quickly as possible.  
Nevertheless, a duration model can examine whether revision is easier to achieve. 
A Cox proportional hazard model estimates the hazard rate of treaty revision; the results 
are reported in models 1 and 2 of table 8.3. A Cox model only estimates the 
survivability of an event, in this case, treaty revision. Yet my theory suggests that 
competing choices exist beyond maintaining the status quo, abrogating, and revising 
the treaty. The competing risk model developed by Fine & Gray (1999) can address 
this dynamic in a duration model. The basic assumptions of this model are similar to 
those of a Cox model; it is a semi-parametric model with no baseline assumption 
regarding the hazard ratio of an event. The main difference is that the competing risk 
model estimates proportional sub-hazards of each outcome when estimating the 
incidence of interest. In other words, the coefficients take other outcomes into account. 




of the coefficients is the same in these models. A positive coefficient means an 
increasing cumulative probability of revision, while a negative coefficient suggests that 
revision is likely to occur in a longer period of time. Models 2 and 4 replace the public 
request variable with the probability of a renegotiation request in order to control for 
selection effect. 
Table 8.4: Duration models on revision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






Public request 1.123**  0.729  
 (0.40)  (0.45)  
Predicted probability of   6.463**  1.597 
  renegotiation request  (2.04)  (3.06) 
Alliance-specific assets 1.228** 1.105* 1.257** 1.079* 
 (0.43) (0.47) (0.43) (0.47) 
Military/political organization  0.523 0.565 0.097 0.111 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.45) (0.50) 
External alliance 1.904** 2.074** 2.103** 2.232** 
   (0.31) (0.34) (0.32) (0.35) 
Lag executive turnover  0.537+ 0.212 0.555+ 0.212 
 (0.29) (0.31) (0.29) (0.32) 
Power parity  2.605+ 3.592* 1.775 2.119 
 (1.39) (1.66) (1.49) (1.45) 
Power parity squared -1.105 -2.140 0.072 -0.198 
 (1.45) (1.78) (1.50) (1.44) 
Treaty has measures  -1.816** -2.104** -2.399** -2.503** 
  to resolve disputes (0.62) (0.72) (0.74) (0.86) 
Any member targeted by  -0.487 -0.497 -0.469 -0.613 
  a fatal MID (0.54) (0.55) (0.54) (0.60) 
Any member initiates  1.141** 0.875* 1.230** 1.020* 
  a fatal MID (0.39) (0.43) (0.40) (0.42) 
Diplomatic dispute -44.591 -43.512** -17.145** -23.128** 
 (.) (0.48) (0.73) (0.70) 
Dispute on alliance -43.549 -43.768** -16.837** -22.676** 
 (.) (0.80) (0.64) (0.66) 
Observations 1981 1930 1981 1930 
Coefficient reported. Robust standard error in the parenthesis. Models are clustered 
by ATOP ID. 
Level of significance  
+ 0.10 





The result in Table 8.4 shows that the public request variable reaches a 
conventional level of significance, but loses statistical significance in a competing risk 
model. The military installation variable received good support; the coefficient is 
positive and p<.05 across all models. Alliance institutions do not have an effect on 
revision, a result that is consistent with the previous analysis. The external alliance 
variable, like the models in chapter 3, has performed well across all models, with p< .01. 
In sum, the independent variables received support in the alternative models. H1, H2, 
and H4a are supported. There is still no evidence for H3. The overall result is consistent 
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